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Essays in Behavioral Household Finance 
Abstract  
     This dissertation investigates some of the factors affecting modern household finance 
decisions in the United States using natural experimental variation and administrative data.  
     In Chapter 1 I estimate the effects of financial education on retirement savings decisions. 
Between 2007 and 2008 the U.S. Army implemented a mandatory 8 hour Personal Financial 
Management Course (PFMC) for new soldiers. Staggered implementation across locations and 
time provides quasi-experimental variation in whether an individual received the training.  I find 
that the course has large and lasting effects on individual retirement savings in the Thrift 
Savings Plan, a tax-deferred account similar to a 401(k). The course doubles savings, has 
significant effects throughout the distribution of savings and the effects persist out to two 
years. The mechanism for the effects is likely a combination of both human capital and 
behavioral assistance.  
     In Chapter 2 I estimate the effects of financial education on a variety of other economic 
behaviors. I rely on the same natural experiment as in Chapter 1 but I use individually matched 
credit data to estimate the effects of financial education on credit scores, credit balances for 
several types of accounts, monthly payments and adverse legal actions. In some areas I find 
that the PFMC has beneficial effects, reducing cumulative account balances (especially for 
automobile accounts) and aggregate monthly payments. In other areas, including credit scores, 
iv 
 
the probability of being active in the credit market and the number of adverse legal actions, the 
PFMC has no statistically significant effects on financial behavior. 
     In Chapter 3 I estimate the effects of stress on financial decision-making. I use the natural 
variation in the casualty rates faced by individuals deploying overseas an exogenous source of 
stress and I measure the effects of this stress on individuals' participation in the Savings Deposit 
Program (SDP), a risk-free 10% annual percentage rate savings account. I find a modest and 
statistically significant negative relationship between the stress of casualties and SDP 
participation on the order of 5%. Some failures of the randomization test and the confounding 
effects of overall activity levels and rural locations cannot be eliminated as a source of the 
observed savings differences and as a result, these results should be considered suggestive 
evidence of the adverse effects of stress on financial decision-making.  
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Estimating the Effects of Financial Education on Retirement Savings: Evidence from the U.S. 
Army’s Personal Financial Management Course 
May 2012 
ABSTRACT 
This paper exploits a natural experiment that occurred in the U.S. Army to estimate the effects 
of financial education on retirement savings. Between 2007 and 2008 the Army implemented a 
mandatory 8 hour Personal Financial Management Course for new soldiers. The staggered 
implementation across locations and time provides quasi-experimental variation in whether an 
individual received the training. Using event studies and regression discontinuity techniques, I 
find that the course had large and lasting effects on individual retirement savings in the Thrift 
Savings Plan, a tax-deferred account available to uniformed service members. The course 
doubles retirement savings, has positive and significant effects on saving levels throughout the 
distribution and has persistent effects through at least twenty four months. The mechanism for 
the effects is likely a combination of both human capital and behavioral assistance and these 
effects cannot be separated in this data. Nonetheless, this research marks one of the first 
experimental findings of large and lasting effects from financial education. These findings 
provide initial evidence to economists and policy makers on the causal effects of such 
education and motivate additional research on the improvement of the treatment effects and 
the identification of the mechanisms for behavioral change.  
William Skimmyhorn 
Harvard Kennedy School 
79 JFK Street 
Cambridge, MA 02138 
bill_skimmyhorn@hksphd.harvard.edu 
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1.1. INTRODUCTION 
     Financial literacy is a popular topic among policy-makers, the media and even academics 
today. The most common discussion in the U.S. media typically involves summarizing academic 
research on the state of individual financial literacy, whether among high school students (New 
York Times, 2010), senior citizens (Reuters, 2012) or even the middle aged (New York Times, 
2012) as inadequate, then calling for more financial education and occasionally, more 
consumer protection. The presence of economic hardship in the U.S. since the 2007 economic 
downturn has only increased the calls for more education and assistance. In response, the 
Federal government has become more active in this area beginning with President Bush’s 
Financial Literacy Advisory Council in 2008 and President Obama’s 2009 financial literacy 
campaign administered jointly by the Treasury and Education Departments. Yet despite the 
popularity of the topic and the infrequently contested conclusion that more education is the 
answer, there exists little robust scientific evidence that financial literacy education improves 
individuals’ economic decisions. Recently, a small but grounded opposition, typified by Willis 
(2011), has emerged and questioned the efficacy of and advisability of additional formal 
education. The modern debate over financial education, especially in academic circles, has thus 
become less about the existence of financial illiteracy and more about whether financial 
education, especially publicly funded education, offers a cost-effective remedy. 
This paper exploits a natural experiment that occurred in the U.S. Army to estimate the effects 
of financial education on retirement savings. Between 2007 and 2008 the Army implemented a 
mandatory 8 hour Personal Financial Management Course for new soldiers. The staggered 
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implementation across locations and time provides quasi-experimental variation in whether an 
individual received the training. Using event studies and regression discontinuity techniques, I 
find that the course had large and lasting effects on individual retirement savings in the Thrift 
Savings Plan, a tax-deferred account available to uniformed service members. The course 
doubles retirement savings, has positive and significant effects on saving levels throughout the 
distribution and has persistent effects through at least twenty four months. The mechanism for 
the effects is likely a combination of both human capital and behavioral assistance and these 
effects cannot be separated in this data. Nonetheless, this research marks one of the first 
experimental findings of large and lasting effects from financial education. These findings 
provide initial evidence to economists and policy makers on the causal effects of such 
education and motivate additional research on the improvement of the treatment effects and 
the identification of the mechanisms for behavioral change.  
   For the purposes of this paper, financial management, financial literacy and financial 
education will be used interchangeably. In addition, the course that includes instruction on 
these topics will be referred to as both training (since it involves some repetitive clearly 
identifiable tasks such as balancing a budget) as well as education (since it involves designing 
solutions and approaches to new situations). In this regard, financial literacy is an area not 
easily categorized by the training/education taxonomy. 
   The paper proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 reviews the existing literature and summarizes the 
contributions of this work. Section 1.3 presents a theoretical model related to financial literacy 
and education. Section 1.4 describes the financial management course and program 
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implementation. Section 1.5 summarizes the variables and data used in the empirical analysis. 
Section 1.6 presents the empirical analysis and discusses the results. Section 1.7 conducts 
robustness checks. Section 1.8 discusses external validity. Section 1.9 summarizes the findings, 
presents brief policy recommendations and concludes. 
1.2. LITERATURE REVIEW & CONTRIBUTIONS 
     There exists a large and interesting body of research on financial literacy, but unfortunately 
this literature is largely non-experimental. As a result, there is little robust evidence of a causal 
relationship between financial education and financial knowledge or financial behavior. This 
section reviews the relevant existing literature and identifies the contributions of the current 
research. The extant literature can be broadly summarized by the following four statements: 
financial illiteracy is widespread in the U.S.; financial literacy affects financial behavior; the 
effects of financial literacy training on financial behavior are unknown; and there remains 
disagreement about the advisability of additional financial education efforts. The current 
research contributes to our understanding of the final two points through the use of 
experimental variation and observation of behavioral outcomes. 
     The first important theme in the financial education literature is that there is widespread 
financial illiteracy in the U.S. For a detailed review of this well-accepted and documented fact, 
see Lusardi and Mitchell (2007). As examples of this illiteracy, the Jump$tart Coalition for 
Personal Financial Literacy (2006) surveys high school and college students and finds poor 
performance (for example, 66% of 12th grade students failed the 2004 test) with little variation 
in students’ scores since then; Mandell (2008) documents annually high school students’ poor 
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performance on a financial literacy quiz over several years in the past decade; Lusardi and 
Mitchell (2006) document similar financial illiteracy among the elderly using the 2004 
Household & Retirement Survey; and a 2005 national survey by the National Council on 
Economic Education revealed an overall score of C for adults, F for high school students and 
additional gaps for women and minorities.1 In fact the existence of this illiteracy in the U.S. is 
accepted by those supporting more education (e.g., Lusardi and Mitchell 2007, 2008) and even 
those opposing it (e.g., Willis 2008, 2009), who argue among other things, that the levels of 
illiteracy may be too large for publicly funded programs to address. 
     The second theme of the financial literacy research is that financial illiteracy correlates with 
financial behavior. Again, see Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) for a review. Hilgert, Hogarth and 
Beverly (2003) find that financial knowledge correlates with financial behavior in four areas: 
cash flow management, credit management, saving and investment. As with the findings of 
widespread illiteracy described above, the link between illiteracy and poor decision-making is 
generally accepted. However, there remains little empirical evidence that decomposes poor 
financial behavior into elements of illiteracy related to knowledge, those related to other 
behavioral issues like self-control and patience and those related to emotions (Xiao et. al 2011 
and Hira 2009). In this sense, the imprecision of the definition of financial literacy may 
complicate evaluations of education and other policy measures as different programs may 
affect only some elements or differentially affect the elements of literacy. The link between 
literacy and behavior is thus correlational and multi-dimensional. To the extent that literacy is 
                                                            
1 Similar findings hold elsewhere in developed countries. . The 2005 report by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) entitled “Improving Financial Literacy” surveyed national programs 
worldwide and found that many countries have not undertaken nationally representative surveys. Among those 
that have, many consumers lack adequate financial backgrounds and overestimate their financial knowledge. 
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multi-dimensional, programs desiring immediate impact must address all elements, while those 
affecting only information related deficiencies might have limited effects or delayed effects, if 
age and experience eventually curb other behavioral tendencies. Conversely, programs might 
require complimentary policy interventions such as default options or regulatory approaches. 
     The next two themes of the financial education research both involve substantial 
disagreement and reveal unresolved issues. The third finding of the literature is that despite a 
great deal of research into the efficacy of financial education, the causal effects of education on 
financial behavior are still unknown. There are at least five reasons that existing research has 
failed to establish convincing causal estimates for the effects of financial education: the use of 
self-reported data; the use of knowledge measures as opposed to behavioral outcomes; the 
potential for improved behavior in one area to be offset by worsened behavior in another area; 
and most importantly, the lack of experimental design and evaluations. First, many studies have 
relied principally on self-reports for their evaluation of the effects of education (e.g., Lusardi 
2004, Lusardi and Mitchell 2006, 2007, Bell, Gorin & Hogarth 2008, 2009, and Bernheim and 
Maki 2003). But such self-reports are problematic for at least two reasons: individuals 
overestimate their knowledge (Agnew and Szykman, 2005) and self-reported measures have 
proven unreliable measures of financial behavior when compared to administrative data 
(Collins et. al. 2009).  
     The second challenge to causal inference is that even increases in financial knowledge do not 
necessarily translate into improved financial behavior. This follows directly from the 
correlational nature of the research linking low levels of knowledge and poor financial behavior; 
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low levels of knowledge might correlate with both poor cognitive and non-cognitive skills and 
so improving knowledge may not improve behavior. In a stark demonstration of this fact, 
Madrian and Shea (2001) find that while 100% of work-related retirement seminar participants 
report that they will save more after receiving information and education, only 14% actually do. 
Similarly, Choi et al (2011) find that educating individuals about foregone 401(k) matches for 
vested, penalty-free withdrawal-eligible workers over the age of 59.5 increases contributions by 
a statistically insignificant amount; in this case, individuals are literally leaving about $507 on 
average on the sidewalk. As a result, even programs that demonstrate advances in knowledge 
levels through tests of literacy or announced intentions cannot be assumed to improve actual 
financial behavior (Coussens 2006).2 Equally concerning are findings that financial education 
might improve behavior without affecting knowledge levels as measured on financial literacy 
exams (Mandell 2009). Thus while financial knowledge is important and may be a goal of some 
education, these first two facts demonstrate the importance of using behavioral outcomes as a 
better measure of the effectiveness of financial education. 
     The third challenge to causal inference is that findings linking financial education with a 
particular behavior may hide transfers within individual or family budgets and suggest positive 
behavioral impact when no net improvement in behavior occurred. For example, Bernheim and 
Garrett (2003) find that financial education in the workplace correlates with 401(k) 
accumulation but not overall wealth accumulation. One explanation is that employer seminars 
                                                            
2 In related work in a different setting, Carpena et al (2011) find that while financial literacy in India does not 
increase some elements of knowledge (numeracy) it does improve awareness of basic financial choices and 
attitudes toward financial decisions. They formulate financial literacy as multi-dimensional and argue that financial 
education should aim to improve awareness and attitudes and that more technical skills and knowledge may 
follow. 
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simply induce individuals to transfer savings into their 401(k) from other accounts, perhaps 
their IRA or another savings account. Without more knowledge about the fee structures, tax 
implications, rates of return and other instrument features, it is unclear if such transfers are net 
beneficial for individuals. In this regard, data on multiple portions of an individual or family’s 
balance sheet can improve welfare comparisons. 
     The fourth challenge is the lack of a consensus on the effects of financial literacy even within 
many non-experimental studies. Both the Jump$tart (2006) and Mandell (2008) results suggest 
that high school students’ financial knowledge levels do not improve even after completing 
financial education classes. Madrian and Shea (2001) and Choi et al (2011) similarly find little 
improvement in behavior even among those inclined to enroll in classes. Thus even in self-
selected groups financial education may be ineffective. But, there are a number of positive 
findings in this vein. Bell, Gorin & Hogarth (2008) provide a detailed list of the existing impact 
evaluations, which are generally positive for financial education.3 Additional non-experimental 
research suggesting a positive relationship between financial education and financial behavior 
exists for credit counseling (Staten 2006), retirement seminars (Lusardi 2004, Bernheim and 
Garrett 2003), optional high school programs (Boyce & Danes 2004), widespread financial 
literacy education (Lusardi and Mitchell 2007), state laws mandating financial literacy courses 
or curriculum (Bernheim, Garrett and Maki 2001) and in the military (Bell, Gorin and Hogarth 
2008, 20094). Taken together then, there remains substantial disagreement over the efficacy of 
                                                            
3 See Appendix A in their work. 
 
4 The findings of Bell, Gorin & Hogarth are directly related to the work here. They evaluated the effect of the 
Army’s pilot Personal Financial Management Course in 2003 with follow up surveys in 2008 and 2009. They found 
that financial education positively affected self-reports of a variety of financial behaviors including budgeting, 
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financial education. And while the most recent reviews and meta analyses of the non-
experimental evidence (Collins et al 2009, Gale and Levine 2011) suggest that financial literacy 
can improve financial behavior, these reviews do not appear to fully discount non-experimental 
research and its limitations for causal inference. 
      The fifth and final challenge to any causal claims related to financial education is the general 
lack of experimental research and the potential for endogenous selection to explain the 
findings in nearly all of the existing research. Typical selection concerns in this area are that 
individuals that attend retirement seminars or enroll in economics or personal finance courses 
differ from those who do not along many dimensions and thus differences in outcomes cannot 
be attributed to the “treatment effect” of the education / intervention / counseling. Meier and 
Sprenger (2007) document one example of this problem and find that future oriented 
individuals are most likely to attend financial education workshops, upward biasing typically 
measured treatment effects. In fact, nearly all of the previously mentioned work uses non-
experimental variation to identify the effects of financial literacy, either by relying on education 
among self-selected individuals (e.g., Lusardi 2004, Lusardi and Mitchell 2006, 2007), failing to 
account for differences in the financial conditions faced by control and treatment groups over 
time (e.g., Bernheim, Garrett and Maki 2001) 5  or the use of non-experimental 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
savings, credit card balance payment and bill payment. However, as the authors acknowledge, their research faced 
several limitations including the lack of an experimental control group (they compared new soldiers in training to 
other more experienced soldiers on Fort Bliss) and reliance on self-reports of behavior rather than actual 
behaviors. In addition, their research employed a survey with a very low response rate. The response rate for the 
first follow-up survey was 4.9% (199/4,061) and these 199 individuals comprised the sample for their results. As 
the current research hopes to show, military administrative data and the subsequent nationwide implementation 
of this program makes experimental use of this program feasible. 
 
5 See Cole and Shastry (2010) for a more robust analysis of the same state laws as Bernheim, Garrett and Maki 
2001 that includes additional controls for state time trends. After including these controls, they find no effects of 
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control/comparison groups (e.g., Bell, Gorin and Hogarth 2008, 2009)6. For a host of reasons 
these studies should be viewed cautiously and causal conclusions seem inappropriate. There 
are a few studies in the research on financial literacy that employ experimental procedures and 
random variation, but none provide sufficient evidence for strong conclusions on the causal 
effects of financial literacy on financial decisions or large scale policy decisions. Duflo & Saez 
(2003, 2004) use a randomized intervention to measure the effects of information and social 
interactions on a job benefits fair attendance and subsequent tax deferred account (TDA) 
savings among employees. Their research provides important evidence on the role of 
information and social networks in financial savings behavior in a work context, but it does 
explicitly analyze the effectiveness of the benefits seminar/financial education. Gartner and 
Todd (2005) evaluate a randomized credit education plan for first year college students but find 
no statistically significant differences between the control and treatment groups. Servon and 
Kaestner (2008) used random variation in a financial literacy training and technology assistance 
program and found virtually no differences between the control and treatment groups, though 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
state mandates for financial literacy courses on asset accumulation, suggesting that states implemented 
mandatory education during times of high growth. They also find that laws requiring more math courses (not 
financial education courses) improve financial behavior for women but not men. 
 
6 The findings of Bell, Gorin & Hogarth are directly related to the work here. They evaluated the effect of the 
Army’s pilot Personal Financial Management Course in 2003 with follow up surveys in 2008 and 2009. They found 
that financial education positively affected self-reports of a variety of financial behaviors including budgeting, 
savings, credit card balance payment and bill payment. However, as the authors acknowledge, their research faced 
several limitations including the lack of an experimental control group (they compared new soldiers in training to 
other more experienced soldiers on Fort Bliss) and reliance on self-reports of behavior rather than actual 
behaviors. In addition, their research employed a survey with a very low response rate. The response rate for the 
first follow-up survey was 4.9% (199/4,061) and these 199 individuals comprised the sample for their results. As 
the current research hopes to show, military administrative data and the subsequent nationwide implementation 
of this program makes experimental use of this program feasible. 
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they suspect that the program was implemented imperfectly.7 Carlin and Robinson (2011) 
evaluate financial education among teenagers at a financial education theme park and find 
mixed effects of financial education, but their treatment assignment was not randomized 
Finally, in a small randomized field experiment (n=144), Collins (2010) evaluates a financial 
education program for low and moderate income families and finds improvements in self-
reported knowledge and behaviors, increased savings and small improvements in credit scores 
twelve months later. 
     The fourth and final theme of the financial literacy research is the remaining disagreement 
over whether additional education is the most appropriate policy choice. This disagreement 
flows naturally from the previous debate over the causal estimates related to financial 
education. As expected, those who believe that education works favor more education (Lusardi 
and Mitchell 2007, Hogarth 2006, Martin 2007). Others, optimistic about the promise of 
financial education despite what they view as little empirical evidence of positive effects, 
support more targeted and timely education with more emphasis on experimental design and 
evaluation (Hathaway and Khatiwada 2008, Collins and O’Rourke 2010). Finally, some who do 
not believe the research demonstrates positive effects support other policy options (Willis 
2008, 2009, 2011).  
Summary of Contributions 
   As this review highlights, there is no definitive experimental research on the causal effects of 
financial education on important financial behaviors. In this regard the literature is incomplete 
                                                            
7 They also acknowledge that their research also suffers from imperfect randomization and non-random attrition. 
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and inadequately supports policy development. The current research aims to fill this void and 
assess the causal effects of financial education using quasi-experimental methods. The 
contributions and benefits of this research are five-fold. First, the research employs a natural 
experiment involving implementation of a mandatory Personal Financial Management Course. 
Variation in course implementation across time and location provides for random assignment 
of the training, conditional on an individual’s job and time of entry into the military. Second, the 
research uses a robust set of behavioral outcomes, thereby avoiding concerns with surveys, 
declarations of intentions and the link between test knowledge and behavior. These outcomes 
are described in more detail in Section 1.5 but include important retirement savings decisions. 
Third, these outcomes, coupled with those in Chapter 2, reflect financial behavior in a variety of 
domains and on different portions of individual and family balance sheets, permitting tests of 
balance shifting within household budgets. Fourth, the research is able to assess the effects of 
financial education on a large population of independent interest and one whose demographic 
diversity and education levels are representative of a population of interest for financial literacy 
programs. Finally, the use of military administrative data affords the use of a rich set of control 
variables, informed by the existing research on the roles of age, experience, gender, race, 
socioeconomic status, family characteristics, education, ability, income and other individual and 
household characteristics. Such data minimizes the risks from omitted variable bias and also 
permits the testing of heterogeneous treatment effects. 
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1.3. PERSONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT COURSE PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION 
   The U.S. Army initiated its first personal financial management course (PFMC) at Fort Bliss 
(near El Paso, Texas) in January 2003. The program was developed and administered by the 
non-profit organization Army Emergency Relief (AER) 8 and executed through a contract with 
San Diego City College (SDCC).9 In 2006, after approximately 4 years of field testing and course 
refinement the Army contracted with SDCC to develop and implement a personal financial 
management course as part of Advanced Individual Training (AIT) at 12 additional locations. 
Enlisted soldiers attend AIT immediately following basic training and they learn the skills 
associated with their specific job (e.g., infantryman, vehicle mechanic, cook, radio operator, 
etc…) during this course.10 Courses range in duration from 1-12 months and are typically only 
offered at one location. In Figure 1.1, I present a map detailing the base locations, course 
implementation dates and percentages of Army enlistees trained at each location in my sample. 
The training implementation dates were selected by Army Emergency Relief Headquarters 
based on discussions with AIT Commanders at each location. As such, these decisions were 
made without notifying or soliciting information from individual soldiers or the U.S. Army’s 
Recruiting Command. This process created implementation dates orthogonal to any individual’s 
enlistment decision or timing. Conditional on an individual’s job (which determines their AIT 
location) and their entry month, the assignment of financial literacy training is as good as 
                                                            
8 For more information on Army Emergency Relief and their mission to assist soldiers and their dependents, see 
www.aerhq.org. 
 
9 SDCC was awarded a sole source contract to deliver training at the pilot location (Fort Bliss) from 2002-2006.  
 
10 Some Army jobs require an intermediate school between Basic Training and AIT (e.g., language school for 
translators). I omit these atypical jobs from this analysis. See Appendix 1 for more details. 
15 
 
randomly assigned. I discuss identification further in Section VI but as this section illustrates, 
the program appears to be a valid natural experiment. 
 
 
Figure 1.1. U.S. Army Advanced Individual Training locations, Personal Financial Management 
Course implementation dates and approximate training percentages. 
Author complied data using Department of Defense and Army Emergency Relief data. Percentages are calculated 
for the periods 2006-2009 for individuals who started AIT within 12 months of program implementation at each 
location excluding those who started in AIT the month before, of and after program implementation, those for 
whom the treatment category is not determinable based on AIT start dates. The resulting sample size is n=85,879. 
See Appendix 1 for more information on the sample construction. 
 
   The financial management course is ambitious in its scope given its limited duration. The 8 
hour course covers a number of important financial subjects with a focus on financial issues and 
decisions that young soldiers face. In Figure 1.2, I present the course topics and the time 
devoted to each topic during the period under study.  
   Whether an 8 hour course is sufficient in length to meet the program’s objectives is unclear. 
On the one hand, this course length seems far too short given the amount of financial 
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knowledge required to succeed in today’s economy. Topics such as compound interest, the 
time value of money and portfolio diversification can only be covered briefly given the time 
limitations above. Similarly, teaching soldiers about how to make better choices in important 
decisions like buying a car, purchasing insurance and managing a credit card is also a difficult 
task in such a short time. Even the most straightforward tasks such as teaching a soldier how to 
read their pay statement and ensure that they are receiving all of their entitlements is difficult 
given the myriad of military pay processes, benefits and programs.  
Lesson Subject Topics Covered Duration (Hours) 
1 Financial Ethics Legal, Moral & Ethical aspects of personal financial management 0.75 
2 Leave & Earnings (Pay) Statement 
Understanding Pay Statements, Military Benefits and 
Insurance coverage, Educational benefits, Payroll 
deductions and Resolving pay problems 
0.25 
3 Developing a Spending Plan 
Net worth, Debt to income ratios, Discretionary vs. Non-
discretionary spending 1.0 
4 The Essentials of Credit 
Types of Credit, Factors affecting credit worthiness, Proper 
credit usage, Warning signs of too much debt, Credit and 
debt assistance, Consumer Protection laws, Credit Reports 
1.0 
5 Consumer Awareness 
Psychology of Advertising, Types of deception, Identity 
theft recognition and correction, Description of common 
scams 
1.0 
6 Car Buying 
Personal budget review, Contract tips, Determining fair 
price, Negotiation tips, Effects of car ownership in the 
military, Financing, Consumer protection 
1.5 
7 Meeting your Insurance Needs 
Renters and Homeowners, Automobile, Life, Health, 
Insurance frauds and scams, Protection tips 0.5 
8 Thrift Savings Plan and Investing 
Retirement Concepts, the Thrift Savings Plan, Military 
retirement programs, Compound interest, Investment 
vehicles 
2.0 
  Total 8.0
Figure 1.2. Personal Financial Management Course Summary 
Author compiled data based on discussions with AER Headquarters Staff, the SDCC Staff, from the Personal 
Financial Management Course classroom slides provided by AER and from the contracting agency’s website.11 
 
                                                            
11 SDCC Program website accessed August 3, 2011 at: http://www.mysdcc.sdccd.edu/Locations/Army_PFM.htm. 
Since 2011 the program includes an additional 0.4 hour lecture on the mission and operations of AER. These topics 
were covered informally prior to 2011. 
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   On the other hand, training time is often the commodity in shortest supply for military schools 
and more time for financial topics may not be justified. Additional time might be wasted if 
diminishing returns take hold and if soldiers become bored with too much information on any 
one subject or the course overall. Schreiner, Clancy & Sheradden (2002) found that an 
education program on individual development accounts increased savings for low-income 
households, but the effects trailed off after 8-10 hours. The purpose of this discussion is not to 
settle the debate over the optimal length of a financial education course but to highlight that a 
course of relatively short duration may have limited effects on behaviors involving complex 
combinations of analytic skills, life experience and self-control.12 
 
1.4. SUMMARY OF VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES 
Demographic and Control Variable Data 
   The data used in this analysis comes from Department of Defense (DOD) administrative 
records and 2000 U.S. Census bureau data. This section briefly outlines the data sources and 
variables that will be used. The DOD data covers all U.S. Army enlisted members entering 
service from May 2006 through June 2009. 13  The military administrative data merges 
information from personnel, operational and financial databases to generate a rich set of 
individual demographic data (age, gender, race, military job, education, Armed Forces 
Qualification Test (AFQT) percentiles, zip code at entry, etc...), visibility of individual movements 
                                                            
12 I am currently working to gather and tabulate the costs of the program. While this research finds large benefits 
in terms of retirement savings outcomes, these benefits need to be balanced against the costs of the program, 
 
13 The data was obtained through the cooperation of the Office of Economic & Manpower Analysis (OEMA) at the 
United States Military Academy, West Point, NY.  All personally identifying information has been removed from 
each observation so as to protect the anonymity of Army members.  
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(assignment locations, deployment dates and durations) and financial conditions (income and 
pay deductions).14 To control for socioeconomic status (SES), I use administrative data on an 
individual’s home of record and matched median household income data from the 2000 U.S. 
Census Summary File 3.  
The Treatment Variable: Personal Financial Management Course (PFMC) 
   This research investigates the effects of participation in the Army’s mandatory Personal 
Financial Management Course (PFMC) course as part of AIT. I use an indicator variable 
(ܲܨܯܥ௜ = 1) to denote individuals who completed the training. Since individual-level data on 
program participation is unavailable I impute an individual’s treatment status using 
administrative data on individual entry dates, basic training durations, unit assignments and 
location assignments. I further confine my sample to individuals attending AIT at a given 
location within 12 months of program implementation at that location. To avoid contamination 
I omit individuals starting AIT in the month preceding, month of and month following program 
implementation and individuals whose AIT start date and AIT duration produce overlap with the 
program implementation at the location.15 After treatment imputation and sample construction 
I have a sample of n=85,879 individuals for my year 1 analyses. For analyses in year 2 I have a 
sample of n=64,017 due to censoring of some individuals in the administrative data. In 
subsequent analyses I interact treatment with other individual characteristics to explore 
heterogeneous treatment effects (e.g., AFQT levels, experience, enlistment durations, 
education levels, SES and marital status). 
                                                            
 
14 I employ indicator variables for individuals missing any demographic data and assigned values of zero for the 
missing data. 
15 For more information on sample selection and imputation of the treatment variable, see Appendix 1. 
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Outcomes of Interest 
     This research focuses on the PFMC effects on individual retirement savings. I observe a 
number of important economic outcomes using administrative and this section briefly identifies 
the principle outcomes of interest for this research.16  
     First I investigate the effects of education on individual retirement savings decisions. The 
Thrift Saving Plan (TSP) is a tax-advantaged retirement program available to Federal employees 
administered by the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board (FRTIB).17 As with a 401(k) 
plan, members can select from several fund options and contribute via payroll deduction or 
individual transactions.18 While military members do not receive matching funds for their 
contributions, the contributions are tax-deferred or tax-exempt depending on the nature of the 
contribution.19 Since I only observe individual contributions that occur via payroll deduction, my 
picture of an individual or household’s retirement savings is incomplete. To the extent that 
                                                            
 
16 In an earlier version of this paper I tested the effects of the Personal Financial Management Course on a number 
of other outcomes. Military behavioral and performance outcomes included probabilities of punitive (disciplinary) 
discharges from service, probabilities of being barred or certified as eligible for reenlistment, the probability of 
promotion to Sergeant in the first term (a sign of good performance) and the mean time to promotion to Sergeant 
for those who are promoted. Other financial outcomes were the probability of military indebtedness and 
Montgomery GI Bill contributions. However, in all cases, the censoring among the treatment group in this data 
made inference using the empirical strategy below impossible and so these analyses were removed.  
 
17 For additional information on the TSP see 
https://www.tsp.gov/planparticipation/about/purposeAndHistory.shtml. Accessed on July 12, 2011. 
 
18 This sample contains only contributions made by payroll deduction. There may be unobserved additional 
deductions for individuals through personal deposits. 
 
19 Contributions made while deployed (when income is typically tax exempt) are also tax exempt. Normal 
contributions are tax-deferred as with most 401(k)s. In addition, tax-exempt contributions do not count towards 
the individual annual Federal elective deferral limit of $16,500. For more details, see “Your TSP Account: A Guide 
for Beneficiary Participants” available at: https://www.tsp.gov/PDF/formspubs/tspbk33.pdf.  Accessed on July 12, 
2011. For more details on the tax implications of different types of TSP contributions, see: 
https://www.tsp.gov/planparticipation/eligibility/contributionLimits.shtml. Accessed on August 10, 2011. 
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individuals can also make TSP contributions directly at a Finance Office, the estimates here will 
underestimate the effects of the program on total TSP contribution levels. In addition, I do not 
view other sources of individual or household retirement savings and thus my estimates only 
apply to the TSP. However, the TSP is an important part of many military members’ retirement 
plans and nearly 31% of Active Duty Army members participate in the TSP.20 In evaluating the 
PFMC’s effects on TSP decisions, I will measure the probability of participation, the 
unconditional mean contribution level and the effects of the treatment on the TSP contribution 
distribution.21 Retirement savings outcomes are of interest as the behavioral economics 
literature and the financial literacy literature are both filled with documentations of under 
saving. In addition, retirement planning in general and the TSP in particular comprise the most 
significant portion of the PFMC curriculum (2.0 hours of 8.0 total hours) and thus TSP account 
balances provide an important measure of the effectiveness of the program. Because TSP data 
is available for all military members, this first analysis performed for the full sample of 
n=87,859. To better understand the distribution of TSP Contributions in the first year, in Figure 
1.3 I present a histogram of the Average Monthly TSP Contribution Data for the positive values 
of the distribution. 
                                                            
20 The aggregate Army participation statistics are based on the May 2011 FRTIB Monthly Meeting Minutes and 
Published statistics, available at: http://www.frtib.gov/pdf/minutes/2011May.pdf. Accessed on July 12, 2011. 
 
21 While these total TSP outcomes can be decomposed into the tax-deferred and tax-exempt contributions, the 
military pay system automatically categorizes individual contributions based on their deployment and tax status. 
This makes individual decisions and knowledge of these features largely irrelevant. Once enrolled, individuals do 
not need to monitor the tax status of their contributions.  
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Figure 1.3. Distribution of Positive Average Monthly TSP Contributions in Year 1 
Author compiled data using DOD data for 2006-2009. Contributions are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles 
prior to the construction of averages. n=85,879. 
 
As the histogram reveals, the vast majority (80.14%) of individuals in the full sample do not 
participate in the TSP during their first year. Among those who do contribute, the average 
monthly contribution level is approximately $130. Given this information, I will evaluate the 
effects of the PFMC throughout the average monthly TSP contribution distribution. 
          Assessing the impact of financial literacy education should involve observing outcomes at 
multiple horizons. However, given the relatively recent program implementation (most training 
started in 2007 and 2008) the focus of this paper is to assess financial outcomes in the short 
term. Future work may revisit this experiment and assess medium or longer term outcomes. 
Contribution=$0 
n=68,820 (80.14%) 
Mean=$129.49 
Std Dev=87.67 
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1.5. THEORETICAL MODEL & HYPOTHESES 
   The empirical estimation in this paper is reduced form in nature and relies on the exogenous 
variation in financial education completion for identification. While structural estimation of the 
effects of financial literacy education on financial behaviors is a worthwhile objective, this 
paper does not develop or test a structural model of financial decision-making. Instead, the 
basic model employed here assumes that financial decisions and behaviors are the result of 
individual characteristics and an individual’s financial education. In this sense I present reduced 
form estimates of the effects of financial education. After reviewing the existing literature and 
the program objectives for the PFMC, I present the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Participation in Personal Financial Management Course (PFMC) will increase 
retirement savings in the Thrift Saving Plan (TSP). 
 
In addition to testing the primary hypotheses above, I will attempt to identify the margins on 
which the PFMC appears to operate. To do so I examine the unconditional averages, 
probabilities of positive participation and the effects throughout the outcome distribution. 
The starting point for my empirical estimation framework is presented below: 
                 																														 ௜ܻ௝௧ = ߙ + ߚ ∙ ܲܨܯܥ௜ + ߛ ∙ ௜ܺ௝௧ + ߮௝ + ߜ௧ + ߝ௜௝௧																																		(1) 
In this model ௜ܻ௝௧ is a measurement of financial decision-making for individual ݅ who attended 
AIT at location ݆ at in time period ݐ. ܲܨܯܥ௜  is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the individual 
completed the Army’s Personal Financial Management Course during AIT in time period ݐ and 
equals 0 if they did not. ௜ܺ௝௧ is a vector of individual characteristics including a quadratic in age, 
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a quadratic in experience, marital status, number of children, an indicator for joining the 
military in the summer, education, gender, race, military income, a fixed effect for an 
individual’s job, their AFQT score, an individual’s enlistment term length, the number of months 
that the individual was deployed during the year and an individual’s socioeconomic status. ߮௝ 
represents fixed effects for training location ݆. ߜ௧ is a vector of time fixed effects in period ݐ. 
Finally, ߝ௜௝௧ is an individual error term assumed to be orthogonal to all other variables. To 
address potential heteroskedasticity, standard errors are clustered at the training location-
month level to capture any unobserved correlation among individuals that experienced the 
treatment together. In this model ߚ is the coefficient of primary interest and its predicted 
effects on financial decisions will be based on the nature of the decisions (i.e., save for 
retirement) and the Personal Financial Management Course curriculum.  
     To improve my estimation I will conduct utilize a regression discontinuity design and 
estimate the effects of the Personal Financial Management Course at the month of 
implementation.  To perform this analysis I consolidate individuals across locations into 
common event month cohorts based on their commencement of AIT relative to the month of 
Personal Financial Management Course program implementation at their location. In Figure 1.4 
I present the details of my event month cohort construction. 
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Figure 1.4. Event Month Cohort Construction for Regression Discontinuity (RD) Design 
Author compiled data based on AER program implementation dates and Army administrative data on individual 
military jobs and entry dates. 
 
          Using these cohorts enables improved estimation techniques that can account for other 
unobserved factors influencing the patterns in financial behavior among cohorts. Specifically, 
the RD framework enables more precise estimation of the treatment effect by controlling for 
smooth functions of the running variable (here, the event month cohort) on both sides of the 
discontinuity. Employing this method my estimating equations take the following general form: 
																																	 ௜ܻ௝௧ = ߙ + ߚ ∙ ݂(ܴ௜) + ߛ ∙ ௜ܺ௝௧ + ߮௝ + ߜ௧ + ߝ௜௝௧																														(2) 
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where ݂(ܴ௜) reflects the smooth function of the running variable that can take on varying 
forms (linear, cubic, etc...). In the simplest case, and the one I primarily use in this analysis, the 
linear RD analysis takes the following form: 
																										 ௜ܻ௝௧ = ߙ + ߚ ∙ ܦ௜ + ߣ · ܴ௜ + ߤ · ܦܴ௜ + ߛ ∙ ௜ܺ௝௧ + ߮௝ + ߜ௧ + ߝ௜௝௧																														(3) 
Here ܴ௜ reflects the running variable (event month) and takes on values [-12,12] excluding [-
1,0,1]. ܦ௜  is an indicator that takes on a value of 1 for ܴ௜ ≥ 0 and a value of 0 otherwise. Thus 
ܦ௜  corresponds exactly to the treatment variable (ܲܨܯܥ௜) in the baseline model. Finally, ܦܴ௜ 
reflects the interaction of these two variables and permits the slope of the smooth function to 
vary on both sides of the discontinuity. I am interested in the estimate ߚ, which reflects the 
effects of the Personal Financial Management Course on the selected outcome at the month of 
program implementation. 
 
1.6. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION 
     The primary purpose of this research is to estimate the effects of an 8-hour mandatory 
course of instruction in financial management on financial decision-making. Identification of 
these causal effects of Personal Financial Management Course on the outcomes of interest 
requires exogenous assignment of the course to individuals. I discuss and test this assumption 
below. For now I assume that this program was exogenously assigned to individuals conditional 
on their job and entry date into the Army.  
1.6.A. Summary Statistics    
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     I begin the empirical analysis with a summary of my data. The research design relies on 
variation in financial literacy education during AIT. In Table 1, I present the summary statistics 
for the data by full sample, control and treatment groups. This analysis restricts its attention to 
the financial outcomes in an individual’s first year of service, beginning with their time in AIT 
and ending 12 months later. 
   As Table 1.1 reveals, sample individuals are young, predominantly male and unmarried and 
almost universally educated at or above the high school level. While this sample is not 
nationally representative of the U.S. population or even the U.S. population with mean age 21, 
it is nonetheless large and demographically diverse.  In addition, given the size of the U.S. Army 
and its importance to U.S. policymakers, the sample is of independent interest as a segment of 
the population for whom the government takes an active role in developing and protecting as 
part of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF).  
     As Panel A. reveals, the outcomes of interest (Probability of Participation and Average 
Monthly TSP Contributions) in the treatment group are substantially larger than those in the 
control group. While the outcome variables are statistically different from one another and 
consistent with the hypotheses above22, simple t-tests are inadequate for causal inference 
given the other demographic differences evident in Panel B that could explain the outcome 
patterns and their omission of other time-varying effects. As a result I will proceed with event studies 
and multivariate regression estimates below.  
                                                            
22 The coefficients, (standard errors), t-statistics and p-values for the Probability of Participation and Average 
Monthly TSP Contribution (Column 3 – Column 2) are: 20.68 (0.4360) t=-47.43 p=0.0000 and 16.92 (0.27) t=-63.59 
p=0.0000 respectively. 
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Table 1.1. Summary Statistics by Treatment Condition for Administrative Data Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Full Sample No Training Received Training 
  N=85,879 N=42,467 N=43,412 
Variable Mean (Std Dev) Mean (Std Dev) Mean (Std Dev) 
Panel A. Outcomes 
Prob (TSP Participation), % 19.86 (39.90) 11.31 (31.67) 28.23 (45.01) 
Avg Monthly TSP Savings, $ 25.68 (64.71) 15.23 (52.15) 35.91 (73.56) 
Panel B. Individual Characteristics 
Age, years 21.67 (4.11) 21.59 (4.10) 21.74 (4.12) 
Experience, years 3.80 (4.02) 3.72 (3.99) 3.88 (4.06) 
Female, % 0.16 (0.37) 0.15 (0.36) 0.16 (0.37) 
Married, % 0.19 (0.40) 0.19 (0.39) 0.20 (0.40) 
Number of dependents 0.87 (1.20) 0.89 (1.21) 0.85 (1.19) 
Less than high school education, % 0.01 (0.08) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.11) 
High school graduate, % 0.90 (0.30) 0.91 (0.28) 0.88 (0.32) 
Some college, % 0.06 (0.25) 0.06 (0.24) 0.07 (0.25) 
College graduate or more, % 0.03 (0.16) 0.02 (0.15) 0.03 (0.17) 
Minority, % 0.32 (0.47) 0.31 (0.46) 0.33 (0.47) 
AFQT Score, percentile 55.91 (19.56) 55.77 (19.42) 56.04 (19.71) 
Summer accession, % 0.37 (0.48) 0.38 (0.48) 0.36 (0.48) 
Enlistment term, years 3.81 (0.99) 3.84 (0.98) 3.78 (1.00) 
AIT length, months 3.16 (1.12) 3.16 (1.13) 3.15 (1.10) 
Monthly basic pay, $ 1,553 (307) 1,608 (329) 1,498 (273) 
Median HH Income in Zip Code, $ 41,922 (14,060) 41,968 (14,079) 41,334 (13,806) 
Months deployed during the year 1.16 (2.31) 1.04 (2.16) 1.28 (2.45) 
Source: Department of Defense and Census Bureau Data. Notes: All data is for U.S. Army enlisted soldiers 
who enlisted between June 2006 and August 2009 and completed AIT at a given location within the 12 
month period before and after program implementation, excluding the month before, of and after 
program implementation (n=85,879). All outcome variables (Panel A) in this table are measured for the 
period beginning during Advanced Individual Training and ending 12 months later. Average monthly TSP 
savings is the monthly average of the amount of the total TSP savings (tax-deferred and tax-exempt) 
during the 12 month period. Experience is an approximate measure of labor force experience at the time 
of enlistment and is calculated using age minus education minus 6 years. For this calculation, education is 
imputed using the following values: 10 years for high school dropouts; 11 years for GED holders; 12 years 
for high school graduates; 13 years for some college; 14 years for associate’s degrees; 16 years for college 
graduates; 18 years for post graduate. The less than high school graduate variable includes dropouts and 
GED holders. The some college variable includes those with an Associate’s Degree. The greater than or 
equal to college graduate variable includes those with Bachelor’s, Master’s and Doctorate degrees. The 
married variable represents formal and common law marriages for anyone who has ever been married. 
Average monthly pay represents the average monthly base pay during the 12 month period. The 
enlistment term variable represents the length of service that an individual has agreed to serve upon 
joining the military or reenlisting and typically varies from 2-6 years and the enlistment term during the 
12 month observation period is used. The median household income data reflects the median household 
income from the 2000 U.S. Census (Sample File 3) for those individuals not missing zip code data. Sample 
sizes apply to all variables with the following exceptions: the education data is restricted to those not 
missing their education level (n=85,307); the monthly pay data is restricted to the individuals for whom 
this data was not missing (n=84,447); the median household income is restricted to the individuals for 
whom this data was not missing (n=41,995). 
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1.6.B. Event Studies 
     I turn now to more powerful visual evidence of the differences in the control and treatment 
groups. In Figures 1.5 and 1.6, I present non-parametric event studies of the Probability of TSP 
Participation and the Average Monthly Level of TSP Contributions for individuals in their first 
year in the Army. I note initially that these are not traditional event studies that follow an 
individual over time. Instead, I use the cohorts described above that pool individuals from 12 
different AIT locations based on the month that they started AIT relative to the month when 
the financial management course was implemented at their AIT location. For example, an 
Infantry soldier who started AIT at Fort Benning, GA in July 2007 (3 months prior to program 
implementation at Fort Benning) and an Engineer soldier who started AIT at Fort Leonard 
Wood, MO in February 2008 (3 months prior to program implementation at Fort Leonard 
Wood) are both assigned to the event study cohort of -3. Once pooled into month cohorts, I 
average the outcomes of interest (probability of participation and the average monthly TSP 
contribution during the first year in the Army) for each cohort.  
     Figure 1.5 presents a striking result: there is a large, discontinuous increase in the probability 
of TSP participation at the time of program implementation across locations. The increase in 
participation appears to be roughly 15 percentage points, approximately doubling the 
probability of participation. Formal tests of this difference are completed below. 
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Figure 1.5. Event Study for the Probability of TSP Participation in Year 1 
Author compiled data using DOD and AER data for 2006-2009. The participation indicator takes on a value of one 
for any participation in year 1 and zero for no participation. The values at each x-axis value depict the average 
probability of participation for all individuals in each cohort. The dashed lines depict an unweighted linear fit of 
these values to visually demonstrate the patterns in participation among cohorts. n=85,879. 
 
     The second event study, displaying the average TSP contribution levels, depicts a similar 
pattern. Figure 1.6 reveals that the average monthly level of contribution also nearly doubles at 
the time of program implementation from around $20 to $40. Once again this is a large effect. 
To address concerns over other possible explanations for the patterns depicted in these event 
studies, I complete balance of covariate tests and additional event studies using predicted 
outcomes that omit treatment in Section 1.7.  
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Figure 1.6. Event Study for the Average Monthly TSP Contributions in Year 1 
Author compiled data using DOD and AER data for 2006-2009. The monthly average is the mean of all 
contributions made by month in Year 1. The values at each x-axis value depict the average of the monthly average 
contributions for all individuals in each cohort. The dashed lines depict an unweighted linear fit of these values to 
visually demonstrate the patterns in participation among cohorts. n=85,879. 
 
     These event studies support a few conclusions. First, there appear to be large discontinuities 
in the outcomes of interest at the time of program implementation (month 0). Second, the 
patterns in the data appear to support the use of a linear functional form in controlling for the 
cohort participation patterns over time. Finally, while the event studies provide suggestive 
evidence that the PFMC increased TSP participation, these methods do not account for the 
differences in cohort demographics or time periods that might also explain the increases in 
participation. As a result I now complete several analyses utilizing multivariate regression in a 
regression discontinuity framework. 
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1.6.C. Regression Estimates 
     My use of regression discontinuity techniques relies on the sharp nature of the policy change 
to estimate the average treatment effects among all students in the PFMC relative to their 
counterparts in the control group cohorts. Given the mandatory nature of the course, all 
individuals who started AIT at a location after the program was implemented can be assumed 
to have completed the course and therefore treatment assignment is sharp.23 Concerns over 
fuzzy treatment assignment generated by individuals who started AIT at a location before the 
program was implemented but finished AIT after the program was implemented motivated my 
omission of such individuals from the sample.24 In addition, the event studies suggest that the 
constructed sample does not suffer from contamination. As a result, this data set and the 
program design support the use of RD analysis. I am interested in the mean outcome 
(Probability of TSP Participation or Average Monthly TSP Contribution for individuals in their 
first year of service) on either side of the implementation threshold and the difference between 
these means. In this case the implementation threshold varies by AIT location but pooling the 
individuals at different locations into monthly cohorts relative to the program implementation 
enables unbiased estimation of the differences in the mean outcomes at the discontinuity. In 
Table 1.2 I present the main effect estimates of the PFMC on average monthly TSP 
contributions in Years 1 and 2. 
 
                                                            
23 While the course is mandatory, it is neither a graded event nor a requirement for completing AIT. As a result, 
some individuals may have missed the course or paid little attention. I discuss violations of the attendance 
assumption below. Briefly, imperfect attendance or inattention would attenuate my results. 
 
24 See Appendix 1.2 for more details on the sample construction. 
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Table 1.2. RD Estimates of PFMC Effects on Average Monthly TSP Contributions, by Year 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Outcome Y Pr(Y>$0) Pr(Y≥$100) Pr(Y≥$200) Pr(Y≥$300) Pr(Y≥$400) 
Panel A: Year 1 Outcomes 
PFMC Effect 16.38 *** 16.15 *** 6.47 *** 1.85 ** 0.50 * 0.07   
Std Err (3.75)   (2.70)   (1.69)   (0.79)   (0.26)   (0.08)   
Control Mean 15.23   11.31   6.59   3.04   0.41   0.04   
Adj R2 0.1200   0.1244   0.1000   0.0718   0.0096   0.0015   
N 85,879   85,879   85,879   85,879   85,879   85,879   
Clusters 266   266   266   266   266   266   
Panel B: Year 2 Outcomes 
PFMC Effect 33.91 *** 29.57 *** 12.91 *** 6.90 ** 2.22   0.56   
Std Err (7.01)   (4.31)   (2.97)   (2.81)   (1.89)   (0.72)   
Control Mean 21.91   16.82   9.05   4.03   0.84   0.12   
Adj R2 0.1073   0.1115   0.0854   0.0681   0.0120   0.0007   
N 54,933   54,933   54,933   54,933   54,933   54,933   
Clusters 186   186   186   186   186   186   
Source: Department of Defense and Census Bureau Data. Notes: All data is for U.S. Army enlisted soldiers who 
enlisted between June 2006 and August 2009 and completed AIT at a given location within the 12 month 
period before and after program implementation, excluding the month before, after and of program 
implementation. The coefficient reported is for the discontinuity at the month of implementation. All 
regressions include the following covariates: a quadratic in age, quadratic in experience, indicators for female, 
married, minority, number of dependents and a summer entry, indicators for education levels less than or 
equal to high school, some college, and greater than or equal to college (high school graduate is the omitted 
category), AFQT score, enlistment term, average monthly base pay, median household income in the 
individual's zip code of record, AIT length, number of months deployed in the year and fixed effects for an 
individuals' job, military branch, AIT location, and AIT start month. Indicator variables capture individuals 
missing pay or zip code income data and these individuals are assigned values of zero for these variables. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, clustered at the AIT location-month level, are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
      
     Table 1.2 provides significant evidence of both the distributional and longitudinal effects of 
the PFMC on TSP contributions.25 On average, the PFMC more than doubles the average 
monthly TSP contribution relative to the control group mean in both years ($16.42 vs. $15.23 in 
year 1 and $33.88 vs. $21.91in year 2) and both results are highly significant (p<0.001). On the 
extensive margin, the program increases contributions significantly, by 16.17% in year 1 relative 
to a control group mean of 11.31% and by 29.68% in year 2 relative to a control group mean of 
16.82%, with both effects highly statistically significant (p<0.001). Since treatment may induce 
                                                            
25 For complete regression results for the Average Monthly TSP Contributions in year 1, see Table 2.13. 
33 
 
changes in the composition of TSP contributors, I evaluate the intensive margin effects by 
looking at the program’s effects on the probability of contributions greater than or equal to the 
levels specified in columns (3) through (6) of Table 1.2. As the results show, the program has 
positive effects throughout the distribution. In year 1, the course has a large and statistically 
significant effect on the probability of contribution levels up to and including $300 per month 
(99th percentile is $282). Similarly, in year 2, the course has a large and statistically significant 
effect on the probability of contribution levels up to and including $200 per month (95th 
percentile is $206). Taken together, the results are large, pervasive and persistent. 
1.6.D. Distributional Effects 
     In addition to the regression table I present graphs of the distributional and longitudinal 
effects of the PFMC. In Figure 1.7, I present the effects of the PFMC on the distribution of TSP 
savings for the 0-95th percentiles. The graph reveals that the PFMC effects are large and 
statistically significant throughout the distribution. Thus the PFMC affects those unlikely to save 
for retirement on their own in year 1 and increases among those who were likely to save. 
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Figure 1.7. PFMC Effects on the Distribution of Average Monthly TSP Contributions in Year 1 
Author compiled data using DOD and AER data for 2006-2009. The x-axis values reflect the 0-95th percentiles of the 
distribution for the Average Monthly TSP Contributions ($0-$195).The RD estimates and 95% confidence intervals 
reflect a series of regressions on indicator variables for Average Monthly TSP Contribution levels that correspond 
to the x-axis. For each bin (k) of binwidth $25 on the x-axis [0,200], I generate an indicator for contribution levels in 
the $25 bin [i.e., I=1 if k<TSP≤k+25 and I=0 Otherwise]. I then complete RD regressions on the series of indicators 
and identify the effects of the PFMC in each bin. These estimates correspond to the left axis. To convert these 
probability estimates into a dollar effect magnitude I divide the RD estimate by f(k)/25 where 
f(k)=Prob(k<TSP≤k+25). These estimates are depicted in blue and correspond to the right axis. n=85,879. 
 
1.6.E. Longitudinal Effects 
     In Figure 1.8, I present the longitudinal effects of the PFMC on TSP contributions by month 
for the first two years of an individual’s service. Using my RD framework I estimate the effects 
of the PFMC on TSP contributions for each month in the individual’s first two years. As the 
graph reveals, the effects vary from approximately $5-$30 each month. In addition, the 
estimates are statistically different from zero at α=0.05 for 17 of 24 months. However, in year 
two there are two noticeable changes in the estimates. First, the standard errors increase and 
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several of the year 2 estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Second, the main 
effect estimates also decrease from month 12 to month 18 and 19. These changes result from 
censoring in the data. Since some treatment group members are censored in the administrative 
data in year 2 they and their control group counterparts by cohort month and location are 
removed from the analysis. Clearly this censoring reduces the estimated program effects, 
implying that the omitted individuals come from AIT locations and cohorts where there were 
strong PFMC effects. While this graph provides additional evidence of the persistent effects of 
the PFMC on TSP contributions, it also reveals that the largest program effects appear to take 
place in the first six months starting with AIT.  
     If inertia plays a large role in individual savings decisions, as the large behavioral economics 
literature on the question suggests that it does (Choi et. al., 2004), then the financial 
management course may simply motivate individuals to enroll in the TSP with payroll deduction 
and once they do, to continue to use payroll deduction for their contributions. As a result, the 
reductions in program effects are likely to due to control group members starting their 
contributions later in their service. If the payroll deduction has less lasting effects then the 
decline in program effects might also be due to treated individuals reducing their contributions. 
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Figure 1.8. PFMC Effects on Average Monthly TSP Contributions in Years 1-2 
Author compiled data using DOD and AER data for 2006-2009. Each point reflects the RD estimates of the PFMC 
effect on the TSP Contribution in the respective month. n=85,879 for months 1-12; n=64,017 for months 13-24. 
 
     In Figure 1.9, I present the longitudinal effects of the PFMC on cumulative TSP contributions 
by month for the first two years of an individual’s service. First I create a TSP cumulative 
account balance for each month in the first two years and then I find estimates of the effects of 
the PFMC on these balances at each month using my RD framework. As the graphs shows, the 
main effects of the PFMC are persistent and increasing with time. However, as described above, 
the year two estimates have larger standard errors and lower point estimates than in year one. 
Even so, all estimates remain statistically different from zero at α=0.10. As a result, while the 
censoring is unfortunate, the first year results provide suggestive evidence of a trend that the 
PFMC establishes and sustains larger cumulative TSP contribution balances. 
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Figure 1.9. PFMC Effects on Cumulative Monthly TSP Contributions in Years 1-2 
Author compiled data using DOD and AER data for 2006-2009. Each point reflects the RD estimates of the PFMC 
effect on the Cumulative TSP Contribution in each month. n=85,879 for months 1-12; n=64,017 for months 13-24. 
 
 
1.6.F. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
     The evidence presented thus far suggests large average treatment effects of the PFMC 
across individuals. However, the course may have different effects on different individuals. The 
rich nature of the military administrative data enables evaluation of heterogeneous treatment 
effects by a host of demographic variables. In Table 1.3 I present RD estimates for the 
heterogeneous treatment effects of the PFMC by gender, human capital (education and AFQT 
scores), socioeconomic status (SES) and marital status. 
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Table 1.3. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects of PFMC on Average TSP Contributions in Year 1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Interaction: None Female AFQT Education SES Married 
PFMC Main Effect 16.51 *** 18.43 *** 15.93 *** 10.13 *** 23.55 *** 17.28 *** 
  (3.75)   (3.93)   (3.74)   (3.76)   (5.13)   (3.94)   
Female -1.73 ** 3.78   -1.73 ** -1.72 ** -1.74 ** -1.72 ** 
  (0.77)   (2.84)   (0.77)   (0.76)   (0.77)   (0.77)   
Female × PFMC     -13.60 ***                 
      (4.49)                   
AFQT Quartile 2 
(Q2) 
-0.16   -0.11   -0.15   -0.16   -0.13   -0.15   
(0.59)   (0.59)   (0.59)   (1.74)   (0.59)   (0.60)   
AFQT Q2 × PFMC         0.90               
          (2.40)               
AFQT Q3 -0.25   -0.25   -0.23   -4.54 * -0.22   -0.22   
  (0.86)   (0.86)   (0.86)   (2.73)   (0.86)   (0.86)   
AFQT Q3 × PFMC         9.33 ***             
          (3.19)               
AFQT Q4 8.15 *** 8.17   8.19 *** 2.02   8.19 *** 8.16 *** 
  (1.21)   (1.21)   (1.21)   (3.38)   (1.21)   (1.21)   
AFQT Q4 × PFMC         20.20 ***             
          (4.64)               
Educ ≥ Some 
College(SMC) 
1.85   1.92   -6.36 ** 2.08   1.85   1.89   
(1.27)   (1.28)   (3.12)   (1.27)   (1.27)   (1.28)   
SMC × PFMC             7.35           
              (4.88)           
SES Q3 -0.11   -0.02   -0.08   -0.33   3.76   -0.11   
  (1.48)   (1.47)   (1.48)   (1.49)   (4.89)   (1.47)   
SES Q3 × PFMC                 -14.42 *     
                  (7.85)       
SES Q4 -0.14   0.12   -0.12   0.15   4.22   -0.05   
  (1.47)   (1.46)   (1.47)   (1.48)   (4.89)   (1.46)   
SES Q4 × PFMC                 -16.00 *     
                  (8.56)       
Married -0.65   -0.65   -0.65   -0.69   -0.63   0.34   
  0.63   (0.64)   (0.63)   (0.64)   (0.64)   (2.11)   
Married × PFMC                      -4.05   
                      (3.18)   
Control Mean 15.23   15.23   15.23   15.23   15.23   15.23   
Adj R2 0.1203   0.1217   0.1204   0.1226   0.1207   0.1206   
N 85,879   85,879   85,879   85,879   85,879   85,879   
Clusters 266   266   266   266   266   266   
 
39 
 
Table 1.3, Continued 
Source: Department of Defense, Census Bureau and Credit Bureau Data. Notes: All data is for U.S. Army enlisted 
soldiers who enlisted between June 2006 and August 2009 and completed AIT at a given location within the 12 
month period before and after program implementation, excluding the month before, of and after program 
implementation. The aggregate balance outcome excludes mortgage debt. The coefficient reported is for the 
discontinuity at the month of implementation. All regressions include the following covariates: a quadratic in age, 
quadratic in experience, indicators for female, married, minority, number of dependents and a summer entry, 
indicators for education levels less than or equal to high school, some college, and greater than or equal to 
college (high school graduate is the omitted category), AFQT score, enlistment term, average monthly base pay, 
median household income in the individual's zip code of record, AIT length, number of months deployed in the 
year and fixed effects for an individuals' job, military branch, AIT location and AIT start month. Indicator variables 
capture individuals missing pay, or zip code income data and these individuals are assigned values of zero for 
these variables. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, clustered at the AIT location-month level, are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
     As the regression results show, there are only a few statistically significant heterogeneous 
treatment effects. First, the treatment interacts negatively with being female (or positively with 
male), with the PFMC reducing TSP contributions for treated females by $13.60 on a control 
mean of $15.23. These effects might occur due to greater peer effects by males in the military 
and/or greater levels of risk aversion among females.26 Second, the upper two quartiles of 
AFQT have a positive interaction with treatment. These results suggest that the PFMC increases 
average monthly TSP contributions for students in the third (fourth) quartile of the AFQT 
distribution by $9.33 ($20.20) on a control mean of $15.23 and both effects are highly 
significant (p<0.005) relative to students in the first quartile. The interpretation is that 
individuals with higher AFQT scores respond more positively to the PFMC lesson on retirement 
savings and the TSP and subsequently increase their contributions more. Second, the upper two 
quartiles of SES, measured by the median household income of the individual’s zip code of 
record, have a negative interaction with treatment. These results suggest that the PFMC 
decreases average monthly TSP contributions for students in the third (fourth) quartile of the 
                                                            
26 See Xiao et al. 2011 for a detailed review of differential risk preferences by gender and their 
potential explanations. 
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SES distribution by $14.22 ($16.00) on a control mean of $15.23 relative to the lower two 
quartiles, but both effects are marginally significant (p=0.067 and p=0.063 respectively). Here 
the interpretation is less clear but the results imply that individuals with high SES, controlling 
for a variety of other factors, respond less favorably to the treatment relative to those 
individuals in the lower two quartiles of SES. It may be that individuals with lower SES have less 
previous experience with information on the time value of money and the role and importance 
of saving for retirement relative to individuals with higher SES. Finally, the remainder of the 
groups: women, individuals with some college or more and married individuals, have no 
statistically distinguishable interactions with the PFMC. 
1.6.G. Discussion of Results 
Treatment Effect Mechanism 
     The evidence presented in Sections 1.6.A through 1.6.F strongly suggests that the PFMC 
increases individual contributions to the Thrift Savings Plan. The mechanism for this increase is 
not identified though and might be increased financial literacy and sophistication or it might be 
a reduction in the costs of TSP enrollment. That is, the PFMC might have taught individuals the 
importance of retirement savings and the value of the TSP or it might simply have assisted them 
with enrollment, or a combination of both. In fact, the PFMC does discuss TSP enrollment 
procedures and requirements and it also provides assistance in actual TSP enrollment, both 
through form completion and form submission.27 Other research has shown the positive effects 
of enrollment assistance in the context of education decisions (Clayton and Dynarski 2006, 
                                                            
27 Based on author discussions with AER program director and SDCC personnel, Fall 2011. 
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Bettinger et al. 2009) and retirement savings (Beshears et al. 2006a, 2006b) and such assistance 
can also be expected to increase enrollment in the TSP. However, the presence of potential 
behavioral effects should not completely undermine the case for financial literacy 
development. In this case, TSP enrollment still requires an active decision and comparison of 
the costs and benefits of making TSP contributions. Enrollment does not occur via a default rule 
change and individuals must take active steps to enroll. Since the decisions under consideration 
require some reflection and effort by students, behavioral assistance seems unable to account 
for the full effect. While AER program administrators might be results oriented and be primarily 
concerned with the total effects, Army administrators and other public policy-makers might 
desire more detailed information on the mechanism at work, both to tailor this course and 
design others in the future. Ideally, the two effects could be separately identified and 
measured. In the context of the PFMC, while there may have been variation in the enrollment 
assistance provided at each location, there is no reliable data on where and when this variation 
occurred.28 Nonetheless, in this sample, the roles of human capital and behavioral assistance 
cannot be separated and the large program effects documented above should be thought of as 
the combination of human capital (financial literacy) development and assistance. Additional 
work is required to identify the effects of financial literacy separate from behavioral policy 
assistance. Chapter 2 of this dissertation explores the effects of the PFMC in the context of 
other financial behaviors where behavioral confounds are absent or less present. 
 
                                                            
28 AER and SDCC personnel confirmed that the enrollment assistance provided has and does vary by location, but 
that the precise timing of the policy changes driving these differences is not documented. 
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Threats to Identification 
     Typical concerns when employing a regression discontinuity (RD) design include concerns 
over other changes occurring at the threshold value (in this case, something else changed at a 
location at the same time that the PFMC course was implemented) and concerns over 
individual manipulation to obtain or avoid the treatment (in this case, individuals attending AIT 
early or delaying their AIT start based on the course implementation). Neither concern seems 
valid in this case given the nature of this policy change, where a month-location combination is 
the forcing variable. I first note that the course implementation dates were selected by the 
executing agency, Army Emergency Relief, external to the Army generally and the Army 
Recruiting Command, which manages the accession and distribution of new enlistees by jobs 
for the entire enlisted force, specifically. Locations and dates of implementation were based on 
the ability to field instructors at an AIT location and the course was implemented at 12 different 
locations (nearly all with differing mixes of all other covariates) nationwide at 8 different points 
in time spanning 2 years. It seems unlikely and almost impossible that AER could have 
systematically determined the course implementation dates with respect to any observable 
characteristics of enlisting individuals. 29  Second, I present the results of a series of 
randomization tests in Table 1.4 that formally establish that the covariates employed in this 
analysis are systematically unrelated to the treatment/discontinuity.30 As the results show, 
none of the observable covariates are systematically related to treatment, validating the 
experimental design and justifying causal inference for the PFMC effects. 
                                                            
29 This intuition is confirmed by author conversations with the AER Program Director from February through March 
2011 and discussions with the contractor in July and August 2011. Soldiers' observable characteristics were never 
identified as a consideration in the timing of the program implementation. 
 
30 For additional balance of covariate tests (event studies), see the Section 1.7. Robustness Checks. 
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Table 1.4. Randomization Tests for Administrative Data Sample 
                Control 
Mean Variable Coeff (Std Err) p-value Sig Adj-R2 Obs Clust. 
Age, Years 18.91 (24.05) 0.4324   0.0271 85,879 266 21.59 
Experience, Years 16.89 (21.48) 0.4325   0.0295 85,879 266 3.72 
Female, % 4.83 (6.69) 0.4703   0.0151 85,879 266 15.32 
Married, % 1.46 (2.08) 0.4849   0.0062 85,879 266 18.62 
Number of Dependents 0.07 (0.06) 0.1990   0.0069 85,879 266 0.89 
Education ≤ High School Graduate, % 0.32 (0.37) 0.3863   0.0226 85,879 266 0.02 
Education = High School Graduate, % 3.23 (2.10) 0.1265   0.0133 85,879 266 91.38 
Education = Some College, % 0.59 (1.02) 0.5599   0.0023 85,879 266 6.22 
Education ≥ College Graduate, % -0.09 (0.73) 0.9030   0.0012 85,879 266 2.38 
Minority, % 4.95 (5.84) 0.3974   0.0112 85,879 266 30.77 
AFQT Score, Percentile -2.28 (2.10) 0.2773   0.0336 85,879 266 55.77 
Summer Enlistment, % -6.51 (4.83) 0.1784   0.6906 85,879 266 37.74 
Enlistment Term Length, Years -0.01 (0.14) 0.9531   0.0416 85,879 266 3.84 
AIT Length, Months 0.10 (0.30) 0.7381   0.1086 85,879 266 3.16 
Monthly Basic Pay, $ 5.01 (14.91) 0.7373   0.1637 85,879 266 1,608 
Median HH Income in Home Zip, $ -1,136 (921) 0.2187   0.7536 85,879 266 41,968 
Months Deployed 0.07 (0.19) 0.7185   0.0338 85,879 266 1.04 
Source: Department of Defense, Census Bureau and Credit Bureau Data. Notes: All data is for U.S. Army enlisted 
soldiers who enlisted between June 2006 and August 2009 and completed AIT at a given location within the 12 
month period before and after program implementation, excluding the month before, of and after program 
implementation. Each cell reports the RD estimate for the effect of the discontinuity at the month of program 
implementation on the covariate specified in the respective row. All regressions include the running variable 
(event month relative to program implementation), an indicator for positive values of the running variable, an 
interaction between the running variable and the discontinuity indicator, and month fixed effects. The education 
data, monthly pay data and household income control means are calculated for those observations not missing 
this data. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, clustered at the AIT location-month level, are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively and are 
depicted in the column labeled Sig. 
 
     With respect to the second concern, individual selection into or out of treatment also seems 
unlikely. The program was managed and implemented by AER but the program was not 
integrated with U.S. Army recruiting efforts. As a result, recruiters, who are the primary source 
of information for individuals considering enlistment, were not informed about the course, its 
contents, or the dates of implementation for each AIT location. As a result, individual decisions 
on whether and when to enlist were made exogenously with respect to course implementation. 
Even if individuals somehow knew about the course and its scheduled implementation date at a 
given location, delaying or accelerating enlistment into the military, a significant life event, is 
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not likely to be influenced by an 8 hour course in financial management that is part of an initial 
entry training phase (Basic Training and Advanced Individual Training) that for most individuals 
is several months long. Second, the randomization test and balance of covariate tests in the 
robustness checks both suggest that there was no selection based on any observable 
characteristics.  
Interpretation of Estimates 
     The interpretation of the magnitude of the effects of the PFMC requires consideration of 
several program features and other institutional features facing new enlistees during the period 
under consideration. Taken together, five features suggest that the estimates presented here 
ought to be considered lower bound estimates of the effects of the PFMC. The first two 
features deal with contamination, the third with peer effects, the fourth with role model effects 
and the fifth with additional and simultaneous financial education in the U.S. Army. First, while 
the course is required for all individuals in AIT, there course is not graded nor is it an explicit 
requirement for completing AIT. As a result, absences, either deliberate or as a result of 
competing demands for soldiers' time, would result in “treated” individuals foregoing 
treatment and attenuate the results of treatment. This parallels the role of the first stage in 
traditional instrumental variables (IV) analyses where ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are 
“scaled up” by the treatment non-compliance rate. In this experimental design I have imputed 
and assumed a first stage of 100% compliance. To the extent that this assumption is violated, 
my estimates will serve as lower bounds and the actual effects of the PFMC will be even larger. 
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     Second, I also assume that there are no delays in individual training and that individuals 
proceed through AIT as scheduled. If individuals are delayed in their AIT training, either due to 
training deficiencies, injuries or other unobserved institutional reasons, individuals in the 
control group (no PFMC) might be delayed until treatment is initiated at a given location. While 
my removal of the month cohorts on both sides of program implementation (cohorts -1 and 1) 
from the sample should alleviate these concerns, any other delays greater than one month 
might result in control group members receiving treatment, again attenuating my results and 
marking them as lower bounds. 
     Third, control group individuals might interact with treatment group individuals after AIT. 
These interactions are likely given the mixing of new soldiers of varying job skills into units at 
Army locations worldwide. If individuals in the control group and individuals in the treatment 
group are subsequently assigned to the same unit (as roommates, barracks mates, squad 
mates, colleagues or friends) then they may discuss the contents of the course and reduce any 
differences in knowledge and motivation that the financial management course imparted. From 
the military’s perspective, such spillovers are desirable. From an experimental standpoint 
though, this contamination will reduce the measured differences in control and treatment 
group members in the future. 
     Fourth, role model effects and Army leadership efforts may bias findings downward. With 
role model effects, unit leaders (Officers or Non-Commissioned Officers) may act to help 
soldiers facing financial problems through voluntary counseling or even requiring financial 
training at the duty location (post-AIT). If control group members are more likely to encounter 
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such problems than treatment group members then these efforts may act to mitigate 
differences between the groups.  
     Finally, the PFMC is not the Army’s only financial education program. To the extent that 
other financial training is available to control group individuals at their AIT location (outside the 
AIT program) or at their first duty assignment location, control group individuals may receive 
training and experience treatment similar to the PFMC.31 While this training is also available to 
treatment group members, if there are diminishing returns or any “John Henry” effects among 
control group members who feel as if they need to obtain more financial literacy, then this 
condition works against finding positive effects of training. Even so, the basic assumption of 
monotonicity holds; there is no condition in which control group members can receive more 
financial education than treatment group members; all optional training opportunities are 
equally is available to both groups and mandatory training requirements outside of AIT apply to 
both groups, regardless of treatment status.32 Fortunately for the research design, all five of 
these factors work against any findings of beneficial effects of the Personal Financial 
Management Course. 
 
1.7. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
                                                            
31 Many Army installations have implemented mandatory financial literacy training for first-term soldiers. This 
training aims to improve the financial capabilities of individuals and their families.  As an example, see the policy 
directive for Fort Sill, OK from 2004 at: http://www.sillmwr.com/Forms/acs/financialReadiness/608-1.pdf.  
 
32 The situation in which some members were receiving training in AIT , others at their first duty location and still 
others at both locations leaves open the possibility for further research into optimal training design by evaluating 
the effects of those with zero, one or multiple courses. Unfortunately, the first assignment training requirements 
are idiosyncratic to different post locations and the data is difficult to obtain. Nonetheless, I am investigating this 
alternate course and its potential for additional analyses. 
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     In this section I complete a series of robustness checks to validate the assumptions, analyses 
and findings above. Specifically, I complete five types of checks: regression estimates with and 
without covariates, balance of covariate event studies, predicted outcome event studies, 
functional form validation for my regression discontinuity estimates and longitudinal treatment 
effect estimates comparing the year 1 and year 2 samples. Together these checks validate the 
identification strategy for this research and support causal inference for my PFMC estimates. 
Table 1.5. RD Estimates of PFMC Effects with and without Covariates 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Average Monthly TSP Contribution ($) 
PFMC Effect 19.33 *** 16.55 *** 16.38 *** 
Std Err (6.20)   (5.26)   (3.75)   
Control Mean 15.23   15.23   15.23   
Covariates N Y Y 
Fixed Effects N N Y 
Adj R2 0.0257   0.0896   0.1200   
N 85,879   85,879   85,879   
Clusters 266   266   266   
Panel B: Probability of TSP Participation (%) 
PFMC Effect 14.85 *** 14.34 *** 16.15 *** 
Std Err (4.12)   (3.75)   (2.70)   
Control Mean 11.31   11.31   11.31   
Covariates N Y Y 
Fixed Effects N N Y 
Adj R2 0.0452   0.0967   0.1244   
N 85,879   85,879   85,879   
Clusters 266   266   266   
Source: Department of Defense and Census Bureau Data. Notes: All data is for U.S. Army enlisted soldiers 
who enlisted between June 2006 and August 2009 and completed AIT at a given location within the 12 
month period before and after program implementation, excluding the month before, after and of program 
implementation. The coefficient reported is for the discontinuity at the month of implementation. All 
regressions include the following covariates: a quadratic in age, quadratic in experience, indicators for 
female, married, minority, number of dependents and a summer entry, indicators for education levels less 
than or equal to high school, some college, and greater than or equal to college (high school graduate is the 
omitted category), AFQT score, enlistment term, average monthly base pay, median household income in 
the individual's zip code of record, AIT length, number of months deployed in the year and fixed effects for 
an individuals' job, military branch, AIT location, and AIT start month. Indicator variables capture individuals 
missing pay or zip code income data and these individuals are assigned values of zero for these variables. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, clustered at the AIT location-month level, are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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1.7.A. Regression Estimates with and without Covariates 
     To rule out differences in observable characteristics as the source of my estimated treatment 
effects, I complete a series of regressions for my main outcomes (Average Monthly TSP 
Contributions and Probability of TSP Participation) in Year 1 in which I estimate the program 
effects using only the RD framework, the RD framework and covariates and the complete 
specification that uses the RD framework, covariates and fixed effects. In Table 1.5 I present the 
results of these regressions. As the table reveals, the estimated effects are largely consistent 
and robust to these variations in specification. As a result it seems unlikely that differences in 
observable characteristics are driving the results. 
 
1.7.B. Balance of Covariate Event Studies 
     In Figure 1.10 I present a series of event studies that depict the patterns in each observable 
characteristic that I use in my regression estimation. While there is substantial variation in the 
patterns across these characteristics and even a few apparent discontinuities, there are no 
large discontinuities that might explain the primary findings here and these event studies do 
not account for differences in participation patterns over time. In addition, as the 
randomization test results in Section 1.6.G. (Table 1.4) revealed, none of these differences are 
statistically significant when tested against the RD framework. To fully explore the role of these 
differences, in the next section I use all of the potential differences in these observable 
characteristics to predict the TSP outcomes among the treatment group and compare that to 
the actual TSP outcomes. 
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Figure 1.10. Event Studies for Covariate Balance in Year 1 
Author compiled data using DOD and AER data for 2006-2009. These event studies provide a non-parametric 
summary of the average covariate value for each month cohort but do not account for time varying effects. The 
dashed lines depict an unweighted linear fit of the mean values for each month cohort. Sample sizes for each 
variable are listed on the graph below the y-axis. 
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Figure 1.10, Continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.7.C. Predicted Outcome Event Studies 
     To complete these event studies I regress the outcome of interest (Probability of TSP 
Participation or Average Monthly TSP Contribution) on the covariates listed in Table 1. (Panel B) 
but I omit the treatment variable from the regression. I then generate a predicted outcome for 
each individual and average these outcomes for all individuals in a given month cohort. These 
estimates capture the variation present in all covariates and should present the best prediction 
for the outcome variables that the observable characteristics can provide. If the program was 
implemented exogenously to individual characteristics then these plots should not reveal a 
significant change in the Predicted Probability of Participation and Predicted Average Monthly 
Contribution Levels at the time of program implementation. Figure 1.11 reveals two facts. First, 
the predicted TSP outcomes are actually lower for the treatment group than the control group, 
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strongly suggesting that the results are not due to differences in observable characteristics. 
Second, the apparent discontinuities in the predicted outcomes are small (approximately $2 for 
the Average Monthly Contribution and 2% for the Probability of Participation) relative to the 
treatment magnitudes estimated above for the main RD specifications ($16.42 and 16.17% 
respectively).  
 
 
 
Figure 1.11. Event Studies for Predicted TSP Outcomes in Year 1 
Author compiled data using DOD and AER data for 2006-2009. The left graph uses the Average Monthly TSP 
Contribution in Year 1 as an outcome; the right graph uses the Probability of TSP Participation in Year 1 as an 
outcome. The points reflect the mean predicted outcome at each cohort month from a regression using all 
covariates in Table 1 and omitting the RD framework, including treatment. The dashed lines depict an unweighted 
linear fit of the predicted values on each side of the discontinuity. n=85,879. 
 
1.7.D. Regression Discontinuity Functional Form 
     As noted in Section 1.6.B the non-parametric event studies for the TSP outcomes of interest suggest 
that the use of a linear functional form is appropriate for this analysis. In addition, there is no reason to 
suggest that the outcomes here should have a polynomial relationship with the month cohorts used in 
the RD analysis. Nonetheless, in this section I complete robustness checks for alternate RD functional 
forms to ensure that the estimates are not the result of a particular functional form. That is, I vary the 
functional form of ݂(ܴ௜) in equation (2) above. In Table 1.6 I present the RD estimates by linear, 
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quadratic and cubic functional forms and for several local linear specifications with varying 
bandwidths.33 As the table reveals, the alternate functional form estimates are consistently large, 
statistically significant and always greater than the linear estimates for all specifications. In this regard 
the linear estimates presented above are likely conservative estimates of the treatment effects. 
 
Table 1.6. RD Estimates of PFMC Effects on TSP Outcomes in Year 1, by Functional Form 
  
Linear Quadratic Cubic 
Local Linear 
  BW=4 Mo BW=6 Mo BW=8 Mo 
Form: (1) (2) (3)     (4)     (5)     (6) 
Panel A: Average Monthly TSP Contribution 
PFMC Effect 16.38 *** 19.35 ** 36.32 *** 35.14 *** 39.30 *** 31.24 *** 
  (3.75)   (7.50)   (12.76)   (9.90)   (13.14)   (5.33)   
Control Mean 15.23   15.23   15.23   15.23   15.23   15.23   
Adj R2 0.1200   0.1200   0.1202   0.1522   0.1374   0.1318   
N 85,879   85,879   85,879   10,467   27,796   46,628   
Clusters 266   266   266   58   110   162   
Panel B: Probability (TSP Participation) 
PFMC Effect 16.15 *** 18.52 *** 28.98 *** 23.72 *** 24.98 *** 20.33 *** 
  (2.70)   (5.76)   (9.61)   (7.44)   (9.52)   (4.23)   
Control Mean 11.31   11.31   11.31   11.31   11.31   11.31   
Adj R2 0.1244   0.1244   0.1246   0.1721   0.1478   0.1361   
N 85,879   85,879   85,879   10,467   27,796   46,628   
Clusters 266   266   266   58   110   162   
Source: Department of Defense and Census Bureau Data. Notes: All data is for U.S. Army enlisted soldiers 
who enlisted between June 2006 and August 2009 and completed AIT at a given location within the 12 
month period before and after program implementation, excluding the month before, after and of program 
implementation. The coefficient reported is for the discontinuity at the month of implementation. All 
regressions include a polynomial of the order specified by the column in the running variable and the 
interaction of the running variable and the discontinuity indicator. All regressions also include the following 
covariates: a quadratic in age, quadratic in experience, indicators for female, married, minority, number of 
dependents and a summer entry, indicators for education levels less than or equal to high school, some 
college, and greater than or equal to college (high school graduate is the omitted category), AFQT score, 
enlistment term, average monthly base pay, median household income in the individual's zip code of record, 
AIT length, number of months deployed in the year and fixed effects for an individuals' job, military branch, 
AIT location, and AIT start month. Indicator variables capture individuals missing pay or zip code income data 
and these individuals are assigned values of zero for these variables. Heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors, clustered at the AIT location-month level, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
1.7.E. Longitudinal Treatment Effects by Sample 
                                                            
33 I have also completed the robustness checks for quartic functional form and the results hold.  
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     The PFMC effects on monthly and cumulative monthly TSP contributions discussed in Section 
1.6.E appear to show discontinuous declines in the PFMC effects between months 12 and 13.  
 
Panel A: Full Sample Effects 
 
Panel B: Effects by Subsample 
 
Figure 1.12. PFMC Effects on Monthly TSP Contributions in Years 1-2 by Subsample 
Author compiled data using DOD and AER data for 2006-2009. Each point reflects the RD estimates of the PFMC 
effect on the TSP Contribution in the respective month. Panel A depicts the original plot (Figure 1.9) as a reference. 
In Panel B (lower graph), the black lines depict the RD estimates for the subsample for which observations are 
available for both years (n=64,017). The red lines depict the estimates for the full sample in Year 1. (n=85,879). 
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Since the administrative data is censored for individuals at this point in time the decreases may 
be the result of data availability and not actual reductions in the program’s effects. To 
demonstrate that the decreases are due to data censoring, in Figure 1.12 I show the same 
longitudinal graphs as above but I plot the estimates separately for subsample that is censored 
in year two and the subsample that is not censored. As the graph show, the apparent 
reductions in the monthly and cumulative contributions appear to be the result of data 
censoring and not a reduction in the PFMC program effects. The lines depicting the effects for 
the uncensored subsample (for whom data is available in both years) are lower than for the full 
sample in year 1. In addition, these estimates smoothly transition to the year two estimates for 
the full sample (n=64,017) evident in the original plot, Figure 1.9 since this subsample is the full 
sample in year 2. Based on these plots, it is reasonable to assume that the estimates for the 
censored sample would similarly transition smoothly to higher monthly and cumulative 
monthly levels in year two. 
 
1.8. EXTERNAL VALIDITY 
     This section briefly discusses the external validity of these findings. There are two primary 
threats to the external validity: differences in the nature of this course vs. other potential 
financial literacy courses and differences in the sample vs. other potential student populations.  
     With respect to the concerns over the nature of this course, the curriculum and the 
instructor population warrant attention. Concerns over the curriculum seem less significant in 
that, while nearly all financial education programs will vary, this program contains elements 
which at first glance seem both reasonable and appropriate. A basic understanding of the 
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organization an individual works in, its pay system and knowledge of benefits and entitlements 
all seem appropriate for employer-designed courses. Courses offered to students in a more 
educational setting might omit these topics. Other topics such as budgeting, managing credit, 
making important purchases and retirement savings seem relevant to nearly all audiences. 
However, the external validity of the PFMC is concerning from a faculty perspective. The 
instructors in the course are typically retired military personnel and likely serve as role models 
for the students, thereby increasing their motivation to learn and to heed the teachers’ 
advice.34  
     However, the key contribution of this work is establishing that financial literacy education 
does positively impact financial decision-making, at least in the short term. With this finding, 
additional research might focus on two related issues. First, there are no doubt potential 
improvements in the curriculum design, course content and teaching of financial literacy topics. 
Systematic examination of these approaches using experimental design holds promise for 
improving student and outcomes and program objectives. Second, more attention might be 
devoted to the difficult task of isolating the specific mechanisms through which this education 
works. Does this training instill knowledge that remains with the individuals and allows them to 
make better decisions? Does it increase their appreciation of the complexity of financial 
decisions and increase the time they devote to these topics, either through their own efforts or 
through seeking out help from others? Or, does the program simply provide a nudge to 
impressionable young adults at an opportune time in their life? Similarly, until the mechanisms 
are better understood, there is the possibility for overconfidence among trained individuals 
                                                            
34 The comments on the nature of the instructors for the PFMC are based on author conversations with the 
Program Director at SDCC and direct communications with lead instructors at a number of locations. 
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that may adversely affect financial outcomes. These detailed questions will be difficult to 
answer but the growth of financial literacy education in the U.S. and other countries presents 
enormous opportunities for learning if program administrators and educators remain 
committed to scientific approaches in their implementation. This research provides a start point 
for this expanded understanding of retirement savings behavior by demonstrating that 
education can influence these behaviors and that the effects appear to operate on both 
margins. 
The second concern with respect to external validity deals with the student population. At a 
minimum, the findings presented here seem applicable to all other members of the military or 
all individuals that have served as enlisted soldiers in the military, which makes the findings 
useful as support for continued financial literacy training for new military members and 
previous military members. As noted previously, this population is large and of independent 
interest for promoting financial literacy. However, there may be important differences in this 
population and the average population for which financial literacy might also be more relevant. 
Given that the students are new recruits they are generally in a mindset to receive instruction 
and are especially likely to be influenced by perceived leaders given their stage in the Army 
initial entry training program. In addition, given that these individuals are now typically living on 
their own and gaining their independence, the timing of the course might be uniquely suited for 
influencing individual financial behavior. Since the population is young they may not have 
developed bad habits yet and might be able to build better financial habits based on the course 
instruction. Finally, peer effects and/or role model effects may influence individuals in this 
population more than in the general population given the proximity of colleagues in military 
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life. Even with these concerns though, the size and the diversity of the sample used in this 
research establish that financial literacy can have large positive effects on retirement savings 
decisions in the short term under these conditions. To generalize these results though, the 
course effects might be viewed as somewhat larger than could be typically expected among 
civilian student populations. 
 
1.9. SUMMARY 
     This paper exploits a natural experiment that occurred in the U.S. Army to estimate the 
effects of financial education on retirement savings. Between 2007 and 2008 the Army 
implemented a mandatory 8 hour Personal Financial Management Course for new soldiers. The 
staggered implementation across locations and time provides quasi-experimental variation in 
whether an individual received the training. Using event studies and regression discontinuity 
techniques, I find that the course had large and lasting effects on individual retirement savings 
in the Thrift Savings Plan, a tax-deferred account available to uniformed service members. The 
course doubles retirement savings with an estimated effect of $16.38 on a control mean of 
$15.23 for the Average Monthly TSP Contribution in Year 1. In addition, the course also has 
positive and significant effects on saving levels throughout the distribution, with statistically 
significant effects at all savings levels from $0 per month (p=0.000) where the course increases 
the probability of contributing by 15.15% through the 95th percentile of $200 per month 
(p=0.02) where the course increases the probability of contributing is 1.85%. Finally, the course 
has persistent effects on TSP contributions, increasing monthly contributions through at least 
twenty four months. The mechanism for these treatment effects is likely a combination of both 
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human capital and behavioral assistance since the course provides traditional education and 
assistance in program enrollment. Unfortunately, these effects cannot be separately identified 
and measured in this data. Nonetheless, this research marks one of the first experimental 
findings of large and lasting effects from financial education. These findings provide initial 
evidence to economists and policy makers on the causal effects of such education and motivate 
additional research on the improvement of the treatment effects and the identification of the 
mechanisms for behavioral change.  
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Appendix 1.1 
Sample Selection and Treatment Variable Imputation 
 
Step 1. I define the full sample of interest as Active Duty U.S. Army enlistees in selected Military 
Occupation Specialties (MOSs) who started AIT at one of 13 locations (see Figure 1) within 12 
months of the Personal Financial Management Course (PFMC) program implementation at their 
respective. Given that the Army’s recruiting and training pipelines do not change significantly in 
such a period, this restriction creates reasonably comparable control and treatment groups, 
conditional on time fixed effects. This method enables the pooling of individuals across 
locations by common month cohorts relative to program implementation and the use of 
regression discontinuity techniques. The sample is thus initially defined as individuals in month 
cohorts [-12, 12] and numbers 104,393.35 
 
Step 2. Second I impute the treatment variable. Since micro data on attendance and completion 
of the financial management course are not available, the imputation of treatment variable 
(ܲܨܯܥ௜) status relies on Army administrative data on unit assignment, data on locations and 
knowledge of the duration of training requirements before Advanced Individual Training (AIT). 
The rules below describe in detail the imputation process for the Personal Financial 
Management Course variable. 
 
2.1. The first sub-objective of the second step is to establish the month that an individual 
started AIT. The Personal Financial Management Course is completed in Advanced 
Individual Training (AIT), which individuals complete immediately following Basic Combat 
Training (BCT).36 AIT durations vary from 4-52 weeks and BCT is 9-10 weeks long. For some 
                                                            
35 I elected to submit a reduced sample to the credit bureau based on the cost of the data. I submitted a 50% 
sample (n=47,798) of the originally constructed administrative sample (n=96,689, based on Steps 1-3.B.). After 
submission of this sample to the credit bureau the full sample was adjusted based on two changes to the sample 
(one involved use of incorrect PFMC program implementation dates at 3 locations and the other involved the need 
to remove some individuals from the treatment group as described here in Step 3.C.). The first change has a 
potential effect on the estimates by preventing some individuals at these three locations in affected month 
cohorts from being included in the sample submitted for matching. The estimated effect of this change is small 
(n~1,000 matched individuals, balanced across the control and treatment groups for each location). The second 
change has no effects on any estimates except that it reduces the sample size of the matched sample. The 
corrected full sample size for the full administrative data for cohorts [-12,-2] and [2,12], which includes all locations 
except the pilot location at Fort Bliss, TX, is n=85,879. The result is that some matched records were unusable 
(n=5,297, about 11% of the submitted sample). However, in the final matched sample employed in this analysis, 
there is no bias in AIT lengths or any other observable characteristics and all program implementation dates are 
correct. In addition, given the relatively small numbers affected by this error and the mixed effects of the 
omissions, there does not appear to be any resulting bias in my estimates. I conducted robustness checks by 
omitting all individuals from the 3 affected locations and found similar results, (for example, the main results for 
the Average Monthly TSP Contribution in Year 1 are Coeff=$16.38, Std Err=3.75, p=0.000 and the reduced sample 
estimates are Coeff=$19.35, Std Err=4.27, p=0.000).  
 
36 A small minority of Army jobs require attendance at other schools (often language school) prior to completing 
AIT. These observations are omitted from the sample as they are atypical of Army enlistees and their treatment 
status is indeterminate. 
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military jobs BCT and AIT are completed together as part of a program called One Source 
Unit Training (OSUT) where new recruits complete BCT and AIT with the same set of 
instructors and soldiers. Finally, a small minority of Army jobs require AIT at locations not 
covered by the Personal Financial Management Course studied here.37  
 
A. Individuals who change both units and locations in the same month after entry into 
the Army are assigned an AIT start month based on this common month. 
(Approximately 64% of the sample was assigned based on this criterion) 
 
B. Unassigned individuals who have unit assignment data but do not have common 
location data are assigned an AIT start month based on the unit assignment data. 
(Approximately 23% of the sample assigned based on this criterion) 
 
C. The remaining unassigned individuals who are missing unit data or who do not 
change units are assigned their AIT start month based on their location change. 
(Approximately 0.01% of the sample assigned based on this criterion) 
 
D. The remaining unassigned individuals who are missing unit and location data are 
assigned their AIT start month based on the scheduled duration of BCT (9-10 
weeks=2.5 months). Their start date is assigned as their entry month +3 months. 
(12.79% of the sample had the AIT commencement month adjusted based on this 
criterion) 
 
E. Finally, individuals who have Army jobs that requires OSUT have their AIT start 
month adjusted down by one month. For these individuals the unit change and/or 
location change marks completion of BCT and AIT. But these individuals started the 
AIT portion of OSUT one month prior to their OSUT completion. (26.7% of the 
sample was affected by this adjustment) 
 
2.2. The second sub-objective of this step is to assign a treatment status based on an AIT 
start month. After the five steps above are completed each individual has an AIT start 
month. This variable serves as the basis for assignment to the control or treatment 
group. I use the dates of program implementation provided by the program agency, 
Army Emergency Relief (AER), to assign individuals their control or treatment status. The 
AER data, reflected in Figure 1, identifies the start month of the training at each of the 
Army’s 13 AIT locations (12 used in this sample, which excludes the pilot at Fort Bliss, TX 
in January 2003). Individuals who completed AIT at a location prior to program 
implementation at that location are assigned to the control group (ܲܨܯܥ௜ = 0). 
Individuals who started AIT during or after program implementation at that location are 
assigned to the treatment group (ܲܨܯܥ௜ = 1).  
                                                            
37 Some examples are Special Forces (AIT at Fort Bragg, NC) and firefighters (Goodfellow Air Force Base, TX). I omit 
these individuals from the sample as they are also atypical of Army enlistees, they are few in number (les that 2% 
of sample), and they do not experience treatment, preventing an experimental comparison. 
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Step 3. I refine and edit the sample to clarify the differences between the control and 
treatment groups and avoid contamination issues.  After the assignment process of Step 2.2, 
every individual has a value of 0 or 1 assigned to the variable ܲܨܯܥ௜. To further avoid any 
contamination of control and treatment group members I adjust the sample in three ways.  
  
A. First, I omit from the sample individuals who started AIT in the month preceding, month 
of and month following program implementation at a given location (month cohorts -1, 
0 and 1). This removes individuals from the sample for whom treatment status is the 
most uncertain and the potential for contamination is high.  
 
B. Second, I omit individuals whose AIT start month and AIT length result in an overlap 
with the month of program implementation (e.g., an individual with an AIT length≥2 
months who started AIT at a location 2 months prior to program implementation 
[month cohort -2]).  
 
C. Third, to avoid a systematic bias in the selection of individuals with longer AIT lengths in 
the treatment group based on this second rule, I remove individuals from the treatment 
group to parallel the removal of the control group individuals described above (e.g., I 
remove individuals from the treatment group in the second month after program 
implementation [month cohort 2] who have an AIT length ≥2 months). The second and 
third rules can be summarized together as omitting any individual whose AIT length is 
greater than or equal to the absolute value of their month cohort.38 
 
After these adjustments the full administrative data sample contains n=85,879 observations. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                            
38 Note that the length of an individual’s AIT course is a covariate of interest included in all regression 
specifications. The assignment rule specified here effectively removes any bias between control and treatment 
groups related to AIT lengths. For evidence refer to the randomization test completed in the Robustness Checks 
section. The coefficient on the discontinuity in AIT length variable regression is statistically insignificant (p=0.8564). 
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Appendix 1.2 
Complete Regression Results for PFMC Effects on Average Monthly TSP Contribution in Year 1 
 
 
Table 1.7. Complete RD Estimates of PFMC Effects on Average Monthly TSP 
Contribution in Year 1 
Panel A: Parameter Estimates 
Variable Coeff (Std Err) p-value Sig 
PFMC Effect (Discontinuity) 16.38 (3.75) 0.000 *** 
Cohort Month 0.17 (0.58) 0.772   
PFMC*Cohort Month -1.30 (0.51) 0.011 ** 
Age 4.07 (1.23) 0.001 *** 
Age2 -0.07 (0.02) 0.001 *** 
Experience -1.35 (0.57) 0.018 ** 
Experience2 0.07 (0.02) 0.001 *** 
Female -1.66 (0.77) 0.032 ** 
Married -0.70 (0.63) 0.271   
Number of Dependents -1.54 (0.22) 0.000 *** 
Education ≤ High School Graduate, % 0.39 (2.61) 0.882   
Education = Some College, % 1.56 (1.28) 0.225   
Education ≥ College Graduate, % 7.70 (2.51) 0.002 *** 
Minority, % 2.85 (0.45) 0.000 *** 
AFQT Score, Percentile 0.18 (0.02) 0.000 *** 
Enlistment Term Length, Years 16.75 (1.26) 0.000 *** 
Monthly Basic Pay, $ 0.02 (0.00) 0.000 *** 
Socioeconomic Status 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.071 * 
Months Deployed 1.50 (0.16) 0.000 *** 
Summer enlistment indicator -2.55 (1.42) 0.075 * 
Missing Pay Indicator 8.35 (2.04) 0.000 *** 
Missing HH Income Indicator -1.32 (1.71) 0.443   
AIT Length, Months 21.52 (23.09) 0.352   
Constant -169.47 (46.60) 0.000 *** 
Panel B: Regression Statistics 
Observations 85,879   Adjusted R2 0.1200 
Clusters 257   F-Statistic 28.23 
Source: Department of Defense, Census Bureau and Credit Bureau Data. Notes: Sample as described in 
Table 1.2. The table reports the regression coefficients for all parameters except the fixed effects, 
specifically, time (month) fixed effects, location fixed effects, job category (branch) fixed effects and job 
specific fixed effects. The omitted category for education is high school graduate. Heteroskedasticity 
robust standard errors, clustered at the AIT location-month level, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * 
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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management course (PFMC) in a quasi-experimental manner. Previous research has shown that 
this course has large, pervasive and persistent effects on retirement savings but the mechanism 
for these effects is unclear. In this paper I use administrative data and individually matched 
credit data to estimate the effects of financial education on a variety of financial outcomes 
including credit scores, credit balances for several types of accounts, monthly payments and 
adverse legal actions. In some areas I find that the PFMC has positive effects, reducing 
cumulative account balances (especially for automobile and credit card accounts) and 
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 
    This paper estimates the effects of financial education on economic behavior. I employ a 
natural experiment in the U.S. Army that implemented a mandatory 8 hour personal financial 
management course (PFMC) in a quasi-experimental manner. Previous research has shown that 
this course has large, pervasive and persistent effects on retirement savings but the mechanism 
for these effects is unclear. In this paper I use administrative data and individually matched 
credit data to estimate the effects of financial education on a variety of financial outcomes 
including credit scores, credit balances for several types of accounts, monthly payments and 
adverse legal actions. In some areas I find that the PFMC has positive effects, reducing 
cumulative account balances (especially for automobile and credit card accounts) and 
aggregate monthly payments. In other areas, including credit scores, the probability of being 
active in the credit market and the number of adverse legal actions, the PFMC has no 
statistically significant effects on financial behavior. 
     Since this research uses the same natural experiment and much of the same data as the 
previous chapter, many sections of this paper will be brief and refer the reader to the previous 
chapter for more detail. The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the existing 
literature and summarizes the contributions of this work. Section 2.3 summarizes the financial 
management course and program implementation. Section 2.4 discusses the relevant theory 
for this analysis. Section 2..5 summarizes the variables and data used in the empirical analysis. 
Section 2.6 presents the empirical analysis and discusses the results. Section 2.7 conducts 
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robustness checks. Section 2.8 discusses external validity. Section 1.9 summarizes the findings, 
presents brief policy recommendations and concludes. 
 
2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW & CONTRIBUTIONS 
     Section 1.2 thoroughly reviews the relevant literature and extant findings for financial 
education. Taken together, there is little experimental evidence of beneficial effects of financial 
education and a host of zero or small findings even in endogenous settings. 
     One additional contribution of this work, in addition to those described in Chapter 2, is the 
use of detailed credit bureau data to analyze financial behavior. While this data has existed for 
a number of years (see Avery et al. 2003 for a summary) and a growing number of economists 
are turning to credit data as a rich source of information on financial behavior (e.g., Agarwal et 
al. 2009 and Finkelstein et al. forthcoming), little of the financial education research has used 
this detailed data. One important exception is Staten et al. 2006, who used credit histories to 
evaluate the effects of targeted credit counseling. They find that credit counseling improves 
credit behavior, albeit in a self-selected group. Given the general concerns with self-reported 
data described in Section 1.2 and the potential for financial education to impact a variety of 
financial behaviors, credit data seems particularly useful in this context. 
 
 
 
71 
 
2.3. PERSONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT COURSE PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION 
     Section 1.3 reviews the implementation of the PFMC and the content of the course. As 
Figure 1.2 reveals, several elements of the PFMC might impact an individual’s financial behavior 
as measured by credit data. First and most directly, there is an entire one hour lesson entitled 
“The Essentials of Credit,” that surveys the types of credit, advises students about the factors 
affecting creditworthiness, reviews the role of debt and discusses proper credit usage, credit 
and debt assistance, consumer protection laws and credit reporting. In addition to this lesson, 
since the course also covers Car Buying, Consumer Awareness and Spending Plans (each one 
hour lessons), the credit data should serve as a useful measure of the diverse and potentially 
wide-ranging effects of the course. 
 
2.4. THEORETICAL MODEL & HYPOTHESES 
     The theoretical model and estimation strategy remains the same as in Chapter 1. I provide 
reduced form estimates of the effects of PFMC on selected financial behaviors. Based on a 
review of the PFMC curriculum I provide the following additional hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2: Participation will reduce the cumulative debt for individuals. 
 Hypothesis 2a: Participation will reduce the size of auto loans for individuals. 
 Hypothesis 2b: Participation will reduce the amount of credit card debt for individuals. 
 Hypothesis 2c: Participation will reduce the amount of finance debt for individuals. 
 Hypothesis 2d: Participation will reduce the amount of unpaid debt for individuals. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Participation will reduce the incidence of negative financial outcomes (liens, 
 foreclosures, judgments, repossessions and collections) for individuals. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Participation will reduce the aggregate monthly payment for individuals. 
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     Given the uncertainty over the use of credit score as a measurement of financial literacy 
provided in Section 2.4, I do not provide a hypothesis for this outcome. Similarly I do not have a 
hypothesis for the effects of the PFMC on the probability of having active credit conditional on 
having a matched credit record. Instead, for these two outcomes, this research provides 
empirical estimates of the relationship between financial literacy and credit activity and 
financial literacy and credit bureau scoring procedures. 
 
2.5. SUMMARY OF VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES 
     This research uses military administrative data as described in Section 1.4 and this data 
affords a significant amount of information about individual demographics, education levels, 
pay, work and home locations. While the outcome data for the retirement savings analysis in 
Chapter 2 also relied on administrative data, this research exploits individually matched credit 
data from one of the three national credit bureaus for a random subsample of the full sample 
employed in Chapter 1.1  
     I selected the evaluation outcomes based on three criteria. First, the outcomes relate 
directly or indirectly to the PFMC topics and implicitly, financial behaviors of interest to the 
program administrators. Second, the outcomes capture a large portion of the economic activity 
of most individuals. In Figure 2.1 I present a comparison of the expected coverage of economic 
activity by categories for my sample and a nationally representative subsample of individuals 
analyzed by Avery et al. in 2003. Unfortunately, there is little data available on demographically 
                                                            
1 For more information on matching results, see Appendix 2.1. For additional information on the sample selection, 
see Appendix 1.1. 
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comparable groups to this sample. As a result, since my sample is not nationally representative 
(they are among other features, younger, less female and less married on average), their 
financial behavior and debt profiles might be expected to differ from the national averages in a 
few ways  (e.g., fewer mortgages, less overall borrowing). Nonetheless, this table shows the 
national averages based on both the number of accounts (columns 1 and 3) and the dollar 
weighted value of accounts (columns 2 and 4) and serve as a reasonable first approximation. 
While the balances and distributions of financial behavior in Table 2.2 should not be taken 
literally, they should provide confirmation that the selected attributes provide visibility on a 
significant portion of individual and household economic behavior.  
Table 2.1. Credit Accounts and Balances, by Type of Account 
    Share of all open accounts 
    National 
Averages (2003) 
Estimates for 
Current Data     
    # $ Wtd # $ Wtd 
Account Type Definition and/or examples (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Open End Repeated discretionary borrowing with a limit. 78.5% 15.3% 69.8% 9.8% 
  Non-Revolving Borrowing for a short period with full repayment. 4.2% 4.0% - - 
  Revolving Unsecured accts with flexible borrowing amounts. 74.3% 11.3% 69.8% 9.8% 
        Bank Card VISA, Capital One, Discover, Citibank, some Amex 37.0% 8.4% 37.0% 8.4% 
        Retail Macy's, Sears, Target 28.1% 0.5% 28.1% 0.5% 
        Finance Sales Fin. Co. Loan or CC, pers. loans, credit union 4.7% 0.9% 4.7% 0.9% 
        Check Credit Overdraft accounts, personal lines of credit 1.9% 1.4% - - 
        Other National oil & gas, government entities, utilities 2.5% 0.1% - - 
Closed End Lump sum loans repaid on a schedule. 21.6% 84.9% 10.6% 76.9% 
  Mortgage Special installment accts secured with real estate. 5.0% 66.5% 5.0% 66.5% 
  Installment Fixed payments that fully amortize the loan amount. 16.6% 18.4% 5.6% 10.4% 
        Automobile From banks, credit unions or other finance co. 4.6% 7.8% 4.6% 7.8% 
        Banking Short term loans from banks. 3.2% 1.4% - - 
        Finance Short term loans from finance companies. 1.0% 2.6% 1.0% 2.6% 
        Other Recreational vehicles & equipment, household items 7.8% 6.6% - - 
Total   100.1% 100.2% 80.4% 86.7% 
Source: Avery et al. 2003. The account totals above exclude accounts in a major derogatory status and those in 
dispute. Notes: Percentages within categories do not add perfectly due to rounding. The estimates for the 
percentages of credit balances observed in columns 3 and 4 assume that the national balance averages by 
account type are the same for my sample as the nationally representative sample in 2003. 
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Third, I tried to select and evaluate outcomes that can separately identify the effects of the 
PFMC through human financial capital. Since the large effects documented in Chapter 2 reflect 
the combined effects of human capital and behavioral assistance, one of the principle goals of 
this analysis is to evaluate behavior in domains where the effects can be attributed to the 
creation of improved human capital. 
     Since the matched credit data is organized by archive dates (April of each year in 2005 
through 2011) but my analysis requires comparison of control and treatment group individuals 
at comparable time horizons, I convert the archive dates to the relevant analysis horizons (e.g., 
year 1 and year 2).2 In addition, I observe the majority of individuals prior to their entry into the 
Army (year 0) and will use credit attributes from this “baseline” year, including the credit score 
and the outcome variables as additional controls in my analyses. 3 
     Next I review the data matching process, which generates several potential outcomes.4 
Records are either matched or attrited and then the matched records are either active (valid 
and present balances and scores) or inactive (no balances and scores due to lack of activity). 
The first outcome is important for experimental validity and the second outcome is a 
meaningful measure of the financial behavior. These are discussed and evaluated below in 
Section 2.6.H and Section 2.6.C respectively. 
                                                            
2 In my analysis, year 0 consists of the 12 months preceding an individual’s entry to the Army. Year 1 consists of the 
12 months beginning with AIT and year 2 consists of the 12 months beginning with the month 13 after beginning 
AIT and ending at month 24. 
 
3 For individuals missing year 0 data but matched in year 1 or year 2 I will assign them an indicator variable for 
missing data and impute a zero for the outcome variable in year 0. 
 
4 See Appendix 2.1 for more details on the specific match statistics. 
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     Here I briefly summarize the match rate statistics for my year 1 and year 2 samples.  Of my 
n=41,303 submitted records, I match n=33,931 (82.2%) records for year 1 and n=33,754 (81.7%) 
records for year 2. Of those that are matched, n=29,318 (86.4%) have active credit records for 
year 1 and n=31,196 (94.2%) for have active credit records for year 2. I will test the credit 
activity outcome below.  
     In addition, given that the inactive records are matched, I can reliably impute zeros for 
balances and trade counts for the matched records. The reason is that a matched record 
reflects unique identification of an individual by the credit bureau from reporting institutions 
(bank, credit card, credit union, etc…) and these institutions have an incentive to not only know 
the account types, balances and statuses for active accounts but also to report these accounts 
to the credit bureau. A matched but inactive record implies balances of zero for a given 
individual. Robustness checks in Section 2.7 validate this assumption. 
      As with the previous research, the recent implementation of this program limits the analysis 
horizon to short term financial behavior. In addition, the censoring of some individuals in my 
year 2 administrative data means that the actual sample sizes will differ from the match 
statistics above. My adjusted sample sizes are n=33,931 for year 1 and n=31,104 for year 2. As a 
result, I focus primarily on year 1 outcomes to maximize statistical power. In contrast to the 
previous research on TSP outcomes, in which I observe individuals in every month each year, in 
this analysis I only observe each individual once per year in April. As a result, an individual’s 
“Year 1” outcome is a one-time monthly snapshot of that individual during their first year and 
the month of observation depends on the relationship between the individual’s AIT 
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commencement month and April of the year. This means that while year 1 observations vary 
between month 1 and month 12, on average I observe individuals at their six and a half month 
since beginning AIT.  
     This research will focus initially on five outcomes: the probability of having active credit 
(conditional on being matched), cumulative balances, aggregate monthly payments, an adverse 
legal action index and an individual’s credit score. 
     First I evaluate the probability of having active credit, conditional on having a matched credit 
record. This outcome reflects extensive margin participation in the credit market. For this 
outcome there is no clear prediction for the effects of the PFMC. The course promotes 
responsible credit use and generally encourages participation in the credit market, subject to 
accumulating small balances, paying more than the minimum payment and restricting the use 
of credit by the type of purchase (routine vs. large purchases). Since financially illiterate 
individuals are likely users of credit, we expect them to have active credit conditional on being 
matched. But since the PFMC is not anti-credit in its curriculum, even if students gain financial 
literacy, there is no reason to assume that they will participate less frequently in the market. 
     Second, since the primary financial behaviors of interest are those that reflect the levels, 
margins and types of credit used, I generate a variable that reflects financial behavior in a 
variety of areas. I generate the outcome titles cumulative balance, that represents the total 
balance that individual ݅ has in the following areas:  automobile credit (loans and leases), credit 
cards (bankcards and retail credit), finance trades (short term loans) and unpaid balances 
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(collections and charge offs).5 6 The cumulative balance is not comprehensive and omits some 
types of accounts (e.g., mortgages) but captures a host of important and routine economic 
transactions. I evaluate the cumulative balances and the components of this balance to 
determine the effects of the PFMC on a variety of important behaviors. 
     Third, since the PFMC aims to reduce the incidence of very poor financial behavior by 
individuals I will evaluate the PFMC effects on behaviors that results in a legal action or decision 
against an individual. Here I generate an index of adverse legal actions that is the total of the 
following actions: liens, foreclosures, repossessions and judgments. While these incidents are 
relatively rare, they are extremely adverse to an individual or household’s current and future 
financial standing and represent an important objective of the PFMC. 
     Fourth, I will evaluate the effects of the PFMC on an individual’s aggregate monthly 
payment. This outcome represents total of all of the scheduled payments for all trades 
(accounts) with outstanding balances. The trades involved in this outcome subsume those in 
the cumulative balance outcome above and include other items like mortgages and personal 
lines of credit. For closed-end credit (e.g., an auto loan or a mortgage), the monthly payment is 
typically constant and amortizes the value of the debt throughout the loan duration. For open-
                                                            
5 Finance loans include loans provided by banks, credit unions and other financing companies. They generally do 
not include payday loans. While payday loans may occasionally be captured in credit data (e.g., if a payday lending 
company is also a bank (say, Wells Fargo) and this institution is reporting on an individual), payday lenders 
generally do not report to credit bureaus. These facts are derived from conversations with credit bureau personnel 
in Fall 2011 and other large financial institution representatives in Spring 2012. 
 
6 In the credit data, a collection refers to an unpaid balance that has been referred to an external company for 
processing and collection or to an institution’s own agency for the same purpose. Such balances are rarely repaid 
in full, adversely affect credit ratings and may be subject to legal actions. A charge off is similar in that it reflects an 
unpaid balance and adversely affects an individual’s credit rating. These balances have typically been “written off” 
by the reporting institution but they may still be referred to collection or legal action at a future date. 
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end credit, individual balances vary by month and the monthly payment is a function of the 
balance, the interest rate and the agreed upon terms for minimum payments. As a result of 
these differences, the aggregate monthly payment reflects a weighted combination of open 
end and closed end credit and is a monotonically increasing function of an individual’s total 
debt. Since this variable reveals the minimum payment in a given month it provides some 
visibility into the cash flow patterns for individuals and households.  
     Finally, I evaluate the effects of the PFMC on an individual’s credit score. While credit scores 
are generally associated with access to better credit and better credit rates, whether or not the 
score correlates directly with financial literacy is less clear. The scores are an industry measure 
used to guide lending decisions, which are driven both by risk and by profitability. The scores 
are proprietary but credit bureaus acknowledge that scores are a function of credit use, the 
number of trades (accounts) and payment history, among other factors. If more literate 
consumers use credit less or open fewer trades their scores might decline relative to the less 
literate. Conversely, if more literate consumers use credit more responsibly and have better 
repayment patterns, their scores may be higher relative to the less literate. As a result, it is not 
clear that a more financially literate individual will necessarily have a higher credit score. As a 
result, the individual’s credit score will be used as an outcome of interest but there is no clear 
theoretical prediction for the effects of the PFMC on the score. 
 
2.6. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION 
2.6.A. Summary Statistics    
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     In Table 2.2 I present the summary statistics for my principle outcomes and covariates for 
the full sample and by treatment status. While there are apparent outcome variable differences 
in Table 2.2, these observed patterns are inadequate for causal inference given the other 
demographic differences evident in Panel B that could explain the outcome patterns and their 
omission of other time-varying effects. As a result I will proceed with event studies and 
multivariate regression estimates below. 
 
Table 2.2. Summary Statistics by Treatment Condition for Administrative Data Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Full Sample No Training Received Training 
  N=33,931 N=17,053 N=16,878 
Variable Mean (Std Dev) Mean (Std Dev) Mean (Std Dev) 
Panel A. Outcomes 
Prob (Active Credit), % 86.40 (34.27) 86.67 (34.00) 86.14 (34.55) 
Cumulative Balance, $ 6,081 (8881) 6,117 (8887) 6,044 (8875) 
Adverse Legal Action Index 0.24 (1.50) 0.19 (1.20) 0.28 (1.76) 
Aggregate Monthly Payment, $ 183 (254) 179 (249) 187 (259) 
Credit Score 578 (91.3) 577 (90.2) 578 (92.4) 
Panel B. Individual Characteristics 
Age, years 21.80 (4.09) 21.70 (4.04) 21.91 (4.14) 
Experience, years 3.90 (3.94) 3.82 (3.91) 3.98 (3.96) 
Female, % 0.12 (0.33) 0.12 (0.32) 0.13 (0.33) 
Married, % 0.20 (0.40) 0.19 (0.39) 0.20 (0.40) 
Number of dependents 0.91 (1.21) 0.94 (1.23) 0.88 (1.20) 
Less than high school education, % 0.01 (0.08) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.12) 
High school graduate, % 0.90 (0.30) 0.91 (0.28) 0.89 (0.32) 
Some college, % 0.07 (0.25) 0.06 (0.24) 0.07 (0.26) 
College graduate or more, % 0.03 (0.16) 0.02 (0.15) 0.03 (0.17) 
Minority, % 0.30 (0.46) 0.29 (0.45) 0.32 (0.47) 
AFQT Score, percentile 56.66 (19.13) 56.20 (19.26) 57.12 (19.00) 
Summer accession, % 0.35 (0.48) 0.37 (0.48) 0.34 (0.47) 
Enlistment term, years 3.81 (0.99) 3.85 (0.98) 3.78 (0.99) 
AIT length, months 3.17 (1.11) 3.17 (1.11) 3.17 (1.10) 
Monthly basic pay, $ 1,551 (304) 1,605 (325) 1,496 (270) 
Median HH Income in Zip Code, $ 42,138 (13,804) 42,204 (13,851) 41,425 (13,272) 
Months deployed during the year 1.19 (2.33) 1.06 (2.17) 1.33 (2.48) 
Credit Score in Year 0 554 (106.3) 555 (104.9) 553 (107.6) 
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Table 2.2, Continued 
Source: Department of Defense and Census Bureau Data. Notes: All data is for U.S. Army enlisted soldiers 
who enlisted between June 2006 and August 2009 and completed AIT at a given location within the 12 
month period before and after program implementation, excluding the month before, of and after 
program implementation and who had a matched credit record in year 1 (n=33,931). All outcome 
variables (Panel A) in this table are measured for the period beginning during Advanced Individual 
Training and ending 12 months later. Experience is an approximate measure of labor force experience at 
the time of enlistment and is calculated using age minus education minus 6 years. For this calculation, 
education is imputed using the following values: 10 years for high school dropouts; 11 years for GED 
holders; 12 years for high school graduates; 13 years for some college; 14 years for associate’s degrees; 16 
years for college graduates; 18 years for post graduate. The less than high school graduate variable 
includes dropouts and GED holders. The some college variable includes those with an Associate’s Degree. 
The greater than or equal to college graduate variable includes those with Bachelor’s, Master’s and 
Doctorate degrees. The married variable represents formal and common law marriages for anyone who 
has ever been married. Average monthly pay represents the average monthly base pay during the 12 
month period. The enlistment term variable represents the length of service that an individual has agreed 
to serve upon joining the military or reenlisting and typically varies from 2-6 years and the enlistment 
term during the 12 month observation period is used. The median household income data reflects the 
median household income from the 2000 U.S. Census (Sample File 3) for those individuals not missing zip 
code data.  Sample sizes apply to all variables with the following exceptions: the monthly pay data is 
restricted to the individuals for whom this data was not missing (n=33,344); the median household 
income is restricted to the individuals for whom this data was not missing (n=14,325); the year 0 credit 
score is restricted to those with credit data in year 0 (n=18,947). 
 
     In addition, since the distributions for several of the outcome variables are heavily 
influenced the presence of zeros, in Table 2.3 I present the summary statistics for the outcome 
variables by unconditional and conditional levels for the full sample. I also include the elements 
of the cumulative balance variable in this table. 
Table 2.3. Selected Summary Statistics for Credit Outcomes in Year 1 
  Unconditional % at 
Zero 
Conditional on Y>0 
Variable (Y) Mean (Std Dev) Mean (Std Dev) 
Prob (Active Credit), % 86.40 (34.27) 13.60 1 (0.0) 
Cumulative Balance, $ 6,081 (8,881) 18.66 7,472 (9,302) 
     Auto Loan Balance, $ 2,759 (6,008) 78.33 12,731 (6,292) 
     Credit Card Balance, $ 767 (1,632) 53.37 1,644 (2,066) 
     Finance Trade Balance, $ 356 (1,606) 88.49 3,098 (3,733) 
     Delinquent Balance, $ 1,986 (4,635) 51.70 4,112 (5,977) 
Adverse Legal Action Index 0.24 (1.50) 94.56 4.35 (4.87) 
Aggregate Monthly Payment, $ 183 (254) 34.82 280 (267) 
Credit Score 578 (91.3) - 578 (91.3) 
Source: Department of Defense and Census Bureau Data. Notes: See Table 2.2 for sample 
and variable details. 
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2.6.B. Event Studies 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Event Studies for Financial Outcomes of Interest in Year 1 
Author compiled data using DOD and AER data for 2006-2009. In each graph, the points at each x-axis value depict 
the average of the outcome for all individuals in the x cohort. The dashed lines depict an unweighted linear fit of 
these values to demonstrate the cohort patterns. n=29,318 for credit score; n=33,931 for all other outcomes. 
 
     In Figure 2.1 I present event studies for the five outcomes of interest from Table 2.2. In many 
cases, the event studies do not indicate a significant discontinuity at the month of PFMC 
implementation. For several outcomes however, including the cumulative balance (and its 
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component parts, auto trades and credit cards) and the aggregate monthly payment, there 
appears to be a discontinuity at the month of program implementation. I explore the 
discontinuity estimates in more detail for all of these outcomes in the next sections. 
 
2.6.C. PFMC Effects: Main Regression Estimates 
     In Table 2.4 I present RD estimates for the five principle outcomes of interest. In addition to 
the average effects (column 1), these estimates reveal the influence of the course on the 
extensive (column 2) an intensive (columns 3 and 4) margins. The regression results reveal that 
the PFMC has mixed effects on the selected outcomes. The course has statistically insignificant 
effects on the probability of having active credit, conditional on an individual record being 
matched (p=0.546), on the adverse legal action index (p=0.957) and on an individual’s credit 
score (p=0.147) in Panels A, C and E respectively. The course does appear to have an effect on 
the cumulative balance and the aggregate monthly payment. On average, the PFMC reduces an 
individual’s cumulative balance by $585 on a control mean of $6,117, a modest (10%) and 
marginally statistically significant effect (p=0.081). This effect appears to operate on the 
intensive margin as the effect estimates for the extensive margin (column 2) are negative but 
statistically insignificant (p=0.328). The course also has an effect on individuals' aggregate 
monthly payments. Here, the PFMC reduces monthly payments on average by $28 on a control 
mean of $179, also a modest (16%) and statistically significant effect (p=0.018) and the effects 
also appear to operate on the intensive margin. These results suggest that the effects of the 
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PFMC operate primarily through the total use of credit, which is typically not identifiable using 
only credit reports and credit scores, highlighting the value of the detailed credit bureau data. 
Table 2.4. RD Estimates of the Effects of PFMC on Financial Outcomes in Year 1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Outcome Variable Y Pr (Y>0) Pr (Y>75 %ile) Y | Y>0 
                                                  Panel A: Probability (Active Credit) 75%ile = 1     
PFMC Effect 1.20   
Std Err (1.99)   
Control Mean 54.64   
Adj R2 0.1764               
N 33,391   
Clusters 257   
                                                            Panel B: Cumulative Balance 75%ile = $9,033     
PFMC Effect -585.43 * -1.85 -3.46 ** -757.88 *
Std Err (334.66) (1.89) (1.69) (400.01) 
Control Mean 6,116.89 81.73 25.33 7,483.95 
Adj R2 0.4516   0.1194   0.2831   0.4309   
N 33,931 33,931 33,931 27,614 
Clusters 257 257 257 255 
                                                               Panel C: Legal Action Index 75%ile = 0     
PFMC Effect 0.002   -0.114   -0.114   -0.009   
Std Err (0.039)   (1.015)   (1.015)   (0.449)   
Control Mean 0.193   5.20   5.20   3.71   
Adj R2 0.5341   0.2653   0.2653   0.5155   
N 33,931   33,931   33,931   1,845   
Clusters 257   257   257   215   
                                            Panel D: Aggregate Monthly Payment 75%ile = $308     
PFMC Effect -28.03 ** -1.25   -2.96   -40.16 *** 
Std Err (11.79)   (2.87)   (2.52)   (13.82)   
Control Mean 178.62   65.58   24.59   272.36   
Adj R2 0.3795   0.1368   0.2083   0.3618   
N 33,931   33,931   33,931   22,117   
Clusters 257   257   257   254   
                                                                         Panel E: Credit Score 75%ile = 641     
PFMC Effect -5.47 1.21 -1.69 -5.47 
Std Err (3.76) (2.01) (2.05) (3.76) 
Control Mean 577.50 86.67 22.00 577.50 
Adj R2 0.4349   0.1758   0.2629   0.4349   
N 29,318 33,931 33,931 29,318 
Clusters 256 257 257 256 
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Table 2.4, Continued 
Source: Department of Defense and Census Bureau Data. Notes: Sample as defined in the text and 
restated here. All data is for U.S. Army enlisted soldiers who enlisted between June 2006 and August 
2009 and completed AIT at a given location within the 12 month period before and after program 
implementation, excluding the month before, after and of program implementation. The cumulative 
balance outcome is the sum of individual account balances from automobile trades (loans and 
leases), credit card trades (bankcard and retail), finance trades and unpaid trades (charge offs and 
collection status codes). The legal action index outcome is the sum of an individual's liens, 
judgments, repossessions, foreclosures and bankruptcies. The aggregate monthly payment outcome 
is the sum of an individual's scheduled payments for all account types. The regression coefficients 
reported are for the discontinuity at the month of implementation. All regressions include the 
following covariates: a quadratic in age, quadratic in experience, indicators for female, married, 
minority, number of dependents and a summer entry, indicators for education levels less than or 
equal to high school, some college, and greater than or equal to college (high school graduate is the 
omitted category), AFQT score, enlistment term, average monthly base pay, median household 
income in the individual's zip code of record, AIT length, number of months deployed in the year, 
the credit score in the year prior to entry, the outcome value in the year prior to entry and fixed 
effects for an individuals' job, military branch, AIT location, and AIT start month. Indicator variables 
capture individuals missing pay, zip code income, credit score and lagged outcome variable data and 
these individuals are assigned values of zero for these variables. Heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors, clustered at the AIT location-month level, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * represent 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
     Having identified the primary effects of the PFMC on economic behavior, I now turn to more 
detailed analyses of the effects of the course on individuals’ cumulative balances throughout 
the distribution, over time, by balance type (auto, credit, finance and unpaid), by previous 
balance levels and through heterogeneous treatment effects.7 
2.6.D. PFMC Distributional Effects 
     In Figure 2.2., I present the effects of the PFMC on cumulative balances throughout the 
majority (0-95th percentile) of the balance distribution. As the graph shows, the PFMC point 
estimates are negative throughout the distribution and typically between a 1% and 6% 
reduction in the probability of a given balance level. However, the 95% confidence interval 
bands reveal that these point estimates are only statistically distinguishable from zero between 
                                                            
7 Since the monthly payments are a function of an individual’s balances, the aggregate monthly payment outcome 
is of secondary interest. Nonetheless, it reveals an important effect of the course: individuals who attended the 
course on average have smaller scheduled payments to creditors. 
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$8,000 and $14,000. The blue line (with square points) on Figure 2.2 depicts the scaled effect 
magnitude. At each $2000 interval along the distribution the blue line represent a scaled effect 
size for the PFMC on that balance level and these effects vary from a $500 to $5500 reduction. 
In the region of the distribution where the PFMC has statistically significant effects at α=0.05 
($8,000-15,000), the scaled effect size is on average $2,303, implying that the PFMC reduces 
balances by this amount for these balance levels. While the effects of the PFMC do not appear 
to operate on the extensive margin, the intensive margin effects also vary substantially with the 
most identifiable effects in the upper part of the distribution (roughly the 75th-85th percentiles). 
 
Figure 2.2. PFMC Effects on the Distribution of Cumulative Balances in Year 1 
Author compiled data using DOD and AER data for 2006-2009. The x-axis values reflect the 0-95th percentiles of the 
distribution for the Cumulative balances ($0-$24,778).The RD estimates and 95% confidence intervals reflect a 
series of regressions on indicator variables for the balance levels that correspond to the x-axis. For each bin (k) of 
binwidth $2000 on the x-axis [0,24000], I generate an indicator for balance levels in the $2000 bin [i.e., I=1 if 
k<TSP≤k+2000 and I=0 Otherwise]. I then complete RD regressions on the series of indicators and identify the 
effects of the PFMC in each bin. These estimates correspond to the left axis. To convert these probability estimates 
into a dollar effect magnitude I divide the RD estimate by f(k)/2000 where f(k)=Prob(k<TSP≤k+2000). These 
estimates are depicted in blue and correspond to the right axis. n=33,931. 
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2.6.E. PFMC Longitudinal Effects 
     While the military administrative data is censored in part during year 2, the size of the data 
set still affords evaluation of the cumulative monthly balances at this horizon. In Table 2.5 I 
present the RD estimates for the effects of the PFMC on cumulative balances for years 1 and 2. 
Table 2.5. RD Estimates of the Effects of PFMC on Cumulative Balance, by Year 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Outcome: Y Pr (Y>0) Pr (Y>75 %ile) Y | Y>0 
Δ No. 
Trades 
                                         Panel A: Year 1 Outcomes 75%ile = $9,033         
PFMC Effect -585.43 * -1.85 -3.46 ** -757.88 * 0.032
Std Err (334.66)  (1.89) (1.69) (400.01)   (0.102)
Control Mean 6,116.89  81.73 25.33 7,483.95   1.66
Adj R2 0.4516   0.1194   0.2831   0.4309   0.0548   
N 33,931  33,931 33,931 27,614   33,931
Clusters 257  257 257 255   257
                                      Panel B: Year 2 Outcomes 75%ile = $14,098         
PFMC Effect -889.79 * -0.40 -1.88 -604.09   0.131
Std Err (465.12)  (1.96) (2.04) (369.47)   (0.185)
Control Mean 8,535.52  88.82 27.36 9,609.49   1.64
Adj R2 0.2389   0.0769   0.1351   0.2201   0.1074   
N 31,014  31,014 31,014 27,188   31,014
Clusters 222  222 222 222   222
Source: Department of Defense, Census Bureau and Credit Bureau Data. Notes: Sample as defined in the 
text. Regression specifications as described in Table 2.4. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, 
clustered at the AIT location-month level, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
The estimates in Table 2.5 reveal that the balance reductions caused by the PFMC carry over to 
year 2. On average, the PFMC reduces an individual’s cumulative balance in year 2 by $889 on a 
control mean of $8,535, a similar size (10%) effect as in year 1, with marginal statistical 
significance (p=0.082). Once again the effect appears to operate on the intensive margin and at 
relatively high balance levels (the point estimate at the 75th percentile is insignificant [col 3] but 
the conditionally positive point estimate approaches significance [col4], p=0.104). Overall, the 
results in Table 2.5 suggest that the PFMC reduces cumulative balances through at least year 2. 
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2.6.F. PFMC Effects by Types of Balances 
Table 2.6. RD Estimates of the Effects of PFMC on Cumulative Balance in Year 1, by Type 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Outcome Variable Y = Balance Pr (Y>0) Pr (Y>75 %ile) Y | Y>0 Δ No. Trades 
Panel A: Cumulative Balance for Open Trades
    75%ile = $9,033     
PFMC Effect -585.43 * -1.85 -3.46 ** -757.88 * 0.032
Std Err (334.66) (1.89) (1.69) (400.01)   (0.102)
Control Mean 6,116.89 81.73 25.33 7,483.95   1.664
Adj R2 0.4516   0.1194   0.2831   0.4309   0.0548   
N 33,931 33,931 33,931 27,614   33,931
Clusters 257 257 257 255   257
Panel B: Cumulative Balance for Open Automobile Trades
    75%ile = $0     
PFMC Effect -656.06 ** -4.55 ** -4.55 ** -453.38   -0.035 *
Std Err (272.04) (1.82) (1.82) (566.41)   (0.021)
Control Mean 2,950.15 41.83 22.60 13,053.69   0.176
Adj R2 0.2632   0.2404   0.2404   0.1012   0.0432   
N 33,931 33,931 33,931 7,353   33,931
Clusters 257 257 257 246   257
Panel C: Cumulative Balance for Credit Card Trades
    75%ile = $853     
PFMC Effect -147.22 -2.35 -4.73 ** -187.99   -0.011
Std Err (91.49) (2.83) (2.17) (145.25)   (0.068)
Control Mean 826.61 49.39 26.84 1,673.74   0.795
Adj R2 0.2807   0.0935   0.1144   0.3155   0.0753   
N 33,931 33,931 33,931 15,822   33,931
Clusters 257 257 257 253   257
Panel D: Cumulative Balance for Open Finance Trades
    75%ile = $0     
PFMC Effect -84.59   -3.14 ** -3.14 ** -70.91   -0.046 * 
Std Err (60.93)   (1.54)   (1.54)   (435.68)   (0.026)   
Control Mean 325.57   9.62   9.62   3,385.34   0.096   
Adj R2 0.2931   0.1281   0.1281   0.3861   0.0721   
N 33,931 33,931 33,931 3,904   33,931
Clusters 257 257 257 226   257
Panel E: Cumulative Balance for Open Unpaid Trades
    75%ile = $1,342     
PFMC Effect 180.51 1.25 4.44 ** 451.08 * 0.115 *
Std Err (114.29) (2.29) (2.11) (242.07)   (0.069)
Control Mean 1,786.21 47.36 23.53 3,771.69   0.597
Adj R2 0.6192   0.3340   0.3898   0.5706   0.0504   
N 33,931 33,931 33,931 16,389   33,931
Clusters 257 257 257 253   257
Source: Department of Defense, Census Bureau and Credit Bureau Data. Notes: Sample as defined in the text. 
Regression specifications as described in Table 2.5. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, clustered at the AIT 
location-month level, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively. 
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     Since the PFMC effect estimates on the balance levels are large (over $1,000 in year 1), 
implying a relatively fast effect and since there exists more detailed evidence on the 
composition of these balances, I now turn to analyzing the effects of the PFMC on cumulative 
balances by the type of account. In Table 2.6 I present the estimates of the PFMC on account 
balances in year 1. In addition to the average (column 1), extensive margin (column 2) and 
intensive margin (columns 3 and 4) estimates, I also analyze another intensive margin, the 
number of new trades (accounts) in each type of account during year 1 in column 5. 
     The most significant finding from Table 2.6 is that the only balance type that the PFMC 
significantly affects is automobile trade balances (Panel B). The Panel B estimates reveal that 
the PFMC reduces auto trade (loans and leases) balances in year 1, on average, by $656 on a 
control mean of $2,950, a moderate (22%) and statistically significant effect (p=0.017) effect. In 
addition, the effects appear to operate on the extensive margin, reducing the probability of 
having an auto trade balance by 4.55%, a modest (11%) and statistically significant effect 
(p=0.013). This extensive margin effect has a few potential sources: the PFMC might discourage 
some soldiers from purchasing or leasing an automobile in year 1 who might have otherwise; it 
might encourage soldiers with existing auto balances to sell their car, perhaps through 
highlighting the complete costs of owning a car or the limited need for a car if deploying; finally, 
the PFMC might encourage soldiers with existing auto balances to reduce their balances, 
through higher monthly payments, renegotiation of interest rates that facilitate repayment 
prior to the year 1 observation, selling the automobile or foregoing new vehicle purchases. 
From a review of the PFMC course materials, all of these possibilities are potential outcomes 
from the car buying lesson.  I explore the automobile trade effects in more detail below. 
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     The second conclusion from Table 2.6 is that the PFMC does not appear, on average, to have 
statistically significant effects on credit card trade (Panel B) balances (p=0.109), finance trade 
(Panel D) balances (p=0.166) or unpaid trade (Panel E) balances (p=0.116), though all of these 
estimates approach statistical significance at the α=0.10 level. 
2.6.F. PFMC Effects by Previous Balance Levels 
     The results presented in Table 2.6 suggest that the main effects of the PFMC operate via 
automobile trade decisions. In this section I analyze the effects of the PFMC on individual 
financial decisions in this area by individual account balance levels in the year prior to entry into 
the Army (year 0). In Table 2.7 I present the results of this analysis for automobile trades. The 
results in Panel A restate the primary effects of the PFMC on automobile trade balances, with 
more detailed analyses of the distributional effects of the PFMC. These results suggest that the 
average effects are concentrated at the lower end of the automobile balance distribution 
(columns 2 and 3).  
     The results in Panel B suggest that for individuals with no existing auto balances, the PFMC 
reduces the total auto balances, on average, by $360 on a control mean of $2,132, a moderate 
(17%) effect that is not significant at conventional levels (p=0.273). This is surprising given that 
the PFMC encourages more frugal car buying for students and a substantive number with no 
existing balances in year 0 buy a car in year 1 (n=4,165). However, given the reduced sample 
size and the indicative p-value (0.273) there might be an effect on this group as well. In 
90 
 
addition, most individuals do not buy a car in year 1, suggesting that the PFMC effects might 
not be visible for this group at this time horizon.8   
Table 2.7. RD Estimates of the Effects of PFMC on Automobile Trade Balances in Year 1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Y = Balance Pr (Y>0) Pr (Y>$5K) Pr (Y>$15K) Pr(Y>$25K) Δ # Trades
Panel A: All Automobile Trades
PFMC Effect -656.06 ** -4.55 ** -4.87 *** -0.86 -0.01   -0.035 *
Std Err (272.04)   (1.82) (1.66) (1.41) (0.75)   (0.021)
p-value 0.017   0.013 0.004 0.542 0.990   0.092
Control Mean 2,950.15   22.60 20.36 7.68 1.33   0.176
Adj R2 0.2632   0.2404 0.2279 0.1354 0.0730   0.0432
N 33,931   33,931 33,931 33,931 33,931   33,931
Clusters 257   257 257 257 257   257
Panel B: Subsample with No Year 0 Auto Trade Balance
PFMC Effect -359.81   -3.52 -3.64 * 1.12 0.68   -0.035
Std Err (327.48)   (2.13) (2.00) (1.27) (0.68)   (0.024)
p-value 0.273   0.100 0.069 0.376 0.317   0.144
Control Mean 2,131.54   15.76 14.92 5.56 0.68   0.175
Adj R2 0.0480   0.0505 0.0479 0.0217 0.0060   0.0495
N 29,629   29,629 29,629 29,629 29,629   29,629
Clusters 256   256 256 256 256   256
Panel C: Subsample with Positive Year 0 Auto Trade Balance 
PFMC Effect -1,590.40 ** -6.70 -2.55 -9.05 ** -2.82   0.003
Std Err (659.65)   (4.55) (4.76) (3.75) (2.80)   (0.056)
p-value 0.017   0.142 0.592 0.017 0.316   0.956
Control Mean 9,094.03   73.92 61.20 23.64 6.18   0.186
Adj R2 0.3647   0.0757 0.1922 0.2850 0.1122   0.0367
N 4,302   4,302 4,302 4,302 4,302   4,302
Clusters 244   244 244 244 244   244
Source: Department of Defense, Census Bureau and Credit Bureau Data. Notes: Sample as defined in the text 
with caveats noted in each panel title. Regression specifications as described in Table 2.5. Heteroskedasticity 
robust standard errors, clustered at the AIT location-month level, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * 
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
     The results in Panel C suggest that for individuals with an existing auto balance, the PFMC 
reduces the total auto balances in year 1, on average, by $1,590 on a control mean of $9,094, a 
moderate (17%) effect that is significant (p=0.017). Here the PFMC effects might operate 
                                                            
8 The results for the Panel B subsample in year two suggests that the PFMC reduces automobile balances for those 
without year 0 balances by $514 on a control mean of $3,748, a modest (14%) reduction that is marginally 
significant (p=0.071). The effect is divided between the extensive margin (about 35% of the effect) and the 
probability of automobile trade balances greater than $5K (about 65% of the effect), suggesting that the PFMC 
encourages both a delay in car buying and improved car buying (better negotiations or more affordable car 
selection). 
91 
 
through several channels: treated individuals could pay down their balances at higher rates 
than their control group counterparts; treated individuals might obtain balance reductions 
through negotiating for reduced interest rates or other fees; treated individuals might sell their 
automobiles at higher rates than their control counterparts, if the course raises the awareness 
of the total costs of car ownership; finally, treated individuals might lower their balances 
through trading in their current car for a less expensive one, by foregoing or delaying the 
purchase or lease of new and more expensive cars, or by upgrading their current automobiles 
for more affordable automobiles relative to the control group. I explore each of these below. 
     The first mechanism (paying larger portions of the balance) is possible given the PFMC 
emphasis on the costs of interest or the total costs of late payments. However, this mechanism 
requires considerable flexibility in an individual’s monthly disposable income, which is less likely 
for military members on a fixed income and in particular, for married individuals or individuals 
with children. I discuss and discount this possibility below, since the subsample in Panel C is on 
average older, more likely to be married and has more dependents (spouse plus children) than 
the subsample in Panel B. 
     The second mechanism (renegotiated terms) is a potential outcome of the course’s coverage 
of the Servicemember’s Civil Relief Act (SCRA), a federal consumer protection law for military 
service members.9 The relevant portion of the SCRA for this analysis is the mandated maximum 
6% interest rates that creditors can charge military members on debt that existed at their time 
of entry into the military. As part of the lesson on credit, the PFMC reviews the SCRA and 
                                                            
9 The SCRA, also known as the “Soldiers & Sailors Act” is a federal law that mandates a number of protections for 
individuals who join the Active Duty military. For more information on SCRA provisions, see: 
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/SCRA.aspx.  
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highlights its protections for soldiers. It also provides students with an example letter in the 
student handbook that students can complete and submit to creditors to obtain interest rate 
reductions.10 If the PFMC increases the probability that individuals obtain SCRA protection then 
it should reduce individual account balances and payments as evidenced in this section. 
Unfortunately, the credit bureau data contains no indications of SCRA protection and without 
monthly panel data the interest rates cannot be reliably computed and compared to determine 
if rates decreased in any given area. This element of the SCRA requires an understanding of the 
law and its requirements by individuals and additional action by them to improve their financial 
standing. As such, the SCRA rewards informed and motivated individuals. But the PFMC 
information about the SCRA and provision of a sample creditor notification letter clearly lower 
the costs of obtaining protection. In this way, claiming SCRA protection is a combination of 
human financial capital (awareness and action) and behavioral assistance (lowering the costs of 
action). As with the retirement savings effects discussed in Chapter 1, the PFMC appears to 
improve the financial situation of its students through a combination of knowledge and 
assistance. To assess whether this mechanism can explain the observed average effects (a 
$1,590 reduction), I conduct sensitivity analysis using a six parameter model of auto loans 
(purchase price, down payment percentage, loan term, interest rate, month of loan relative to 
joining the military and month in the military when the SCRA notification occurs) to compute 
                                                            
 
10 Once notified of qualified debt by a soldier, a creditor is required to take several steps, including: reducing the 
individual’s interest rate to 6% APR for all payments for the existing debt during the individual’s service; forgive 
interest balances in excess of 6%; and the 6% APR must include all fees. Upon notification of qualified debt, the 
creditor typically calculates the account balance at the time of entry into service and reamortizes the payments at 
the new interest rate. Such procedures typically result in lower account balances and lower monthly payments for 
individuals. Based on author phone conversations and email discussions with executives at large financial 
institutions during spring 2012. For additional information on the required steps, see as a reference a DOJ manual 
on SCRA provisions at: http://www.justice.gov/usao/az/rights/Servicemembers_Civil_Relief_Act.pdf. 
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the principle owed at month 6 in year 1 (when I observe individuals on average), recomputed 
the balance if the loan was refinanced at 6% APR, and determine the potential balance 
reductions from SCRA protection.11 I then vary the parameters to determine what conditions 
might generate the observed savings levels. Only variations in the automobile price and interest 
rate can generate these savings levels, but holding all other parameters constant, the average 
price would have to be $62,105, or the interest rate would have to be over 43%. This 
automobile balance is nearly seven times the actual average automobile balance for this group 
in the data ($8,992) and the interest rate is nearly six times the national average for commercial 
bank auto loans with 48 month terms (7.52%) based on Federal Reserve Data during the period 
under study.12 These conditions are unreasonable as average parameters and as a result, the 
SCRA cannot fully explain the PFMC results for the automobile balances among this group in 
year 1.13  In addition, the SCRA benefits assist all individuals with existing debt but the effects 
are visible only in the middle of the automobile balance distribution (balances greater than 
$25K). The SCRA mechanism might reasonably explain roughly 25% of the observed effect 
($384/$1,590). 
                                                            
 
11 In the baseline specification I assume a $15,000 automobile loan with 10% down ($1,500), a 48 month term, 
taken 12 months prior to military entry with SCRA notification made at month 2 of military service (during AIT). 
These parameters generate an estimated average savings from SCRA protection at month 6 of $384. 
 
12 Federal Reserve data on average automobile loan rates by institution type can be found at the Board of 
Governors website. Accessed April 18, 2012 at: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/hist/cc_hist_tc.html.  
 
13 There are two facts supporting the conclusion about the reasonability of these parameter estimates. First, since 
the estimated reduction of $1,590 is an average effect, it would require that all individuals with existing auto 
balances be eligible for and file for SCRA protection. In the most comparable research on behavioral assistance, 
Bettinger, Long and Oreopoulos (2009) find average effects of 30-40% in the context of financial aid. So it is 
unlikely that every student will take advantage of the SCRA even once informed about its potential benefits. If 
every student did not take advantage, then the required savings for those who did obtain SCRA protection would 
have to be even larger than $1,590, an unsupportable benefit level given the empirical distribution of auto loans in 
the sample. 
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     The third mechanism (greater likelihood to sell) is possible given the emphasis on the total 
costs of car ownership but implies elastic demand for automobiles among this group (i.e., for 
young, single, non-parent individuals who have less need for a car early in their military service, 
as they typically live on base with access to food and other shopping). To test the feasibility of 
this explanation, in Table 2.8 I compare selected individual characteristics for the individuals in 
the subsamples in Panel B and Panel C. As the results show, the individuals in Panel C are less 
likely to have elastic demand for automobiles given their ages, marital statuses and number of 
dependents. In addition, if treatment induces selling cars then the change in the number of 
automobile trades during year 1 would be more negative for treated individuals. As column 6 of 
Table 2.7 reveals though, the course has no statistically significant effects on the change in the 
number of trades from year 0 to year 1 (p=0.956). Thus the third mechanism seems unlikely. 
Table 2.8. Selected Summary Statistics by Auto Balances in Year 0 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Full Matched 
Sample 
No Previous 
Balance (Panel B) 
Positive Previous 
Balance (Panel C) Difference 
  N=26,050 N=21,747 N=4,303 (3)-(2) 
Variable Mean (Std Dev) Mean (Std Dev) Mean (Std Dev) Mean   (Std Err) 
Age, years 22.65 (4.21) 22.39 (4.09) 23.97 (4.52) -1.58 *** (0.07) 
Married, % 24.46 (42.98) 22.07 (41.47) 36.53 (48.16) -14.47 *** (0.71) 
Number of dependents 1.04 (1.28) 0.98 (1.26) 1.32 (1.38) -0.33 *** (0.02) 
Source: Department of Defense, Census Bureau and Credit Bureau Data. Notes: Sample as defined in the text. Here 
the sample is restricted to those individuals with matched credit records in the year prior to entry into the Army 
(year 0). Column 2 reports the summary statistics for the subsample with no previous automobile trade balances 
and column 3 reports the summary statistics for the subsample with previous automobile trade balances. Column 
4 reports the differences in the means by subsample, the standard errors for the differences and the significance 
levels for the t-tests of the equality of means. ***, **, * represent statistical significance for the difference in 
means at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
     Finally, the fourth mechanism would require treated individuals to lower their balances 
through trading in their current car for a less expensive one, by foregoing or delaying the 
purchase or lease of new and more expensive cars, or by upgrading their current automobiles 
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for more affordable automobiles relative to the control group. This scenario seems the most 
likely given the inability of the other four explanations above to explain more than about 25% 
of the treatment effect. In addition, the demographic analysis (Table 2.8) suggests that this 
group has inelastic demand for automobiles and the subsample analysis (Table 2.7) suggests 
that the effects operate via the average balance (specifically a reduced probability of balances 
greater than $15K as shown in column 4) and not via the number of automobile trades. It thus 
appears that the immediate effects of the PFMC is to persuade individuals with existing 
balances to be more frugal in their car purchases and leases, through trading down, foregoing 
an upgrade or upgrading to a lesser degree than those in the control group.  
2.6.G. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
     In this section I explore the heterogeneous treatment effects for the PFMC with individual 
characteristics on the cumulative balance. I test for heterogeneous effects along the same 
categories as in Chapter 1: gender, human capital, SES and marital status. In addition I test for 
differences by individuals’ year 0 credit score quartiles. In Table 2.9, I present RD estimates for 
these heterogeneous treatment effects for individuals’ cumulative balances. As the estimates 
reveal, only one characteristic, the fourth quartile of year 0 credit scores, has a statistically 
significant interaction with treatment. The interaction effect in column 5 suggests that treated 
individuals with high credit scores reduce their cumulative balances by $1,134 relative to 
treated individuals with credit scores in the lower two quartiles (the omitted category, which 
has credit scores equal to 0 based on the matched records in year 0). None of the other 
categories have statistically significant interaction effects with the PFMC. 
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2.6.H. Discussion of Results 
     The PFMC appears to improve the financial behavior and financial outcomes for its students. 
Relative to individuals that did not complete the course, the PFMC has statistically significant 
positive effects for two of the five principle outcomes evaluated here and no statistically 
significant effects for the remaining outcomes. Specifically, the PFMC appears to reduce 
cumulative account balances by about 10%, reduce aggregate monthly payments by about 16%, 
while having statistically insignificant effects on the probability of being active in the credit 
market, individual credit scores and the adverse legal action index. For two of these outcomes 
(probability of active credit and credit score), the theoretical predictions were unclear and 
unfortunately, this analysis cannot shed any light on the empirical relationship between 
financial education and the outcome. For the adverse legal action index, it appears that the 
PFMC is, on average, unable to reduce the incidence of severely negative financial outcomes for 
students. The attenuating effects of leadership and role models and the availability of alternate 
financial education might both be particularly strong effects in this context as Army leaders will 
act to assist soldiers and minimize the incidence of these legal actions. Alternately, these 
outcomes might be rare and unlikely at this time horizon. Nonetheless, this result is still 
discouraging for the role of education in mitigating severely negative financial outcomes. 
     One encouraging aspect of these findings is the absence of any finding of an increase in 
individual credit financing to offset the increased retirement savings demonstrated in Chapter 
1. If the PFMC did not induce individuals to change their consumption preferences or budgeting 
and spending procedures, the $17 average increase in retirement savings in year 1 ($33 in year 
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2) that the PFMC generates might be offset with increased credit financing. There is no 
evidence here of such an increase, implying that even if the credit outcome effects analyzed of 
the PFMC analyzed here were zero, the course would be on-balance welfare enhancing for 
individuals. To the extent that the course improves budgeting or increases preferences for 
saving and future consumption, these effects might continue to improve individual financial 
outcomes relative to those that did not attend the course.  
Treatment Effect Mechanism 
     One of the primary goals of this research was to estimate the effects of financial education 
on financial behaviors where the effects of human capital could be separated from the effects 
of behavioral assistance. In Chapter 1 I demonstrated that the combined effects were large in 
the context of retirement savings in the Thrift Savings Plan. Unfortunately, as described above 
in Section 2.5, these effects may not be differentiable in this research. Given the role of the 
SCRA and the PFMC assistance in obtaining SCRA protections and benefits, the large and 
significant effects of the PFMC in reducing automobile trade balances should also be considered 
the combined effects of learning about the SCRA (perhaps 25% of the effect on automobile 
balances) and more general consumer awareness and motivation and human capital (the 
remaining 75% of the effect).  
     Overall, the estimates presented here suggest that the PFMC has a number of beneficial 
effects on overall financial behavior. However, the mechanism for these effects is not as precise 
as might be desired. Given the size, quasi-experimental nature, and rich data sources used in 
this analysis, separating and measuring these effects will be difficult for future research. More 
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precise mechanism identification and estimation in future work will likely require similarly large 
experiments, detailed financial outcome data and either high frequency outcome data (in cases 
where the financial education develops both human capital and provides assistance to 
students) or a course that provides only human capital development and no assistance. 
Threats to Identification 
     While the randomization tests in Chapter 1 established that the observable characteristics 
were unrelated to treatment and the sample used here is a random sample of the full sample, 
there remains the possibility that within this sample the observed effects are driven by 
differences in the characteristics of the control and treatment groups. To discount this 
possibility, in Table 2.10 (Panel B), I present the results of an additional randomization test for 
this sample. As the results, show, once again, the observable characteristics are unrelated to 
treatment. Of the 20 observable characteristics, none are statistically related to treatment at 
the α=0.05 level and only one (AFQT Score) is statistically related to treatment at the α=0.10 
level, no more than what we would expect by chance. In addition, the AFQT finding, with a 
lower AFQT score among the treatment group, would bias against a finding of PFMC benefits 
since AFQT correlates positively with desirable financial behaviors. Table 2.10 also reveals that 
there is no selection in attrition between the control and treatment group (Panel A). 
Interpretation of Estimates 
     The magnitude interpretations for the estimates in this chapter are the same as in Chapter 1. 
Delays in training, absences, peer or role model effects and simultaneous financial literacy 
training elsewhere in the Army will all attenuate the estimates in my estimates. As a result, 
these estimates should serve as lower bounds for the effects of the PFMC on financial behavior. 
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Table 2.10. Randomization Tests for Credit Sample 
                Mean in 
Control Variable Coeff (Std Err) p-value Sig Adj-R2 Obs Clusters 
Panel A. Credit Matching Outcomes for Year 1 and Year 2 Samples 
Prob (Record Not Matched) Yr 1 0.73 (1.89) 0.697   0.0074 41,303 257 16.76 
Prob (Record Not Matched) Yr 2 0.65 (2.08) 0.756   0.2646 41,303 257 12.42 
Panel B. Individual Characteristics for Year 1 Sample 
Age 0.30 (0.270) 0.2641   0.0240 33,931 257 21.70 
Experience 0.28 (0.243) 0.2540   0.0266 33,931 257 3.82 
Female 5.04 (5.91) 0.3948   0.0112 33,931 257 11.92 
Married 2.92 (2.29) 0.2027   0.0051 33,931 257 19.23 
Number of Dependents 0.09 (0.061) 0.1194   0.0061 33,931 257 0.94 
Education ≤ HS Graduate 0.10 (0.370) 0.7904   0.0337 33,931 257 0.02 
Education = HS Graduate -0.11 (1.694) 0.9487   0.0098 33,931 257 91.22 
Education = Some College 0.43 (1.056) 0.6862   0.0024 33,931 257 6.37 
Education ≥ College Graduate -0.42 (0.931) 0.6548   0.0013 33,931 257 2.39 
Minority 6.62 (6.04) 0.2741   0.0098 33,931 257 29.26 
AFQT Score -3.89 (2.24) 0.0838 * 0.0356 33,931 257 56.20 
Summer Enlistment -5.73 (5.15) 0.2668   0.6977 33,931 257 36.98 
Enlistment Term Length -0.02 (0.14) 0.8823   0.0398 33,931 257 3.85 
AIT Length (Months) -0.07 (0.30) 0.8059   0.1041 33,931 257 3.17 
Monthly Basic Pay 8.84 (18.74) 0.6375   0.1678 33,931 257 1,605 
Median HH Income in Home Zip -1,560 (1065) 0.1442   0.6963 33,931 257 42,204 
Months Deployed 0.17 (0.23) 0.4494   0.0337 33,931 257 1.06 
Panel C. Lagged Credit Outcomes for Year 1 Sample 
Credit Score in Yr 0 -12.18 (14.59) 0.4046   0.0214 33,931 257 555.22 
Predicted Score for Yr 0 -11.68 (14.44) 0.4193   0.0209 33,931 257 555.03 
Missing Score for Yr 0 1.62 (2.65) 0.5417   0.0239 33,931 257 46.00 
Prob(Credit Active) in Yr 0 -3.01 (2.19) 0.1700   0.0019 25,998 255 71.92 
Agg. Monthly Payment in Yr 0 53.65 (895.81) 0.9523   0.0061 33,931 257 86.53 
Adverse Legal Action Index in Yr 0 2.24 (3.63) 0.5376   0.0008 33,931 257 0.18 
Cumulative Balance in Yr 0 1,623 (35,878) 0.964   0.0069 33,931 257 3,428 
Auto Trades Balance in Yr 0 4,629 (19,386) 0.8115   0.0029 33,931 257 1,404 
Credit Card Trades Balance in Yr 0 -6,855 (6,325) 0.2795   0.0035 33,931 257 353.55 
Finance Trades Balance in Yr 0 1,361 (5,584) 0.8076   0.0005 33,931 257 209.50 
Unpaide Balances in Yr 0 -2,314 (16,293) 0.8872   0.0087 33,931 257 1,276 
Source: Department of Defense, Census Bureau and Credit Bureau Data. Notes: All data is for U.S. Army enlisted soldiers 
who enlisted between June 2006 and August 2009 and completed AIT at a given location within the 12 month period 
before and after program implementation, excluding the month just before, of and after program implementation. Each 
cell reports the RD estimate for the effect of the discontinuity at the month of program implementation on the covariate 
specified in the respective row. All regressions include the running variable (event month relative to program 
implementation), an indicator for positive values of the running variable, an interaction between the running variable 
and the discontinuity indicator, and fixed effects for the month that the individual began AIT. The monthly pay data is 
restricted to the individuals for whom this data was not missing (n=32,456 in full sample; n=14,629 in control); the 
median household income is restricted to the individuals for whom this data was not missing (n=13,583 in full sample; 
n=11,423 in control). The regressions in Panel B are all for the credit records that are matched in the individual's first 
year, beginning with AIT. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, clustered at the AIT location-month level, are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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2.7. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
     In this section I complete a series of robustness checks to validate the experimental validity, 
estimated effects and interpretations presented in Sections 2.1 through 2.6. Given the series of 
robustness checks in Chapter 1 that validated the quasi-experimental setup used in this 
analysis, I forego the analyses presenting regression estimates with and without covariates, 
balance of covariate event studies and predicted outcome event studies. The randomization 
test results in Section 2.6 validate the experimental design used in this analysis and subsume 
these omitted analyses. I focus instead on two robustness checks: comparing the estimated 
effects using the full matched sample and the subsample for individuals with active credit and 
functional form validation for my regression discontinuity estimates. 
2.7.A. PFMC Effects by Matched Sample vs. Active Credit Subsample 
     In Section 2.4 I explained the rationale for imputing zeros for the balances and account 
trades for individuals with matched but inactive credit records. To demonstrate that the results 
are not driven by inclusion of these records, in Table 2.12 I present my estimates for the three 
relevant outcomes (omitting the probability of an active record and the credit score, since 
imputation was impossible for these outcomes) for the full matched sample (n=33,931) and the 
matched sample with active records (n=29,318).  
As the estimates reveal, the findings hold for both samples. The findings are generally larger for 
the active sample but the control group means are also larger, suggesting roughly similar effect 
magnitudes (for example, 10% for the full sample cumulative balance effect vs. 12% for the 
active sample cumulative balance effect and 16% for the full sample aggregate monthly 
payment effect vs. 18% for the active sample payment effect). The statistical significances are 
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also stronger in the active credit sample. Overall, these results demonstrate that the findings 
hold for the full matched sample and the active credit sample. 
 
Table 2.11. Effects of PFMC on Financial Outcomes in Year 1, by Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Probability 
(Active 
Credit) 
Cumulative 
Balance 
Adverse 
Legal 
Action 
Index 
Aggregate 
Monthly 
Payment 
Credit 
Score 
Outcome Variable 
Panel A: Full Sample (Matched Record) 
PFMC Effect 1.20   -585.43 * 0.002   -28.03 ** -5.47   
Std Err (1.99)   (334.66)   (0.039)   (11.79)   (3.76)   
Control Mean 54.64   6,117   0.193   178.62   577.50   
Adj R2 0.1764   0.4516   0.5341   0.3795   0.4349   
N 33,391   33,931   33,931   33,931   29,318   
Clusters 257   257   257   257   256   
Panel B: Active Credit Sample (Matched and Active Record) 
PFMC Effect N/A   -807.23 ** 0.007   -37.61 *** -5.47   
Std Err     (381.79)   (0.046)   (13.06)   (3.76)   
Control Mean     6,969   0.217   205.91   577.50   
Adj R2     0.4316   0.5290   0.3594   0.4349   
N     29,318   29,318   29,318   29,318   
Clusters     256   256   256   256   
Source: Department of Defense, Census Bureau and Credit Bureau Data. Notes: Sample as defined in 
the text. Regression specifications as described in Table 2.5. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, 
clustered at the AIT location-month level, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
2.7.B. Regression Discontinuity Functional Form 
     In Table 2.12 I present my regression estimates for the main outcome of interest, the 
cumulative balance in year 1, by functional form. Here the estimates vary by form and the 
average of all six estimates is -$595.  
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Table 2.12. RD Estimates of the Effects of PFMC on Cumulative Balance in Year 1, by 
Functional Form 
  
Linear Quadratic Cubic 
Local Linear 
  BW=4 Mo BW=6 Mo BW=8 Mo 
Form: (1) (2) (3)     (4)     (5)     (6) 
Panel A: Cumulative Balance 
PFMC Effect -585 * -172   -145   2,888 ** -2,812   -2,743   
Std Err (335)   (583)   (793)   (1,399)   (2,257)   (2,379)   
Control Mean 6,117   6,117   6,117   6,117   6,117   6,117   
Adj R2 0.4516   0.4516   0.4516   0.5245   0.4961   0.4812   
N 33,931   33,931   33,931   3,897   10,921   18,438   
Clusters 257   257   257   53   105   157   
Source: Department of Defense, Census Bureau and Credit Bureau Data. Notes: Sample as defined in the text. 
Regression specifications as described in Table 2.5. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, clustered at 
the AIT location-month level, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
2.8. EXTERNAL VALIDITY 
     In Section 1.8 I present a detailed discussion of the external validity of the PFMC.  One 
additional consideration for the external validity of the course in the context of credit outcomes 
is the potential importance of the Servicemembers’ Civil Relief Act (SCRA). Since the SCRA 
provides unique benefits to individuals joining the military, similar lessons and potential 
benefits might be unavailable in other financial education programs, especially the desirable 
protection of a maximum interest rate of 6% on existing debts. For this population, the 
integration of financial education efforts with consumer awareness information and practical 
assistance (how to file for SCRA protection) is undoubtedly appropriate and, based on the 
empirical estimates here, potentially valuable. To the extent that there are other consumer 
protection laws that apply to different student populations, perhaps one goal of these 
programs should be to educate students about their rights and assist them, to the extent 
possible, in obtaining the appropriate legal protections and available benefits. In this sense, 
financial education may be most successful when the awareness inherent in human capital 
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development is combined with practical assistance to overcome behavioral tendencies to 
procrastinate or otherwise discount the future. 
 
2.9. SUMMARY 
     This paper estimates the effects of financial education on economic behavior. I employ a 
natural experiment in the U.S. Army that implemented a mandatory 8 hour personal financial 
management course (PFMC) in a quasi-experimental manner. Previous research has shown that 
this course has large, pervasive and persistent effects on retirement savings but the mechanism 
for these effects is unclear. In this paper I use administrative data and individually matched 
credit data to estimate the effects of financial education on a variety of financial outcomes 
including credit scores, credit balances for several types of accounts, monthly payments and 
adverse legal actions. In some areas I find that the PFMC has positive effects, reducing 
cumulative account balances (especially for automobile and credit card accounts) and 
aggregate monthly payments. In other areas, including credit scores, the probability of being 
active in the credit market and the number of adverse legal actions, the PFMC has no 
statistically significant effects on financial behavior. 
     While one of the principle goals of this research was to determine if the beneficial effects of 
financial education operated via human capital development, behavioral assistance or a 
combination of these two mechanisms, the existing data does not provide conclusive evidence 
on this question. In the context of retirement savings and more general financial behavior, it 
appears that the PFMC’s benefits are the result of a strategic combination of education and 
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assistance. From an academic perspective this is disappointing in that it leaves open the 
unanswered question of the “teachability” of financial literacy. From a policy perspective, 
however, this research demonstrates in the largest experiment to date, the significant and 
lasting effects of carefully designed financial literacy education that is actionable in its content 
and methods. 
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Appendix 2.1 
Summary of Matching Process for Administrative and Credit Data 
 
     This appendix summarizes the results of the merge of military administrative and credit 
bureau data.14 15 Figure 2.3 depicts the results of the merge for Year 1 outcomes.16 
 
Figure 2.3. Sample Sizes and Match Statistics for Year 1 Credit Outcomes 
Author compiled data based on the results of the individual-level data merge of Army 
administrative data and credit bureau data. 
 
The merge results are largely successful: 82.15% of submitted observations were matched by 
the credit bureau in Year 1. Individuals in the “Attrited” category were not matched based on 
the credit bureau’s search algorithm and the Army administrative data. Individuals in the 
                                                            
14 For more information on the sample selection and merge process, see the first footnote in Appendix 1.1. 
 
15 The data submission, security and matching process were handled by authorized DOD and credit bureau 
personnel. After initial coordination and price negotiation by the author, Army personnel completed and 
supervised the contract creation, legal review, contract signing, data security protocol establishment and data 
submission. Credit bureau personnel then matched the data and returned the matched sample without any 
personally identifying information. The process took approximately 5 months. 
16 The match rates vary for each potential outcome year since individuals may enter or leave the credit market. 
Similar statistics are available for the Year 2 and Year 3 outcomes from the author upon request. 
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“Inactive” category were matched but have no credit score or detailed data available due to 
infrequent transactions and activity. Individuals in the “Active” category were matched and 
have all items of the credit bureau data available for the appropriate period. Attrition is 
unrelated to treatment (p=0.6974), validating the use of matched individuals as representative 
of the full sample. Being active in the credit market is an outcome of potential interest and 
tested above in Section 1.3. 
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Appendix 2.2 
Complete Regression Results for the PFMC Effects on Cumulative Balance in Year 1 
 
Table 2.13. Complete Regression Results for PFMC Effects on Cumulative Balance in Year 1 
Panel A: Parameter Estimates 
Variable Coefficient (Std Err) p-value Significance 
PFMC Effect (Discontinuity) -585.43 (334.66) 0.081 * 
Cohort Month -152.56 (135.68) 0.262   
PFMC*Cohort Month -0.26 (35.11) 0.994   
Age -120.69 (243.28) 0.620   
Age2 2.25 (5.26) 0.669   
Experience -83.46 (92.83) 0.369   
Experience2 1.20 (5.49) 0.828   
Female -185.92 (138.49) 0.181   
Married 1,425.28 (143.10) 0.000 *** 
Number of Dependents 374.02 (45.65) 0.000 *** 
Education ≤ High School Graduate, % -355.31 (382.94) 0.354   
Education = High School Graduate, % 481.02 (206.33) 0.021 ** 
Education = Some College, % 515.04 (482.20) 0.286   
Education ≥ College Graduate, % 80.73 (78.92) 0.307   
Minority, % -19.44 (2.27) 0.000 *** 
AFQT Score, Percentile 171.79 (157.47) 0.276   
Enlistment Term Length, Years 179.29 (51.89) 0.001 *** 
Monthly Basic Pay, $ 1.29 (0.15) 0.000 *** 
Socioeconomic Status -0.0092 (0.0036) 0.011 ** 
Months Deployed -96.17 (20.16) 0.000 *** 
Credit Score in Year 0 0.8980 (0.1715) 0.000 *** 
Cumulative Balance in Year 0 0.71 (0.01) 0.000 *** 
Missing Pay Indicator 789.13 (333.13) 0.019 ** 
Missing HH Income Indicator -108.52 (258.68) 0.675   
Missing Year 0 Cumulative Balance Indicator -307.58 (89.72) 0.001 *** 
AIT Length, Months 1,265.92 (2,343.42) 0.590   
Constant 579.17 (5,624.87) 0.918   
Panel B: Regression Statistics 
Observations 33,931   Adjusted R2 0.4516 
Clusters 257   F-Statistic 372.79 
Source: Department of Defense, Census Bureau and Credit Bureau Data. Notes: Sample as described in Table 
2.3. The table reports the regression coefficients for all parameters except the fixed effects, specifically, time 
(month) fixed effects, location fixed effects, job category (branch) fixed effects and job specific fixed effects. The 
omitted category for education is those missing education data. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, 
clustered at the AIT location-month level, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF STRESS ON FINANCIAL DECISION-MAKING:  
EVIDENCE FROM U.S. ARMY DEPLOYMENTS AND THE SAVINGS DEPOSIT PROGRAM1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                            
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at 2011 Western Economic Association International Conference 
Session on Effects of Deployment on Health, Families, and Earnings. 
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ABSTRACT 
Using a natural experiment, I estimate the effects of the stress of combat casualties in a U.S. 
Army unit on individuals' participation in the Savings Deposit Program (SDP), a no-risk 10% 
annual percentage rate (APR) savings account. I find a modest and statistically significant 
negative relationship between the stress of casualties and SDP participation on the order of 5%. 
While the natural experiment is imperfect, robustness checks in reduced samples suggest that 
this relationship holds for a variety of specifications and is not driven by non-random variation 
in individual characteristics. I find no differential effects of stress by gender, human capital 
levels, or length of deployment but I do find large negative and significant interaction effects 
between stress and being married. The confounding effects of overall activity levels and rural 
locations cannot be eliminated and as a result, the large scale field evidence presented here 
should be considered suggestive evidence of the adverse effects of stress on financial decision-
making. 
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   The President authorized a 10 per cent interest rate on Uniformed Services Deposits for all 
servicemen, including officers, who are stationed overseas. 
   Think of it!  That’s a return of 10 cents on every dollar for every year that you remain 
overseas.  Few people, other than stock market speculators, have ever received such return on 
their money, and certainly no one has ever obtained it with such high degree of safety in their 
investment... 
   So, you save and your country benefits as well.  Who could ask for a more pleasant 
prospect?  Why not check into the Uniformed Services Deposits program today?  Ask your 
finance officer about it.   
–American Forces Network Bulletin  
  September 9, 19662 
 
3.1 HOW DOES STRESS AFFECT INDIVIDUAL SAVINGS DECISIONS? 
     This paper estimates the effects of stress on individuals’ financial decisions. Using a natural 
experiment, I estimate the effects of the stress of combat casualties in a U.S. Army unit on 
individuals' participation in the Savings Deposit Program (SDP), a no-risk 10% annual percentage 
rate (APR) savings account. I find a modest and statistically significant negative relationship 
between the stress of casualties and SDP participation on the order of 5%. While the natural 
experiment is imperfect, robustness checks in reduced samples suggest that this relationship 
holds for a variety of specifications and is not driven by non-random variation in individual 
characteristics. I find no differential effects of stress by gender, human capital levels, or length 
of deployment but I do find large negative and significant interaction effects between stress 
and being married. The confounding effects of overall activity levels and rural locations cannot 
be eliminated and as a result, the large scale field evidence presented here should be 
considered suggestive evidence of the adverse effects of stress on financial decision-making. 
     For the purposes of this paper, a clinically precise definition of stress is not employed.  
Instead I will use a general formulation that defines stress as the reaction of an individual to an 
event (a stressor) to try to restore homeostasis.  This definition draws on the seminal work of 
Hans Seyle (1936, 1975) and reflects the generally accepted definition used by the American 
                                                            
2 This passage is a reproduction of an American Forces Network (AFN) information bulletin.  Available at: 
http://www.25thida.com/TLN/tln1-29.htm. Accessed: 13 Dec 2010. The Uniformed Services Deposit Program is 
now called the Savings Deposit Program and is the financial instrument used in this research. 
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Institute for Stress, which defines stress as, “physical, mental, or emotional strain or tension.”3  
When the distinction of a stressor (i.e., noise, crowding, or the casualty statistics) from stress (a 
physiological response) is required then I will use the more appropriate term. However, the 
terms will often be interchanged in this paper as they are elsewhere in the economic literature.  
     This research proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 reviews the existing literature and summarizes 
the key contributions of this work. Section 3.3 briefly reviews the existing theoretical models 
relating to stress and decision-making. Section 3.4 provides a brief summary of the Savings 
Deposit Program and its relevant provisions. Section 3.5 summarizes the data employed in the 
empirical analysis. Section 3.6 presents the empirical analysis and results. Section 3.7 conducts 
robustness checks. Section 3.8 summarizes the findings, presents policy recommendations and 
concludes. 
 
3.2 A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE ON STRESS AND DECISION-MAKING 
Review of Existing Literature 
     This research contributes to the literature in economics, psychology and public policy.  The 
topic (the effects of stress on decision-making) should be of interest to psychologists, 
economists and marketers; the policy instrument (a high yield government savings account) 
should be of interest to economists, government officials and citizens; and the effects on the 
population under study (deployed U.S. Army personnel) should be of interest to academics in a 
variety of fields, government officials, health care providers, military leaders and all citizens. 
                                                            
3 The American Institute of Stress website discusses the definitional challenges of the term stress but provides this 
commonly accepted version.  See: http://www.stress.org/Definition_of_stress.htm. Accessed: 14 Dec 2010. 
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This section reviews the relevant existing literature and identifies the contributions of the 
current research. 
     The first literature is the long-standing investigation by psychologists and health 
professionals into the effects of stress on individuals. This is a large literature with a number of 
important findings. What follows is a relatively brief review of the effects of stress on various 
performance measures. Laboratory results suggest adverse effects of stress on a variety of 
behaviors.4  For a review of documented stressors and their effects, see Cohen (1980).  
Research on stress in more natural settings has also demonstrated a number of negative effects 
on cognitive and behavioral outcomes.5 
          One potential reason for a lack of more varied and detailed findings on the effects of 
stress is the nature of Human Subjects Research guidelines in the social sciences.  If perceptions 
of control over a stressor reduce the effects of the stressor (Glass, Singer and Friedman (1969) 
                                                            
4 A variety of stressors have been found to affect individuals including noise (Glass, Singer and Friedman (1969), 
Shaham, Singer and Schaeffer (1992)), stressful instruction sets (Shaham, Singer and Schaeffer (1992)), increased 
workload and time stress (Wickens et al. 1993), task inducements such as giving a speech (Preston et al. 2007), 
cold-pressors (Porcelli and Delgado (2009)), and a combination of multiple stressors (Wickens et al. (1993)).  All 
have been shown to inhibit individual performance including reduced capacity to direct attention (as measured on 
the Stroop task), reduced performance on proof-reading tasks, and reduced tolerance for frustration.  It is worth 
noting that the findings on these stressors are not universal. For example, Shanteau and Dino (1993) find no 
negative effects of stress (noise, heat, crowding and schedule interruptions) on verbal behavior or on most 
decision-making processes. They do however find negative effects on creativity measures.  In spite of their 
findings, the results above serve as accepted evidence that stressors can affect individual behavior and decision-
making.  
 
5 The adverse effects found in natural settings include; reduced reading ability among children (Cohen, Glass and 
Singer (1973)), reduced ability to concentrate among children (Cohen, Glass and Phillips (1979)), drug relapse 
(Niaura et al. (1988)), a relationship between perceived stress levels and smoking (Cohen & Lichtenstein (1990)), 
narcotic (alcohol, drugs or smoking) use and relapse (Hall, Havassy and Wasserman (1990), Shiffman and Waters 
(2004)), reduced performance on tasks with spatial demands (Wickens et al. (1993)), reduced self-control in 
constraining eating (Ward and Mann (2000)), absenteeism at work (Kim and Garman (2003)) and reduced 
performance by individuals and teams in medical settings (LeBlanc (2009)). While not all of these studies are 
experimental in nature, there exists significant evidence of the adverse effects of stress on individual behavior in a 
variety of task domains and situational environments.   
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and Cohen (1980)), then research protocols that require informed consent may generate non-
findings of the effects of stressors on outcomes of interest.6  These regulatory effects, or the 
perceptions of their existence, pose challenges for researchers in these fields and may reduce 
researchers’ interests in pursuing stress-related research. While there are many researchers 
working on stress-related topics in spite of these restrictions, which seem appropriate in nearly 
all cases, there still may be implications for the findings in this literature.  As long as informed 
consent requirements generate some perceptions of control over the stressors by research 
subjects, the current body of laboratory research ought to serve as a lower bound of the 
estimates of the effects of stress on the behaviors and measures in question, since without 
these perceptions of control individuals would likely experience more stress and exhibit 
reduced performance. These potential limitations of laboratory research also serve as a 
justification for using more natural experiments and naturalistic observational studies where 
human subjects requirements do not apply. 
     This research also contributes to the equally mature but evolving investigation by 
economists into individual decision-making processes and individual savings and consumption 
choices. This literature has at its roots the classical approaches to the study of individual 
consumption and savings decisions embodied in Friedman’s Permanent Income Hypothesis 
(Friedman (1957)) and Modigliani’s Life Cycle Hypothesis (Ando and Modigliani (1963)).7 Both 
hypothesize that individuals (or households) choose consumption and savings levels to 
maximize their future utilities.  The relevant portion of income for these decisions is an 
                                                            
 
6 For more detail on this possibility, see Gardner (1978). 
7 For a helpful review of these two theories see the announcement for Modigliani’s 1985 Nobel Prize at: 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1985/press.html. Accessed 17 Dec 2010.  
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individual’s expectations about present and future permanent income.  The models differ 
primarily in their time horizon; Friedman assumes an infinite horizon which includes planning 
for future decedents and Modigliani assumes a finite horizon confined to an individual’s own 
life.  Together these models serve as the rational and neoclassical economic benchmark against 
which more modern behavioral models of decision-making and choice have been judged. While 
this research will not settle this debate it will contribute to our understanding of the effects of 
stress on individual savings decisions, a phenomenon not recognized by the classical approach. 
     While the neo-classical approaches to decision-making and consumption-savings choices 
were predominant throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, modern economic approaches 
have questioned these approaches.  Economists have increasingly modeled individual decision-
making and choice as an interaction between different motivations and different processes in 
individuals’ minds. Some of these processes are cognitive, rational and deliberative and others 
are emotional, impatient and motivational.  These “two-mind” models are now common in the 
economics literature.8 While each of the popular “two-mind” models has something to offer, 
the Affective vs. Deliberative model of Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005) will be used in this 
analysis because of its clear formulation of the underlying processes, its generation of well-
specified testable hypotheses and its inclusion of stress as a factor in individual choice.   
                                                            
8 Prominent examples in include those postulated as  Hot vs. Cool (Metcalfe and Mischel (1999)), Affective vs. 
Cognitive (Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999)), System 1 vs. System 2 (Frederick (2002)), Automatic vs. Control (Benhabib 
and Bisin (2004)), Affective vs. Deliberative (Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005)), and Impulsive vs. Patient 
(Fudenberg and Levine (2006)). They have much in common, including acknowledgement of a non-unitary decision 
making process for individuals, conceptualization of decision-making as a game played between an individual’s 
present and future period selves, appreciation of the contributions of psychology to the improvement of economic 
theory and models, and commitment to empirical evaluation of these models in laboratory and natural settings. 
117 
 
     Unfortunately, while the models reviewed above have generated plausible and persuasive 
explanations of individual choice, they suffer from two significant shortcomings.  First, their 
empirical record is incomplete.  To be sure, nearly all of these works cite some empirical 
evidence that supports their conceptualization but few produce prospective hypotheses and 
empirical tests, instead relying on ad hoc and retrospective reviews of existing economic 
conditions.  The three most widely cited pieces of evidence for these “two-mind” models are: 
Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999), who find that individuals under higher levels of cognitive load 
(memorizing seven digit numbers vs. two digit numbers) choose more affective food options 
(chocolate cake vs. fruit salad) when the presentation mode is real; Vohs and Heatherton 
(2000) who find that self-control is a limited resource that is depleted by a previous disciplined 
choice; and Ward and Mann (2000) who find that cognitive load undermines self-control among 
restrained eaters (dieters) but not among non-restrained eaters. But these findings provide no 
evidence on the relative contributions of each mental system and the conditions under which 
each system determines choice. Moreover, these empirical tests have not demonstrated that 
individual choice is an outcome of an intra-mind conflict.  
     Second, there is limited evidence of the effects of stress on economic decision-making and to 
the author’s knowledge, no existing evidence in the economic literature on the effects of stress 
on individual consumption-savings decisions. None of the evidence for the economic “two-
mind” models discussed above includes evidence of the effects of stress on choice.  But as the 
review of the psychology literature above demonstrates, there are some relevant findings for 
the effects of stress on elements of economic decision-making, including risk-preferences, 
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learning and consumption choices.9  The above findings clearly demonstrate that stress can 
affect individuals’ economic decisions and outcomes, but none relate to the effects of stress on 
the consumption-savings decision. Since this decision is one of the most basic and most 
frequent economic choices that an individual makes and since it lies at the heart of many micro 
and macroeconomic models, further empirical work on this question is needed. 
     These first two literatures (psychology and economics), while separate for most of their 
history, are now converging in part due to the expanded interest among economists in 
behavioral models as a means of explaining individual choice and the advances of neuroscience 
and neuroeconomics in specifically identifying the physical locations and physiological 
processes involved in choice.  While this convergence holds great promise for human 
understanding of individual choice and judgment, there remains a great deal of theoretical and 
empirical work to be done.  
     The final literature that this research serves to inform is the economic, health and policy 
literature devoted to analyzing the effects of stress and military service on military members.  
Since the 1940s the military and other offices of the U.S. government have been actively 
engaged in researching the behavioral effects of stress on its members in order to better 
understand these effects and find ways to reduce them. This line of research has focused 
                                                            
9 First, stress produces a change in risk preferences (Porcelli and Delgado (2009)) by increasing risky behavior in the 
loss domain and reducing risky behavior in the gains domain, though other evidence finds no differences in risk 
preferences under stress (Shaham, Singer and Schaeffer (1992)). Second, stress correlates with risk preferences 
among London stock traders but does not predict profitability (Coates and Herbert (2008)). Third, stress slows 
learning on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) (Preston et al. (2007)). Fourth, stress generates differential gender 
performance on the IGT, with women performing better when stressed and men performing worse (van den Bos, 
Hartveld and Stoop (2009)), though other evidence found insignificant differential gender effects (Preston et al 
(2007)). Fifth, stress is correlated with increases in consumption (Lee, Moschis and Mathur (2001)).  
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primarily on the effects of stress on job performance with its principle concern being improving 
military capabilities and readiness. This research has consistently found negative effects of 
stress on job performance.10 Since that time, the military has continued to research the effects 
of stress on its members. While the primary goal of military and government-sponsored 
research has been to improve military capabilities, a secondary concern of evaluating service 
members’ health and welfare during and after their service has also emerged. As a prominent 
example, consider the economic assessment of the effects of military service during Vietnam on 
individuals’ post-service earnings (Angrist (1990)). 
     Modern research on the non-military health and welfare effects of the stress of military 
service has dealt primarily with the causes, consequences and costs of Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD).  For a detailed discussion of PTSD, see Krueger (2008) and Harrison, 
Satterwhite and Ruday (2010). Since most recent research has focused on the effects of stress 
as it relates to military performance or on the extreme health effects of stress associated with 
PTSD, there remains a gap in our understanding of the effects of stress on the health and 
welfare of individuals in less than the most extreme cases.11  This is a large topic area and will 
include the economic and social welfare of individuals as well as their health outcomes during 
and after deployments, during and after military service and the effects of military service on 
members’ families and friends. To date there has been limited work in this area, though the 
                                                            
10 Significant early findings were those by Shaffer (1947), who found that pilots reported reduced performance in 
combat as a result of stress; and Grinker and Spiegel (1947) who found that combat stress produces battle-
fatigued soldiers and that psychological breakdowns are often associated with individual feelings of inadequacy.  
For a longer review of early findings of the effects of stress on military members, see Lazarus, Deese and Osler 
(1952). Academic research has often worked alongside this effort and produced findings related to stress and 
military performance and military service more generally (Harris, Ross and Hancock (2008)).   
11 For a notable exception to this gap, see Dineen, Pentzien and Mateczun (1994) who analyze the effects of 
predepolyment stress on the crew of a U.S. navy hospital ship. Even they note that “surprisingly” little has been 
written about precombat and deployment stress.   
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exogenous nature of many military decisions to its members presents many opportunities for 
studying individual outcomes with scientific approaches.  This work contributes to this 
literature by evaluating the effects of the stress from one aspect of military service 
(deployments) on individual’s financial decisions and outcomes.  To the author’s knowledge this 
study represents the first evaluation of the conditions of military deployments on the economic 
decisions and outcomes of service members. 
Summary of Contributions 
     As the review highlights, this research locates itself at the nexus of several interesting and 
traditionally distinct literatures.  First, this research informs the psychology literature on the 
effects of stress by estimating the effects of stress on individuals’ personal financial decisions in 
a natural setting.  Second, this research serves as one of the first and most significant empirical 
tests of economic “two-mind” models of decision making and, to the author’s knowledge, the 
first empirical evaluation of the effects of stress on individuals’ consumption-savings decisions.  
Finally, this research estimates the effects of the conditions of military deployments on 
individuals’ financial choices with important economic outcomes.  
 
3.3. THEORETICAL REVIEW & HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
     This section summarizes the relevant decision-making theory and presents the hypotheses 
that will be empirically tested.  As mentioned above, while several theoretical models 
commonly referenced in the economics literature propose a “two-mind” model of choice, one 
of the clearest and most detailed is Loewenstein & O’Donoghue (2005).  In this model, 
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individual behavior is the outcome of an interaction between the distinct deliberative and 
affective systems. While both systems interact, the affective system has primacy for most 
decision-making tasks.  In addition, the proximity of a stimulus plays a key role in determining 
the degree to which the affective system is activated. While the affective system enjoys 
primacy, it is not always dominant and the deliberative system can override the affective 
system through the exercise of willpower. This process is dependent on the mental and 
emotional state of the individual though, as both stress and cognitive load can undermine the 
deliberative system and reduce willpower.  As a result, individuals make choices by balancing 
the desirability of an action and the associated costs of willpower.  The critical predictions of 
the model for this research are that increased stress or higher cognitive loads will move 
behavior further from the deliberative optimum. 
     Implicit in this model is the ability to define the optimal behavior.  In the case of Shiv and 
Fedorikhin (1999) the optimal (deliberative) choice is fruit salad, whereas the non-optimal 
(affective) choice is the chocolate cake.  For the purposes of this research, participation in the 
SDP (a risk-free 10% APR) is assumed to be the optimal choice, based on its economic 
dominance of financial instruments comparable in risk, maturity and liquidity.  Non-
participation in the SDP is therefore the affective choice. Section IV will explain this dominance 
in more detail.  
     Recall that this analysis assumes that casualty statistics generate stress among deploying 
soldiers.  The precise nature of this stressor (the casualty statistics), the stress generated (the 
individuals’ responses) and their measurement are described in more detail in Section VI. For 
now, I assume an increasing monotonic relationship between knowledge of casualties and 
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individual stress. With the optimal and non-optimal behaviors identified and the instrument of 
stress specified, I now formulate my primary hypothesis based on the Deliberative/Affective 
choice model summarized above.12 
• Hypothesis 1: Individuals with higher initial stress levels will exhibit lower SDP 
participation.13 
That is, individuals who experience higher casualty rates in their unit in their first month of a 
deployment will have lower probabilities of SDP participation.   
 
3.4. THE SAVINGS DEPOSIT PROGRAM IN BRIEF 
     The financial instrument used in this research to examine individuals' decision making is the 
Savings Deposit Program (SDP). The SDP was established by President Johnson on August 14, 
1966 through Executive Order 11298 with the stated goals of offering deployed service 
members a way to earn extra money while deployed to Southeast Asia and as a means of 
reducing the U.S. balance of payment deficit.14 In conjunction with Section 1035 of Title 10, the 
program provides a 10% annual percentage rate (APR) of return on deposits of up to $10,000 
for members armed forces deployed in eligible locations. President George W. Bush authorized 
SDP participation for members of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in November of 
                                                            
12 These hypotheses are also derived in Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005) in a more general setting. These 
predictions are not original to my work, but I aim to test their theory using a natural experiment. 
 
13 Initial levels of stress will be measured using the casualty statistics from the individual’s month of arrival. 
 
14 See http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/11298.html for the actual text of the 
Executive Order.  
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2001 and Operation Iraqi Freedom in February of 2003.15 These operations cover the vast 
majority of deployed soldiers today and represent a sizable population to study. 
     The returns on deposits are compounded quarterly, guaranteed by the Federal Government, 
and disbursed via the U.S. Treasury and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS).  
The 10% APR can be earned on any deposits made once an individual has been deployed for at 
least 30 consecutive days and deposits can remain in the SDP account earning interest up to 90 
days after an individual returns home.  Returns on the SDP are taxable income.  Deposits are 
relatively illiquid for the one year period, though individuals can withdraw their money prior to 
their return if they are facing economic hardship.  Deposits can be made via check or payroll 
deduction.16 The program is well established and appears to be well-known. Military members 
are advised of the SDP at their home stations, in pre-deployment training and readiness 
certifications, in transit to their country of deployment, in military periodicals, on military 
benefits-related websites and upon arrival in an eligible location.17  
                                                            
15 For more detailed information on the SDP, see a useful Fact Sheet at: 
http://www.usarpac.army.mil/SoldierFamilyWellBeing/Reintegration/USARPAC%20SAVINGS%20DEPOSIT%20PRO
GRAM%20FACT%20SHEET.htm  or the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) website at: 
http://www.dfas.mil/militarypay/woundedwarriorpay/savingsdepositprogramsdp.html   
 
16 The maximum monthly deposit for an individual participating by payroll deduction is equal to their unalloted pay 
and allowances.  This will vary for a given individual based on their rank and special pays. For most enlisted 
soldiers, this provision would limit their monthly deposit to $1,400-5,000 and require 2-7 months to obtain the 
maximum deposit of $10K. For most officers this provision would limit their monthly deposit to $2,700-5,700 and 
require 2-4 months to obtain the maximum deposit.  However, individuals do not need to achieve $10K to 
participate and the 10%APR accrues on all deposits made. See the current military pay scale at: 
http://www.dfas.mil/militarypay/militarypaytables.html . Accessed 20 Dec 2010. 
 
17 The most common periodicals that Army soldiers have access to while deployed are the Stars & Stripes and The 
Army Times. Both feature financial readiness sections and letters to the editor which routinely discuss the SDP, 
among other finance related topics. 
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     The SDP is a unique instrument for at least two reasons. First, it is only available to selected 
members of the Armed Forces when they are deployed to designated combat zones.  These 
restrictions aid the research program by ensuring treatment conditional on deployment. 
Second, this short-term (1-year) instrument enjoys a risk-free guaranteed 10% APR which is 
superior to any available financial product with comparable time horizon and liquidity.  In 
Figure 3.1 I present a comparison of the rates of return offered by the SDP and comparable 
financial instruments during the period 2001-2010. 
 
Figure 3.1. Comparison of Economic Rates of Return, 2001-2010 
Economic rates of return for short-term risk-free financial products available from Nov. 2001 
through Dec. 2010. Data depicted available from publicly available sites maintained by the 
Federal Reserve, Mortgage-x.com and the Department of Defense. The SDP rate of return is 
legally mandated at 10%. The cost of savings index is based on the interest rates Wells Fargo 
(later, Wachovia) pays to individuals on certificates of deposits. The federal funds rate is the 
rate at which depository institutions lend balances to each other overnight. n=432. 
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3.5. SUMMARY OF DATA SOURCES 
     The data used in this analysis comes from a combination of several governmental and non-
governmental sources.18 The data set covers the period October 2001- December 2010. The 
administrative data on military members comes from U.S. Army and Department of Defense 
databases. The demographic data were provided by the Total Army Personnel Database. 
Individual pay data and SDP participation data were provided by the Defense Finance and 
Accounting Service. Military operational deployment data was provided by the Army’s Office of 
Economic and Manpower Analysis. The data for the rates of return for alternative financial 
instruments were obtained from several sources. The Federal Reserve website provided data 
on the returns for 1-Year T-Bills and the intended Federal Funds rate.19 Mortgage-x.com 
provided data on the rates of return for the Wells Fargo Cost of Savings Index.20 In Figure 3.1 I 
present the rates of return for several comparable financial instruments from 2001-2010. As 
the graph shows, the SDP is a superior financial instrument to all comparable products 
throughout the time period of this analysis. It offers eligible individuals a high rate of return 
with no risk at a limited liquidity cost. 
                                                            
18 The data was obtained through the cooperation of the Office of Economic & Manpower Analysis (OEMA) at the 
United States Military Academy, West Point, NY.  All personally identifying information has been removed from 
each observation so as to protect the anonymity of Army members.  
 
19 1 Year T-Bill Data: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H15/data/Monthly/H15_TB_Y1.txt Accessed: 13 DEC 
2010. Fed Funds Target Rate Data: http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm Accessed: 13 
DEC 2010. To see the data in a more usable form, see: http://www.moneycafe.com/library/fedfundsrate.htm 
Accessed 13 DEC 2010. Note that since November 2009 the Federal Funds Target rate has been 0.00-0.25%. For 
this analysis I assumed that the rate was 0.25%. 
 
20 The Wells Fargo Cost of Savings Index (COSI) is based on the interest rates paid by Wells Fargo on CDs held by its 
depositors. It reflects the interest rate that WF is paying to individuals for CDs. Wells Fargo/Wachovia COSI Data is 
available at: http://www.mortgage-x.com/general/indexes/default.asp Accessed 26 OCT 2010.  
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Independent Variable of Interest (Stress) Data 
     The primary purpose of this research is to estimate the effects of stress on individual’s 
financial decision-making. While no data exists that directly measures the physiological stress 
levels of deployed military members, reasonable instruments for this omission exist. 
Specifically, this analysis will use military casualty data as a measure of the stress that 
individuals arriving in a combat zone (Iraq or Afghanistan) face. I employ Department of 
Defense casualty data aggregated for each Army unit in each month of the sample period. The 
relationship between casualties and stress seems straightforward; higher levels of casualties in 
a country indicate a more dangerous situation for individuals serving there and will increase the 
stress placed upon arriving members.   
 
3.6. ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF STRESS ON SAVINGS DECISIONS 
Identification Strategy 
     Identification of an unbiased estimate of the effects of casualties on savings decisions 
requires random assignment of individuals to the control or treatment group. The natural 
experiment used here relies on random assignment of individuals to units once I condition on 
an individual's military occupation specialty (job category), their rank (experience) and the year. 
This identification requires an assumption of unconfoundedness, more commonly known as 
selection on observables. U.S. Army and Department of Defense Policy personnel and 
assignment policies support this assumption in that individuals are assigned to units (and hence 
locations) based on "the needs of the Army" and not individual characteristics or preferences 
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(Department of Defense (2005)). This assumption has been validated in the social science 
literature where the use of military assignment and movements is often used as an 
instrumental variable for evaluation of other parameters of interest, including the effects of 
parental absence on children’s educational outcomes (Lyle (2006)), the effects of access to 
payday lending (Carrell & Zinman (2008)), differential treatment by race (Antecol & Cobb-Clark 
(2008)) and the health effects of pollution on children (Lleras-Muney (2012)). Once individuals 
are conditionally randomly assigned to a unit, they are assigned to the control or treatment 
group based on the exogenous variation in several important deployment characteristics 
including the deployment country (Iraq or Afghanistan), location within a country (base camps, 
forward operating bases, combat outposts, etc...), timing of arrival (periods of combat 
operations, election seasons, holidays, mission "surges," etc...), missions assigned once in a 
location (base defense, counterinsurgency, resupply convoy movements, garrison staff work, 
reconnaissance, etc...) and the level and type of enemy activity (large scale engagements, 
ambushes, sniper fire, improvised explosive devices, suicide bombings, etc...).  In summary, 
there are a number of factors suggesting that the casualty rates of units are orthogonal to the 
observed characteristics of the individuals in the unit, conditional on their job, experience level 
and year. I preform randomization and robustness checks below to assess the viability of this 
assumption and the impact of randomization failures.   
     In addition to the selection on observables assumption detailed above, there are at least 
three other threats to the identification of stress as the primary factor affecting savings choice. 
A first challenge to the identification strategy proposed here is the inability to discriminate 
between the effects of stress and the effects individuals' levels of activity on individuals’ savings 
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decisions. That is, times of high casualties are likely to be times of high operational tempo 
(OPTEMPO) for military units. Reduced savings decisions could be the result of solders' 
experiencing increased stress associated with higher levels of casualties, or they could be the 
result of soldiers being too busy to enroll in the Savings Deposit Program. Assuming that 
casualty statistics are orthogonal to all relevant considerations may be inappropriate and 
disentangling these effects will be difficult. I have two strategies for dealing with this concern. 
First, while both activity levels and stress levels may contribute to lower participation, from a 
policy perspective, both constitute “stress” within a broad sense and suggest that the 
conditions of an individual’s deployment may adversely affect their ability to participate in the 
program In this sense, whether the causal factor is stress, being too busy, or both, the adverse 
outcome on the individual is the same and policy design should account for this fact.21 Second, 
to attempt to address this concern from a scientific standpoint I employ several methods. I will 
employ additional control variables to account for unit activity levels using country-month fixed 
effects, controls for unit function (percentage Combat Arms vs. Combat Support vs. Combat 
Service Support), controls for unit composition (indicator for Special Forces unit, indicator for 
member of a Brigade Combat Team, percentage Officer, percentage of high-experience 
members and percentage female), and instruments for the activity level a unit likely faces 
(holiday periods, election periods, troop levels and aggregate fuel consumption). While none of 
                                                            
21 That is, if the purpose of the Savings Deposit Program is to assist soldiers by offering them high returns on their 
savings deposits, then reduced participation, be it from stress or from high levels of activity, are equally 
worrisome.  The lesson to military leaders and program administrators is to remain sensitive to casualty levels as a 
measure of when participation levels are likely to decrease. The specific solutions might vary depending on the 
reason for non-participation (too busy or too stressed), but to the extent that the policy prescriptions are 
straightforward both reasons can be addressed through increased education, outreach and enrollment services 
during these periods. Even with estimates of reduced scientific interest, the results of this analysis are of practical 
interest. 
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these methods are perfect, they allow me to more confidently assign reduced participation to 
higher stress levels. 
     A second threat to my identification strategy involves the confounding effects of an 
individual’s stress level (unit casualty) level with the individual’s location and its availability of 
technologies to enroll in the SDP.  If individuals who experience high casualty rates are located 
in rural areas on small bases and these bases lack internet connectivity and/or military finance 
offices then failure to enroll in the SDP may be the result of high levels of stress or lack or 
opportunities or both.  Unfortunately the data employed here do not allow me to evaluate this 
confound explicitly as they do not contain detailed location information.  If this confound is 
correct then the estimates presented here will be upward biased estimates of the effects of 
stress on SDP participation.  
     Despite the challenges described above, I believe that this research holds promise for 
demonstrating the effects of combat stress on individuals’ financial decision-making. Modern 
warfare is extremely stressful for service members. Soldiers face challenging environmental and 
terrain conditions; they fight against traditional and irregular enemy formations; they perform 
traditional war-fighting, peace-keeping, nation-building, and counterinsurgency operations; 
they face disease and chemical, biological and radiological threats; they deploy for long periods 
of time; and they often deploy repeatedly. For these reasons and others, some have suggested 
that modern soldiers face greater combat stress than their counterparts in any previous conflict 
(Krueger (2008)). Since this is an empirical question, the results of this analysis can better 
inform our understanding of the consequences of modern stressors on the battlefield by 
130 
 
demonstrating the existence and magnitude of any such effects, even if they represent average 
effects or if they are not solely attributable to the stress from casualty levels.   
Empirical Results 
     I begin the empirical analysis by reviewing the data in the sample.  In Table 3.1 I present the 
summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables by casualty levels. The 
dependent variables of interest are the probability of participation, where participation is 
defined as any deposit into an SDP account; the total amount of money deposited in the SDP 
account; the deposit total conditional on participation and the time elapsed until participation, 
defined as the duration in days from the start of the deployment until the first deposit. These 
outcomes allow me to evaluate both extensive and intensive margin behaviors.  On the 
extensive margin, the patterns in the probability of participation and unconditional deposit 
total suggest that deploying during times of positive casualties reduces individuals’ participation 
in the SDP. On the intensive margin, the patterns in the conditional deposit level and the time 
to first deposit also suggest lower levels of participation among those deploying in units during 
months with casualties. However, there are many other differences between individuals who 
deploy in times of no casualties and those who deploy in times of positive casualties, as Table 
3.1 makes clear. The results described above are not regression-adjusted and do not account 
for other potential differences across the control and treatment groups. Thus the results in 
Panel A of Table 3.1 are consistent with the hypothesis presented here and suggest additional 
analyses to causally link casualties and SDP participation.  
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Table 3.1. Summary Statistics by Unit Casualty Level 
  (1)  (2)   (3) 
  Full Sample  Zero Casualties   Positive Casualties
  N=288,772  N=260,113   N=28,659 
Variable Mean  (Std Dev)  Mean  (Std Dev)   Mean   (Std Dev) 
Panel A. Outcomes 
Probability (Participation), % 7.36  (26.1)  7.54  (26.4)   5.78   (23.3) 
Deposit Total, $ 597  (2,304)  613  (2,333)   456   (2,022) 
Deposit Total | Participation, $ 8,108  (3,347)  8,128  (3,333)   7,879   (3,498) 
Time to First Deposit | 
Participation, days 66  (59)  66  (60)   65   (55) 
Panel B. Individual Characteristics 
Age, years 27.8  (7.0)  28  (7.1)   26.1   6.1 
Female, % 7.9  (26.9)  8.4  (27.8)   2.8   (16.6) 
Married, % 47.2  (49.9)  46.4  (49.9)   54.1   (49.8) 
Number of dependents 1.4  (1.5)  1.4  (1.5)   1.2   (1.5) 
Minority, % 32.5  (46.8)  33.1  (47.0)   27.1   (44.4) 
Less than HS education, % 1.6  (12.5)  1.6  (12.6)   1.4   (11.8) 
High school graduate, % 69.2  (46.6)  68.5  (46.5)   76.0   (42.7) 
Some college, % 8.1  (27.2)  8.2  (27.5)   6.8   (25.1) 
College graduate, % 12.0  (32.5)  12.2  (32.7)   10.6   (30.8) 
Greater than college education, % 1.0  (9.9)  1.0  (10.1)   0.6   (7.4) 
AFQT Score, percentile 60.2  (20.3)  60.1  (20.3)   61.3   (20.4) 
Monthly pay, hundreds of $ 41.59  (18.99)  41.98  (19.24)   38.02   (16.13) 
Officer, % 14.5  (35.2)  15.0  (35.6)   10.2   (30.3) 
Warrant Officer, % 5.2  (22.3)  5.6  (23.0)   2.2   (14.7) 
Military experience, years 5.8  (6.4)  5.9  (6.4)   4.5   (5.5) 
Deployment length, months 8.8  (4.3)  8.8  (4.3)   8.8   (4.2) 
Number of previous deployments 0.9  (1.2)  0.9  (1.2)   0.9   (1.2) 
Previous SDP participant, % 4.5  (20.6)  4.6  (20.9)   3.2   (17.6) 
Panel C. Treatment Variables 
Hostile fire casualty rate, % 0.154  (0.597)  0.000  (0.000)   0.157   (1.17) 
Hostile fire death rate, % 0.013  (0.096)  0.000  (0.000)   0.013   (0.278) 
Source: Department of Defense Data. Notes: All data is for U.S. Army soldiers.  The probability of participation is the 
fraction of individuals with any SDP deposit total greater than zero.  Time to first deposit is the number of days 
between the deployment start and the first deposit transaction. The married variable represents formal and common 
law marriages for anyone who has ever been married. The less than or equal to high school graduate variable includes 
high school dropouts and GED holders. The some college variable includes those with an Associate’s Degree. Monthly 
compensation represents the base pay during the deployment divided by 100. Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) 
statistics are calculated for enlisted individuals only (n=231,743). Military experience is the amount of time in years 
that the individual had served at the date of deployment.  Previous SDP participant is an indicator variable set equal to 
one if the individual had ever participated in the SDP prior to the current deployment observation.  The hostile fire 
casualty rate is the sum of deaths and injuries from hostile fire in a unit divided by the total number deployed in the 
unit and the numbers here represent averages of the unit casualty rates. 
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Panel A. Unweighted Scatterplot 
 
 
Panel B. Weighted Scatterplot with Bins Weighted by the Number of Individuals  
 
Figure 3.2. Scatterplots of SDP Participation vs. Unit Total Hostile Fire Casualty Rate 
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     To further evaluate the relationship between stress and SDP participation I completed a 
variety of scatterplots. In Figure 3.2 I provide a non-parametric look at the bivariate relationship 
between the casualty rate in a given month and the SDP participation rate, in an unweighted 
and weighted format.  The graphs and the associated best fit lines reveal a negative relationship 
between the casualty rate and the probability of SDP participation. These graphs further 
support the hypothesized relationship between stress and savings. 
     Based on the summary statistic observations and the graphical analysis discussed above I 
also completed an initial statistical analysis of the outcome variable means for below and above 
the median casualty levels in the full sample. Note that for both countries and for the full 
sample the median and modal casualty rate is zero.  In fact, of the 288,772 observations in the 
sample, only 28,659 (11.0%) have positive unit casualty rates.  Thus despite the apparently 
large sample, there are comparatively few observations that provide for identification of the 
effects of casualties on SDP participation.  Nonetheless, in Table 3.2 I present t-tests of the 
differences in the outcome means for the zero and positive casualty subsamples.  
Table 3.2. Differences in Outcomes by Unit Casualty Level 
  (1)  (2)   (3) 
  
Zero Casualty 
Mean  
Positive Casualty 
Mean   Difference 
  N=260,113  N=28,659   (1) - (2) 
Variable Mean Mean Mean p-value
Probability (Participation), % 7.54  5.78   1.76   0.00 
Deposit Total, $ 613  456   157   0.00 
Deposit Total | Participation, $ 8,128  7,879   249   0.00 
Time to First Deposit | Participation, days 66  65   1   0.47 
Source: Department of Defense Data. Notes: All data is for U.S. Army soldiers.  The probability of 
participation is the fraction of individuals with any SDP deposit total greater than zero.  Time to first 
deposit is the number of days between the deployment start and the first deposit transaction. Column 3 
tests whether the differences in the mean values by casualty level are different from zero using a t-test.  
The mean difference and p-value for the t-tests is listed. These results are not regression adjusted. 
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On the external margin, the differences in the probability of participation and the deposit total 
are significant at the ߙ=0.01 level. On the intensive margin, the difference in the SDP deposit 
total conditional on participation is significant at the ߙ=0.01 level while the difference in the 
time to first deposit is insignificant at the ߙ=0.10 level. While these differences do not control 
for other differences in the control and treatment groups, they do justify further analysis via 
multivariate regression. 
Multivariate Regression Analysis 
     With a better understanding of the distributions of the stressor and explanatory variable 
data I now turn to an introduction of the regression specifications for my hypothesis testing.  
An individual’s participation in the SDP is determined by a number of factors: their level of 
stress, their individual experiences and capabilities, the opportunity cost of participation, and 
the conditions of their deployment.  These can be broadly categorized as individual 
characteristics, time fixed effects and unit characteristics.  Equation (1) formalizes this 
relationship: 
                         														 ௜ܻ௝௞௧ = ߙ + ߚ ∙ ܴܵܶܧܵ ௝ܵ௞௧ + ߛ ∙ ௜ܺ௝௧ + ߜ௧ + ௝߬௞௧ + ߝ௜௝௞௧																											(1) 
In this model ௜ܻ௝௞௧ is a measurement of individual ݅’s SDP participation in country ݆in unit ݇ in 
time period ݐ. ܴܵܶܧܵ ௝ܵ௞௧ is a measurement of stress experienced by the individual and will be 
estimated by the hostile-fire casualty rate in unit ݇ in country ݆ during time period ݐ. As a result, 
ߚ is the coefficient of primary interest and I hypothesize that ߚ < 0. That is, as an individual’s 
unit casualty rate increases, the individual is less likely to participate in the SDP.  ௜ܺ௝௧ is a vector 
of individual characteristics including a quadratic in age, education level, gender, minority 
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status, military income, AFQT score, an individual’s military occupation specialty (job), rank 
category (officer, warrant officer or enlisted), a quadratic in military experience, a quadratic in 
the length of the deployment, the country of deployment, the number of previous deployments 
and an indicator for previous SDP participation. ߜ௧ is a vector of time fixed effects that includes 
indicators for each country-month combination and a seasonal control for the winter period.22  
௝߬௞௧ is a vector of unit characteristics including the percentages of the unit by job types (combat 
arms, combat support and combat service support), by officer status, by female and by high 
levels of experience (>5 years). ߝ௜௝௞௧ is the error term assumed to be orthogonal to all other 
variables. The critical assumption for identification is selection on observables, specifically: 
																																																									 ௜ܻ௝௞௧ ⊥ ܴܵܶܧܵ ௝ܵ௞௧	|	 ௜ܺ௝௧, ߜ௧, ௝߬௞௧																																																							(2) 
That is, conditional on an individual’s job, experience and year, the treatment of stress via 
casualties is randomly assigned. I apply this general model to the specific hypotheses from 
Section III to generate the empirical tests for this research. 
• Hypothesis 1: Individuals with higher stress levels will exhibit lower SDP participation.23 
     I conduct my empirical of this hypothesis using Equation (1) and multivariate regression 
analysis. I use a linear probability model for simplicity of interpretation and the sample size 
justifies this selection. Table 3.3 displays the regression results.  
 
                                                            
22 The most notable potential time trend in casualty data is the proposition of a “fighting season.” This is 
particularly relevant in Afghanistan, where heavy winters and extreme terrain can make fighting untenable in 
winter months.  I use an indicator variable for winter months (December, January and February) to control for this 
phenomenon.   
 
23 Initial levels of stress will be measured using the casualty statistics from the individual’s month of arrival in their 
deployment country. 
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Table 3.3. OLS Estimates of the Effect of Stress on Probability of SDP Participation 
  (1)   (2)   (3) 
Variable Coeff   (Std Err)   Coeff   (Std Err)   Coeff   (Std Err) 
Mean outcome in control 7.54       7.54       7.54     
Own unit casualty rate -30.52 ** (12.15)   -24.90 ** (12.62)   -23.29 * (12.61) 
Age 0.20 *** (0.07)   0.20 *** (0.07)   0.20 *** (0.07) 
Age2 -0.003 *** (0.001)   -0.003 *** (0.001)   -0.003 *** (0.001) 
Female 5.66 *** (0.29)   5.63 *** (0.29)   5.16 *** (0.28) 
Married 0.52 *** (0.14)   0.49 *** (0.14)   0.51 *** (0.14) 
Number of dependents -0.47 *** (0.05)   -0.45 *** (0.05)   -0.45 *** (0.05) 
Minority 1.42 *** (0.12)   1.44 *** (0.12)   1.41 *** (0.12) 
Education ≤ HS -0.13    (0.31)   -0.13    (0.31)   -0.14    (0.31) 
Some college 0.69 *** (0.23)   0.65 ** (0.23)   0.66 *** (0.23) 
College graduate 2.58 *** (0.31)   2.54 *** (0.31)   2.55 *** (0.31) 
Education ≥ College 3.07 *** (1.00)   2.99 *** (1.00)   2.88 *** (0.99) 
AFQT 0.03 *** (0.00)   0.03 *** (0.00)   0.03 *** (0.00) 
Monthly compensation (hundreds $) 0.08 *** (0.01)   0.07 *** (0.01)   0.07 *** (0.01) 
Officer 3.50 *** (0.87)   3.90 *** (0.86)   3.69 *** (0.86) 
Warrant Officer 1.91 ** (0.91)   2.24 ** (0.91)   2.25 ** (0.91) 
Experience2 0.003    (0.004)   0.003    (0.004)   0.003    (0.004) 
Deployment length 1.14 *** (0.08)   1.14 *** (0.07)   1.10 *** (0.07) 
Deployment length2 -0.01 * (0.00)   -0.01 ** (0.00)   -0.01 ** (0.00) 
Number of previous deployments -1.51 *** (0.06)   -1.50 *** (0.06)   -1.50 *** (0.06) 
Previous SDP participant 41.68 *** (0.74)   41.49 *** (0.72)   41.43 *** (0.72) 
Individual Characteristics Yes   Yes   Yes 
Time Fixed Effects No   Yes   Yes 
Unit Characteristics No   No   Yes 
Number of Observations 288,772   288,772   288,772 
Number of Clusters 44,453   44,453   44,453 
Adjusted R2 0.2215   0.2249   0.2262 
Source: Department of Defense Data.  Notes: The probability of participation is the fraction of individuals with any 
SDP deposit total greater than zero. The hostile fire casualty rate is the sum of deaths and injuries from hostile fire 
in a unit divided by the total number deployed in the unit and the numbers here represent averages of the unit 
casualty rates. The married variable represents formal and common law marriages for anyone who has ever been 
married. The less than or equal to high school graduate variable includes high school dropouts and GED holders. The 
some college variable includes those with an Associate’s Degree. Monthly compensation represents the base pay 
during the deployment divided by 100. Military experience is the amount of time in years that the individual had 
served at the date of deployment and the linear experience term is absorbed in the assignment fixed effects 
(jobxexperiencexyear). Previous SDP participant is an indicator variable set equal to one if the individual had ever 
participated in the SDP prior to the current deployment observation. For observations missing education data, AFQT 
scores or experience data, zero values are assigned and indicators reflecting the missing data are used. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the unit-month level. ***, ** and * reflect statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels. 
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In the baseline specification (column 1) I include the treatment variable (Own unit casualty rate) 
and all individual characteristics, including those required for my assumption of 
unconfoundedness (fixed effects for job×experience×year). In column 2 I add additional time 
fixed effects and in column 3 I add unit characteristics. In all specifications the relationship 
between stress (casualties) and financial decision-making (SDP participation) is negative, stable 
and statistically significant. In the most complete specification (column 3) the coefficient of 
interest is -23.29 and it is statistically significant at the 10% level (p=0.065). This implies that a 
change in the own unit casualty rate from 0 to 1 would reduce SDP participation by 23.29% on a 
mean participation rate of 7.54%. While this is a very large effect, such a change is unlikely and 
exaggerates the likely effects of casualties in most cases. I discuss the appropriate magnitude 
for treatment effect estimates in greater detail below. Nonetheless, initial regression results 
suggest they hypothesized negative relationship between stress and savings holds. 
     In Table 3.4 I present results for all four SDP outcomes of interest using the same 
specification from column 3 of Table 3.3. In this table I only display the coefficient of interest 
(own unit casualty rate).  These results confirm that the effects of casualties on SDP 
participation decisions appear to operate only on the extensive margin.24  With respect to this 
margin, column 1 reveals that a change in the unit casualty rate from 0 to 1 reduces an 
individual’s probability of participation by 23.29% relative to a control group mean of 7.54% (p 
= 0.065) and column 2 reveals that this change in the casualty rate reduces an individual’s 
average SDP deposits by $1,983 relative to a control group mean of $613 (p = 0.060). On the 
intensive margin, column 3 reveals that a change in the unit casualty rate from 0 to 1 reduces 
                                                            
24 For the complete regression results for these outcomes, see Appendix 3.2 (Table 3.4.A). 
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an average SDP deposits by $10,395 relative to a control group mean of $8,128 but the 
difference is statistically insignificant (p = 0.176) and column 4 reveals that this change in the 
casualty rate delays the time until a first SDP deposit by 95 days relative to a control group 
mean of 66 days but the difference is statistically insignificant (p = 0.568). 
 
 
Table 3.4. OLS Estimates of the Effect of Stress on SDP Outcomes 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) 
Variable Coeff   (Std Err)  Coeff   (Std Err)  Coeff   (Std Err) Coeff   (Std Err) 
Outcome Probability of 
Participation 
 
SDP Deposit Total 
 SDP Deposit Total      
| Participation 
Time to first 
Deposit | 
Participation     
Mean in control 7.54 613 8,128 66 
Own unit casualty rate -23.29 * (12.61)  -1983.08 * (1054.36)   -10395.32    (7686.51) -94.93    (166.06) 
Number of 
Observations 288,772  288,772  21,261 21,261 
Number of Clusters 44,453  44,453  44,453 44,453 
Adjusted R2 0.2262  0.2331  0.2170 0.1633 
Source: Department of Defense Data. Notes: Variables are defined as in Tables 3.1-3.3. All regression 
specifications include individual characteristics, unit characteristics and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors 
are clustered at the unit-month level. ***, ** and * reflect statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
Interpreting the Magnitude of the Estimated Effects 
     Thus far the estimate magnitudes reported for the effects of casualties on SDP participation 
have been for a change in the unit casualty rate from 0% to 100%, an unlikely change and one 
that makes the effect sizes reported unrealistic. A more common measure in the social sciences 
literature is a standardized treatment variable, but that measure is also inappropriate in the 
current context given the highly unbalanced sample (n=260,113 observations have casualty 
values equal to 0 and n=28,659 observations have non-zero casualty levels). While there is no 
correct measure, I offer two potential interpretations of the magnitude of the effect of 
casualties on SDP participation based on the underlying natural experimental framework.  First, 
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if individuals are randomly assigned to units conditional on some controls, then the most 
reasonable interpretation for comparison is to compare the estimated differences in the 
probability of participation for a typical unit in the no casualty control group and a typical unit 
in the positive casualty treatment group. The mean casualty rate in the control group is 0% and 
the mean casualty rate in the treatment group is 1.57%. Using these means, the estimated 
difference in the probability of participation in the SDP for a typical individual in a no casualty 
unit compared to a typical individual in a unit that experiences casualties is 1.57% x -23.29% = -
0.366 percentage points on a control group mean of 7.54%.  The magnitude of this effect 
method is approximately 4.85%, a modest effect. 
     The second method for estimating the effect size uses the movement from the 25th 
percentile in the casualty distribution to the 75th percentile in the casualty distribution among 
those units experiencing casualties.  This difference is 2.272-0.617 =1.66. Using this level of 
casualty I estimate the magnitude of the effect as 1.66% x -23.29% = -0.386 percentage points 
on a control group mean of 7.54%. The magnitude of this effect method is approximately 
5.11%, a slightly larger but still modest effect. Nonetheless, to the extent that there are 
pervasive effects of combat casualties in a single month on a decision that can occur any time 
within a deployment lasting up to 19 months even controlling for a host of other environmental 
(country and season), job (occupation, experience level, type of unit) and personal (family 
characteristics, age, education) sources of daily stress, these results remain notable. 
     Having established suggestive evidence that there is a negative relationship between 
casualties and SDP participation I now turn to the principle threats to my identification strategy. 
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3.7 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
     The primary threats to my identification strategy are two-fold: failures of my assumption of 
randomization conditional on observables and confounding effects of other deployment 
characteristics. 
Randomization Tests 
     Identification of an unbiased estimate of the effects of casualties on savings decisions 
requires random assignment of individuals to the control or treatment group. The natural 
experiment used here relies on random assignment of individuals to units once I condition on 
an individual's military occupation specialty (job category), their experience (rank) and the year. 
An ideal random experiment would generate balance among all individual characteristics 
between those individuals deploying in units with no casualties (the control group) and those 
individuals deploying in units with casualties (the treatment groups), conditional on these 
observable factors. To test this assumption I complete a randomization test in two steps.  In 
Table  3.5 I present the randomization test results. In column 1 I validate the important 
individual characteristics that determine SDP participation outcomes by regressing SDP 
participation on the individual characteristics used in column 3 of Table 3.3.  These 
characteristics predict SDP participation and validate my control variables. In column 2 I regress 
my treatment variable on these same characteristics, controlling for the characteristics 
supporting the selection on observables assumption and additional time fixed effects and unit 
level controls.  The results of this test reveal five individual characteristics that are statistically 
related to my treatment variable, implying that this natural experiment is imperfect in its 
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implementation. The individual characteristics that fail the randomization test and are related 
to treatment at a statistically significant level are: female (p=0.000), previous SDP participant 
(p=0.000), monthly compensation (p=0.064), deployment length (p=0.004 for the linear term 
and p=0.001 for the quadratic) and college graduate (p=0.070).  
 
Table 3.5. Randomization Test Between Casualty Rates and Individual Characteristics 
Variable 
(1) (2) 
Coeff  (Std Err) Coeff  (Std Err)
Outcome Probability of 
Participation Own unit casualty rate   
Mean in control 7.54 0.00 
Age 0.203*** (0.068)   0.0001    (0.0001) 
Age2 -0.003*** (0.001)   -0.0000    (0.0000) 
Female 5.17*** (0.277)   -0.019***(0.004) 
Ever married 0.508*** (0.139)   -0.002     (0.004) 
Number of dependents -0.448*** (0.049)   -0.0017   (0.0012) 
Minority 1.41*** (0.118)   -0.003     (0.003) 
Less than high school education -0.135       (0.309)   -0.007     (0.008) 
Some college     -0.656*** (0.228)   0.006     (0.006) 
College graduate 2.54*** (0.313)   0.011*   (0.006) 
Greater than college education 2.88*** (0.992)   0.011    (0.014) 
Monthly compensation (hundred $) 0.069*** (0.007)   -0.0005*(0.0003) 
AFQT score 0.029*** (0.003)   -0.0000  (0.0001) 
Officer 3.70*** (0.860)   -0.025   (0.022) 
Warrant Officer 2.25*** (0.907)   -0.033   (0.021) 
Experience2 0.003       (0.004)   -0.0000  (0.0001) 
Deployment length 1.09*** (0.069)   -0.013***(0.002) 
Deployment length2 -0.001** (0.004)   -0.0009***(0.0003) 
Number of previous deployments -1.50*** (0.059)   0.001    (0.004) 
Previous SDP participant 41.4*** (0.722)   -0.020***(0.007) 
Number of Observations 288,772 288,772 
Number of Clusters 44,453 44,453 
Adjusted R2 0.2262 0.1215 
Source: Department of Defense Data. Notes: Variables are defined as in Tables 3.1-3.3. All regression 
specifications include individual characteristics, unit characteristics and time fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the unit-month level. ***, ** and * reflect statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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     While these randomization test failures reveal non-random assignment to the treatment 
group based on some individual characteristics, they do not reveal the resulting bias in my 
estimates.  To determine these effects I conduct a series of robustness checks on reduced 
samples using the SDP participation decision outcome to evaluate the effects of stress on the 
portions of the sample that meet the assumption of random assignment. In Table 3.6 I present 
the results of these robustness checks. The results from these robustness checks support the 
conclusion that there is a negative relationship between stress and SDP participation. Column 5 
in Table 3.4 provides the most stringent check by reducing the sample to those with none of the 
characteristics that were statistically related to treatment.  In this case, the reduced sample 
(n=36,164) omits females, individuals with previous deployments, college graduates, individuals 
with monthly compensation above the sample median ($3,759), and individuals with 
deployment length above the median (9 months). In this specification an increase in the unit 
casualty rate from 0 to 1 reduces the probability of SDP participation on average by 40.89 
percentage points relative to the reduced sample control group mean of 1.24% that is 
significant (p=0.000).  The relative magnitude of this effect is over ten times larger than in the 
full sample.  Overall, the robustness checks in Table 3.6 reveal that the randomization failures 
and imperfection of the natural experiment used in this study actually generate a downward 
bias in the magnitude of the estimated coefficients and increase the variation in the observed 
outcomes, reducing the level of statistical significance of the estimates of stress on individual 
savings decisions.  In this case the revised estimates are much larger for the reduced samples 
than for the full sample and the reduced sample mean SDP participation rates in the control 
group are much smaller.  This provides suggestive evidence that the randomization failures 
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inherent in this natural experiment do not threaten the validity of the identification of a 
negative effect of stress on savings and the primary estimates should be considered as a lower 
bound on the effects of stress on SDP participation. 
Table 3.6. OLS Estimates of the Effect of Stress on Probability of SDP Participation                 
in Reduced Samples (Robustness Checks) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) 
Variable Coeff   (Std Err)  Coeff   (Std Err)  Coeff   (Std Err) Coeff   (Std Err) 
Mean in control 7.54  5.83  4.50 1.24 
Own unit casualty rate -23.29 * (12.61) -54.12 *** (19.09) -62.68 *** (19.47) -40.89 *** (10.79) 
Reduced Sample Specifications 
Omits females No  Yes  Yes Yes 
Omits previous deployers No  Yes  Yes Yes 
Omits college graduates No  Yes  Yes Yes 
Mo. compensation ≤ median No  No  Yes Yes 
Deployment length ≤ median No  No  No Yes 
Number of Observations 288,772  113,482  82,245 36,164 
Number of Clusters 44,453  22,674  15,755 10,385 
Adjusted R2 0.2262  0.1379  0.0600 0.1050 
Source: Department of Defense Data.  
Notes: Variables are defined as in Tables 3.1-3.3. All regression specifications include individual characteristics, unit 
characteristics and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the unit-month level. ***, ** and * reflect 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
Confounding Effects of Activity Levels and Remote Locations 
     The second threat to identification involves important confounds associated with the natural 
experiment wherein casualty rates may be correlated with other conditions that individuals 
face that also reduce SDP participation. These threats could bias my results even if the 
assumption of random assignment holds.  The first potential confound is that the activity levels 
of individuals' units may correlate with the units' casualty rates. If individuals in units with 
casualties are also in units that are especially busy, then the failure to enroll in the SDP might 
reflect stress (from casualties) or a lack of time (from the busy schedule) or a combination of 
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the two.  While this confound cannot be completely dismissed, robustness checks suggest that 
there is a negative effect of casualties on SDP participation even controlling for the activity level 
experienced by individuals. First, the regression specifications used above incorporate fixed 
effects for each country in each month, capturing country wide trends and activity levels for the 
entire U.S. Army force in each country.  Second, I complete additional robustness checks 
incorporating several other controls for activity levels including election timing in each country, 
Islamic holidays in each year, a quadratic in the aggregate troop level in each country and a 
quadratic in aggregate U.S. fuel consumption (available only for Afghanistan beginning in Jan. 
2002). In Table 3.7 I present the results of these robustness checks. 
  These robustness checks reveal that the estimates of stress on savings are remarkably stable.  
This is not surprising as the original specification included fixed effects at the country×month 
level. The estimate for the effect of stress on SDP participation remains statistically significant 
for all specifications except the final specification in column 4. The reduced sample size for this 
specification (fuel consumption data was only available from the U.S. Central Command for 
Afghanistan) increases the standard error of the estimate and the estimate is statistically 
insignificant at conventional level (p=0.150). However, the coefficient remains stable and 
actually increases slightly (as does the mean SDP participation rate in the control group for this 
reduced sample). Taken together, these results suggest that while activity levels cannot be 
eliminated as a source of reduced SDP participation, there appears to be a separate and 
distinguishable negative effect generated by casualties.   
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Table 3.7. OLS Estimates of the Effect of Stress on Probability of SDP Participation          
with Additional Controls for Activity Levels (Robustness Checks) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) 
Variable Coeff  (Std Err)  Coeff  (Std Err)  Coeff  (Std Err) Coeff   (Std Err) 
Mean in control 7.54     7.54     7.54    7.74     
Own unit casualty rate -23.29 * (12.61)  -23.29 * (12.61)  -23.29 * -(12.61) -27.85   (19.33) 
Additional Controls for Activity Level 
Time fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Holidays, elections, surges No  Yes  Yes Yes 
Quadratic in U.S. troop level No  No  Yes Yes 
Quadratic in U.S. fuel consumption No  No  No Yes 
Number of Observations 288,772  288,772  288,772 159,127 
Number of Clusters 44,453  44,453  44,453 21,606 
Adjusted R2 0.2262  0.2262  0.2262 0.2252 
Source: Department of Defense Data.  
Notes: Variables are defined as in Tables 3.1-3.3. All regression specifications include individual characteristics, 
unit characteristics and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the unit-month level. ***, ** 
and * reflect statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
     Third, the stress from casualties does not appear to affect the average time until the first 
deposit for individuals as demonstrated in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. Instead, the effects from the 
stress of casualties appear to operate on the extensive margin, implying that individuals would 
have to be busy for their entire deployment, an unlikely scenario.  However, even with these 
controls and evidence, I cannot rule out the possibility that the unobserved unit activity levels 
could correlate with casualties and bias my findings upwards.  While this confound remains 
important, the distinction between how busy an individual is and their stress level is somewhat 
arbitrary.  In many contexts being busy is synonymous with experiencing stress. This critique 
might be better noted as a shortcoming of the definition of stress used in this study (casualties) 
than the general conclusion of the adverse effects of exogenous deployment conditions on 
individual financial decisions.  
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     The second potential confound to my identification is the possibility that unit casualties may 
correlate with unit location.  If individuals assigned to remote locations experience both high 
casualties and lower levels of access to SDP enrollment technologies (either in a military finance 
office or via the internet), then my findings might be upward biased. This is a serious concern 
and one that the current study does not afford much insight into. Unfortunately the 
Department of Defense casualty data and personnel data used here does not include 
information on an individual's assignment location within a country or the features of their 
assignment location (e.g., access to a finance office or the internet).  While casualties in Iraq 
and Afghanistan occur in both rural and urban settings, and at remote and accessible locations, 
there is little available information on the composition of casualties based on these divisions. 
This means that while the confound is potentially valid, there is no information from which to 
form a prior on the likelihood that casualty rates among U.S. Army units are higher in areas 
where opportunities to enroll in the SDP are limited. In addition, there is one finding from this 
study that suggests that the remoteness of an individual’s location is unlikely to be driving the 
results. While there are a number of remote bases, often called Combat Outposts (COPs), used 
by the U.S. Army in both Iraq and Afghanistan, individuals assigned to these locations typically 
rotate in and out of these locations from larger bases. If individuals at remote locations desire 
to enroll in the SDP but are unable do the lack of access of their primary location, then we 
would expect that they might enroll in the SDP when they move to larger bases, either 
temporarily or permanently. Such decisions would be visible in delayed enrollment times for 
those in units with high casualties.  Yet the results here suggest that there are no effects of 
casualties on the intensive margin, including the time until the first SDP deposit (See Table 3.4, 
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p=0.568). This provides some weak evidence that the results are not driven by the confounding 
effects of access to SDP enrollment opportunities.  
     The adverse effects of stress on financial decision-making estimated in this study appear to 
be statistically significant and robust to a number of confounds. However, these robustness 
checks are not decisive and I cannot rule out the possibility that there are unobserved 
characteristics of individuals’ deployment conditions that are correlated with both their unit’s 
casualty level and their SDP participation levels. The evidence presented here is suggestive but 
not conclusive. 
Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
     I also explore the heterogeneous treatment effects between casualties and several 
categories of individual characteristics: sex, marital status, human capital (college graduate and 
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score), and the deployment length. In Table 3.8 I 
present the results of these tests. I find no statistically significant differential gender effects of 
stress on SDP participation (p = 0.881), no differential effects by human capital levels as 
measured by AFQT score (p = 0.835) or among college graduates (p = 0.943), and no differential 
effects by deployment length (p = 0.564 for the linear term and p=0.866 for the quadratic 
term). I do find a statistically significant negative interaction between being married and the 
stress generated by casualties (p = 0.0027) that implies that a married individual exposed to 
casualties has a ((29.70x1.57)/7.54) = 6.18 percent lower probability of SDP participation than a 
non-married individual exposed to casualties. 
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Table 3.8. OLS Estimates of Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Coeff  (Std Err) Coeff  (Std Err) Coeff  (Std Err)
Mean in control 7.54 7.54 7.54  
Own unit casualty rate -23.29* (12.61) 79.37    (60.95) -6.74      (13.28)
Female 5.16*** (0.28) 5.15*** (0.28) 5.16*** (0.28)
Cas rate × Female  9.88      (66.2)   
Married 0.51*** (0.14) 0.56*** (0.14) 0.56*** (0.14)
Cas rate × Married -30.12** (13.60) -29.70** (13.39)
College graduate 2.55*** (0.31) 2.53*** (0.32) 2.54*** (0.31)
Cas rate × College graduate 2.60       (36.50)   
AFQT 0.03*** (0.003) 0.03*** (0.003) 0.03*** (0.003)
Cas rate × AFQT -0.09       (0.41)    
Deployment length 1.10*** (0.07) 1.10*** (0.07) 1.10*** (0.07)
Cas rate × Deployment Length -8.14     (14.12)   
Deployment length2 -0.01*** (0.004) -0.01*** (0.004) -0.01** (0.004) 
Cas rate × Deployment length2   -0.14      (0.81)   
Number of Observations 288,772 288,772 288,772
Number of Clusters 44,453 44,453 44,453
Adjusted R2 0.2262 0.2263 0.2262 
Source: Department of Defense Data. Notes: Variables are defined as in Tables 3.1-3.3. All regression 
specifications include individual characteristics, unit characteristics and time fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the unit-month level. ***, ** and * reflect statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Column 1 reports the coefficients from the main specification from the baseline 
model from Table 3. Column 2 reports the coefficients, standard errors and statistical significance for all 
of the individual characteristics and interaction variables between the casualty rate and these variables. 
A joint F test of the significance of the individually insignificant interaction terms supports removing 
these terms from the model (F=0.01, p=0.913). Column 3 reports the revised model that includes all 
original individual characteristics, unit characteristics and time fixed effects and the statistically 
significant interaction terms. 
 
In the final specification (column 3) the main effect estimate of casualties on SDP participation 
is -6.74 percentage points and the interaction estimate between casualties and being married is 
-29.70 percentage points and these estimates are jointly significant (F = 5.94, p =0.015). This 
suggests that the reduced SDP participation generated by exposure to casualties in this sample 
is largely driven by the effect of casualties on married individuals. I note that this result is 
counter to my prior expectation. I expected that while married individuals might have negative 
main effect estimates due to competing financial needs, the prevalent use of powers of 
attorney by married soldiers would allow their spouses to enroll them in the SDP.  Nonetheless, 
149 
 
it appears that married individuals may acutely experience the effects of casualties in their 
units. 
     Overall, the results of this study provide suggestive evidence that there is a modest negative 
relationship between casualties and financial decision-making.  This relationship appears to 
operate exclusively on the extensive margin, implying that stress inhibits individuals from 
enrolling in the SDP.  While the natural experimental variation employed here is imperfect, the 
negative relationship holds and is strengthened when the sample is confined to those 
individuals for whom random assignment is valid.  This relationship is robust to concerns over 
the confounding effects of unit activity levels, implying that while being busy might also reduce 
the probability of SDP participation, there is a separate and statistically distinguishable negative 
effect generated by casualties in an individual's own unit. In addition, while there is no evidence 
that casualty rates correlate with low levels of access to SDP enrollment, this is an important 
potential confound that the present study cannot rule out. Finally, the stress generated by 
exposure to casualties appears to affect married individuals more than their non-married 
counterparts. 
 
3.8. SUMMARY 
     This study provides suggestive evidence that stress may reduce savings and adversely affect 
financial decision-making.  Since typical economic models of decision-making ignore such 
factors they may benefit from incorporation of such psychological influences and research into 
financial decisions may be subject to traditional omitted variables biases. In this study exposure 
150 
 
to casualties in a U.S. Army soldier's unit during the month of deployment reduces their 
probability of participating in the Savings Deposit Program approximately 5%. 
     While the sample considered here is not representative of the U.S. population it is 
representative of the Armed Forces and should inform defense policy planners of the role of 
deployment conditions on service members.  Moreover, to the extent that the members of this 
sample are self-selected members of an All-Volunteer Force (AVF), their own decisions, 
preparations, training and attitudes suggest that stress may influence decision-making even 
among motivated and resilient groups.  More broadly this suggests that vocational stressors 
play a role in individual's financial choices, especially those choices related to their occupation 
(e.g., their 401(k), medical benefits, insurance decisions, etc...) and while the population may be 
unique, the general sign of the results seems generalizable. 
     The nature of the stressor in this research, combat casualties, is also unique and somewhat 
atypical for society as a whole.  To be clear, military service, especially in armed conflict is 
uniquely stressful and the treatment effects estimated here do not provide easily translatable 
measures for other jobs or stress treatments. Many U.S. military members undergo extreme 
stress and trauma as part of their service and there is a substantial literature on the effects of 
extreme stress and the consequences of PTSD.  But the military doesn’t enjoy a monopoly on 
extremely stressful events.  In fact, as Reid (1990) notes, up to 8% of the U.S. population 
experiences a traumatic event in a given year, when the definition of trauma includes robbery, 
sexual assault, serious motor vehicle accidents, bereavement and natural disasters. This 
proportion increases to 10% if trauma includes family violence and divorces with significant 
financial impacts. Thus traumatic events, while not commonplace in U.S. society, are not rare 
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events either. As a result, the general result of negative effects of stress on savings and 
deliberative financial decision-making should apply to individuals outside the military as well, 
with implications for stress in other jobs and the role of other life stressors (job loss, divorce, 
etc...) on financial decision-making. 
     While this research design provides early estimates for the effects of stress on savings 
decisions, the psychological mechanism(s) through which stress may operate are not identified 
here.  The research at hand provides reduced form estimates and cannot establish whether the 
stress is changing risk or time preferences, undermining willpower, degrading cognitive 
capabilities or otherwise influencing individual decisions. Even so, the large scale field evidence 
provided here should motivate additional research into the particular effects of stress on 
financial decisions. 
     Finally, this study has some straightforward policy implications. First the research suggests 
that policy design should be sensitive to the level of stress that an individual is facing. Choice 
architectures and information provision should reflect the potential levels of stress that 
individuals making choices will face, including choices as varied as life insurance payouts and 
retirement decisions.  Second, in the context of this particular policy, to the extent that the SDP 
was established as a benefit to military members performing combat service, increasing 
participation in the SDP is a natural objective.  Reform of the SDP enrollment rules, legal or 
administrative, to provide for pre-deployment enrollment would likely boost SDP participation 
since service members could make their decisions without the daily stresses of combat 
inhibiting their decision-making.  Since pre-deployment training and preparation for all services 
already includes a host of decisions and validations with respect to medical (checkups), 
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administrative (emergency data notification), legal (wills and powers of attorney), financial 
services (payroll deductions) and health care (health and life insurance), adding SDP enrollment 
seems straightforward and advisable. If legal requirements mandate enrollment after combat 
deployment, individuals could sign delayed enrollment contracts during pre-deployment 
processing.  Current choice architecture for U.S. Army soldiers does not appear to optimally 
promote SDP enrollment. 
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Appendix 3.1 
Summary of Data and Dataset Procedures 
     This project combines data from several sources.  Military administrative data, operational 
data and casualty data was provided by the Office of Economic & Manpower Analysis (OEMA) 
at the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York. Given the sensitive nature of the 
data I have signed a non-disclosure agreement with OEMA that restricts my right to publish this 
work without their prior review and approval.  Savings Deposit Program (SDP) participation 
data was provided by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) to OEMA to merge 
with the military administrative data.  Personally identifying information was removed from all 
data before I received it. 
     The sample for this study is U.S. Army soldiers who deployed to Afghanistan or Iraq from 
October 2001 through Dec 2010 for a period of 1-19 months.  The population is further 
restricted to individuals serving in deployed units of 10 members of larger and those individuals 
not missing data on their age, number of dependents, gender, race and military experience. For 
individual missing data on their experience, education level and Armed Forces Qualification 
Test (AFQT) score, I assigned the individuals a value of zero and created indicator variables to 
record those missing data for each variable. These indicators were included in all regressions.  I 
also omitted all individuals for whom I could not confirm a deployment location of Iraq or 
Afghanistan, based on individual assignment data and/or unit data. This includes omitting those 
missing country data and those assigned to Kuwait.  To prevent the unnecessary influence of 
outliers, I winsorized total casualty rates, hostile fire death rates, SDP balances, monthly 
compensation and military experience variables at the 99th percentiles. I winsorized hostile fire 
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injury data at the 95th percentile. For individuals with incomplete deployments as of December 
2010, I imputed the SDP deposit total based on the median rate of return and current deposits. 
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Appendix 3.2 
Additional Regression Results 
Table 3.4.A. Full OLS Estimates of the Effect of Stress on SDP Outcomes 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Coeff   (Std Err)  Coeff   (Std Err) Coeff   (Std Err) Coeff   (Std Err) 
Outcome Probability of 
Participation 
 
SDP Deposit Total SDP Deposit Total | Participation 
Time to first Deposit 
| Participation    
Mean in control 7.54      613     8,128     66     
Own unit casualty rate -23.29 * (12.61)  -1983.08 * (1054.36) -10395       (7686) -94.93 (166.06)
Age 0.20 *** (0.07)  14.18 ** (6.22) 3.06    (37.79) -0.94    (0.93) 
Age2 0.00 *** (0.00)  -0.27 *** (0.11) -0.16    (0.56) 0.01    (0.02) 
Female 5.16 *** (0.28)  414.21 *** (24.42) -45.46    (101.03) 2.06    (1.77) 
Married 0.51 *** (0.14)  74.14 *** (12.34) 407.94 *** (88.84) -0.85    (1.67) 
Number of dependents -0.45 *** (0.05)  -65.54 *** (4.34) -390.17 *** (35.49) 1.51 ** (0.70) 
Minority 1.41 *** (0.12)  95.72 *** (10.25) -66.92    (81.79) 2.28    (1.46) 
Education ≤ HS -0.14    (0.31)  -8.04    (26.57) -275.08    (420.89) -5.20    (6.05) 
Some college 0.66 *** (0.23)  41.43 ** (19.55) -32.77    (175.12) -6.46 ** (2.75) 
College graduate 2.55 *** (0.31)  250.36 *** (28.21) 232.53    (162.23) -4.91    (3.07) 
Education ≥ College 2.88 *** (0.99)  270.74 *** (93.35) 428.81    (352.18) -15.09 *** (5.57) 
AFQT 0.03 *** (0.00)  2.76 *** (0.25) 13.85 *** (2.69) 0.02    (0.05) 
Monthly compensation 
(hundreds $) 0.07 *** (0.01)  8.71 *** (0.70) 30.31 *** (3.97) -0.13 * (0.07) 
Officer 3.69 *** (0.86)  368.42 *** (76.75) 747.67    (514.41) -3.46    (8.20) 
Warrant Officer 2.25 ** (0.91)  243.23 *** (79.15) 758.32    (618.43) -1.28    (9.95) 
Experience2 0.003    (0.004)  0.130    (0.428) 1.320    (1.761) 0.096    (0.091) 
Deployment length 1.10 *** (0.07)  74.93 *** (6.26) 738.25 *** (75.46) -7.65 *** (2.03) 
Deployment length2 -0.01 ** (0.00)  0.61    (0.40) -20.23 *** (3.50) 0.50 *** (0.09) 
Previous deployments -1.50 *** (0.06)  -122.20 *** (5.23) -45.20    (55.64) 7.61 *** (1.35) 
Previous SDP participant 41.43 *** (0.72)  3467.88 *** (65.27) 349.75 *** (93.14) -20.58 *** (2.03) 
Number of Observations 288,772  288,772 21,261 21,261 
Number of Clusters 44,453  44,453 44,453 44,453 
Adjusted R2 0.2262  0.2331 0.2170 0.1633 
Source: Department of Defense Data. Notes: Variables are defined as in Tables 1-3. All regression specifications include 
individual characteristics, unit characteristics and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the unit-
month level. ***, ** and * reflect statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
 
 
